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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis has been to analyse which similarities exist in combatants’ control over food supply 
lines to non-combatants in African civil conflict and evaluate whether these similarities are sufficient to 
permit generalisations about the use of food as a weapon in African civil conflict. The nature of this study 
is both descriptive and explanatory. The case studies of Darfur and Somalia form the descriptive part of 
this study. This thesis is also explanatory in that it aims to make a first attempt at theory building where 
such theory did not exist before. I try to explain if, how and why combatants intentionally use food as a 
means of power in civil conflict. Is the control over food a deliberate and rational choice by combatants or 
are situations of food scarcity and even hunger or famines simply a consequence of war?  
 The case studies of Darfur and Somalia provide many similarities concerning the impact of conflict 
on livelihoods and food security. Famine is more an issue of limited access rather than availability. The use 
of food as a weapon displays a number of important similarities. Attacks on food security can be divided 
into acts of omission, commission and provision. In Darfur, combatants exercise a greater level of control 
over food supply lines than in Somalia. Finally, I argue that famine in African civil conflict is highly 
functional and has a distinct political-economic character. The creation of famine is often deliberate, with a 
hidden political agenda.  
 In both Darfur and Somalia, attacks on food security serve a political, economic and military 
rationale. The political logic of attacks on food security was most important in Darfur, although here the 
signs of a sustainable war economy become apparent. In contrast, in Somalia, food production and 
procurement are attacked without the intent to destroy the livelihoods of specific societal groups, with the 
exception of the politically and economically marginalised groups in the south-central part of the country. 
The political logic is very superficial in Somalia. The level of deliberateness and organisation of attacks on 
food security, and hence the importance of the political logic, seem to tie in with the level of organisation 
of the central government, as well as with the presence or absence of a powerful ideology that clearly 
divides certain sections of the population from others.  
 I recommend that further research be undertaken to analyse if theory on resources and conflict 
applies to attacks on food. Furthermore, additional research is needed on how to mitigate the negative 
effects of Food Aid. Finally, it is valuable to investigate to what extent effective government control and/or 
the presence of a binding ideology affect the importance of the political logic behind the attacks on food 
security. To this point, this research should be extended to include more case studies, with a specific focus 
on the factors of governmental control, ideology and political logic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
Opsomming 
 
Die doel van hierdie tesis was om die ooreenkomste oor die beheer wat gewapendes oor die 
voedselvoorsieningslyne vir ongewapendes in Afrika se siviele konflikte te ondersoek, en om te evalueer 
of hierdie ooreenkomste genoegsaam is om veralgemenings te maak oor die gebruik van voedsel as ‘n 
wapen in hierdie konflik. Die omvang van hierdie studie is beide beskrywend en verduidelikend. Die 
gevallestudies van Darfur en Somalia vorm die beskrywende deel van hierdie studie. Hierdie thesis is ook 
verduidelikend in die sin dat dit poog om ‘n eerste probeerslag te skep vir die bou van teorie waar dit 
voorheen nog nie bestaan het nie. Hierdie studie poog om te verduidelik as, hoe en wanneer gewapendes 
voedselvoorrade intentioneel gebruik as ‘n bron van mag in siviele konflikte. Is die beheer oor voedsel 
deurdagte en rationele keuse deur gewapendes, of is situasies van voedseltekorte of selfs hongersnood 
eenvoudig ‘n gevolg van oorlogvoering? 
 Die gevallestudies van Darfur en Somalia bied vele ooreenkomste rakende die impak van konflik 
op oorlewingsmeganismes en voedselsekuriteit. Hongersnood is meer ‘n geval van beperkte toegang, 
eerder as beskikbaarheid. Gebruik van voedsel as wapen het ‘n aantal belangrike ooreenkomste opgelewer. 
Aanvalle op voedselsekuriteit kan opgedeel word in dade van weerhoud, kommissie en provisie. In Darfur 
het gewapendes ‘n groter vlak van beheer oor die lyne van voedselverskaffing as in Somalia. Uiteindelik is 
dit die argument van hierdie tesis dat hongersnood in siviele konflik in Afrika grootliks funksioneel is en 
duidelike polities/ekonomies van aard is. Hierdie oorsaak van hongersnood is telkemale opsetlik met ‘n 
gepaardgaande verskuilde politiese agenda. 
 In beide Darfur en Somalia het aanvalle op voedselsekuriteit ‘n politiese, ekonomiese en militêre 
rationale. Die politieke aard van aanvalle op voedselsekuriteit was besonder opmerksaam in Darfur, 
alhoewel tekens van ‘n onderhoudbare oorlogsekonomie duidelik begin word het. In teenstelling is 
voedselproduksie en versekering in Somalia onder aanval sonder die bedoeling om die lewenswyse van 
sekere sosiale groepe te vernietig of van stryk te bring, met die uitsondering van die politiese en ekonomies 
gemarginaliseerde groepe in die suid-centrale deel van die land. Die politieke logika is baie oppervlakkig 
in die geval van Somalia. Die vlak van beplanning rakende aanvalle op voedselsekuriteit, en 
gepaardgaande die belang van die politieke redenasies, blyk samehorig te wees met die vlak van 
organisasie van die sentrale regering, asook die teenwoordigheid of afwesigheid van ‘n sterk ideologie wat 
sekere dele van die populasie duidelik onderskei van andere.   
 Ek beveel aan dat verdere navorsing onderneem word om te analiseer of gepaste teorie op 
hulpmiddele en konflik relevant geag kan word in verband met voedselaanvalle. Verder word addisionele 
navorsing benodig ingevolge die beperking en kontrolering van die newe effekte van Food Aid. Uiteindelik 
is dit van pas en belangrik om die omvang van effektiewe regeringsbeheer en/of die teenwoordigheid van 
‘n oorkoepelende en bindende ideologie aangaande die effek daarvan op die politieke beredenerings agter 
die aanvalle op voedselsekuriteit te bestudeer. In hierdie opsig behoort hierdie navorsing uitgebrei te word 
om meer gevallestudies in te sluit met ‘n spesifieke fokus op die individuele faktore van regeringsbeheer, 
ideologie en politieke redenasie. 
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Food and Civil Conflict in Africa: An Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and rationale 
 
Much has been written about food scarcity and hunger as an effect of conflict. Especially on the African 
continent, where in some regions food production systems are under extreme pressures to supply the ever 
increasing population, conflict can have devastating effects, destabilizing these production systems not 
only directly but also leaving a legacy for generations to come. 
To a lesser extent, there also exists a body of literature dealing with food production as a cause of 
war. Messer and Cohen (2006) for example identify export cropping as a possible cause of conflict, 
especially when export prices for these commodities are prone to fluctuations and can therefore destabilize 
households and the national income in general (Messer and Cohen 2006: ii). Collier and Hoeffler (2004: 
588) also found that the availability of primary commodity exports substantially increases the risk of 
conflict. Just like in resource wars where the control over a natural resource such as diamonds is at stake, 
the revenues from export crops like cotton and coffee can be used by combatants to finance hostilities. This 
is however in many cases subject to the willingness of the importing parties to assist in the exporting 
process, since many conflict areas lack the geographical position or infrastructural means to transport the 
export commodity out of the conflict area. 
Nevertheless, we find an increasing number of examples on the African continent where not the 
control of resources for export purposes but rather for domestic use is at stake. As Homer-Dixon (1994: 5) 
already noted in 1994, with the sharp increase in population numbers the pressure on the world’s food 
production systems will become ever greater. This leads me to believe that it is highly likely that in the 
near future not only the control over export crops but also over regular food sources for domestic use, 
especially in vulnerable production systems, such as those found in Africa, will become of increasing 
value.  
It is important to note here, however, that the rationale behind the control of these food resources is 
rather different than the one leading combatants to seek control over export crops or minerals. They do not 
try to control food supplies in order to finance their own operations but rather as a means of power over the 
populations they seek to control.1 These food supplies can be divided into four categories. First, the local 
population could rely on their own food produce, second we find food purchased at local markets, third, 
and sadly the case in many African countries, the local population can or will have to rely on Food Aid 
distributed by donors such as the World Food Programme (WFP) and finally the population can be fed by 
what is imported from other countries, either distributed by the government or traded at the local markets. 
Since the third food supply stream is provided by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), these 
non-state actors are increasingly drawn into the conflict, having to create alliances with military partners to 
protect their own safety and ensure the delivery of their food supplies to civilians. On many occasions in 
recent years insurgents have seized food deliveries from NGOs in order to be able to distribute (or refrain 
from distributing) this food themselves to civilians. Food donations specifically have therefore increasingly 
                                                 
1
 The notion of a ‘means of power’ is further explained under the heading “Conceptualisations”. 
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acquired a strategic value and the time when food donors could simply do their work and try to bring as 
much relief as possible to civilians in conflict situations seems to have passed. Ultimately, therefore this 
thesis also deals indirectly with the question what the role of NGOs is in aiding or prolonging conflict and 
will try to identify conditions under which these NGOs can diminish the negative side effects of their 
participation.  
Especially considering the frequency of civil conflict on the African continent, combined with the 
vulnerable food supply system and the high population pressure on this system, the strategic use of food 
supply lines to non-combatants as a means of power seems a rational choice for combatants, especially 
those deprived of other ways to raise resources. It is important to give this topic the attention it deserves in 
order to gain insight into how food supply to non-combatants is being used as a means of power in civil 
conflict. Furthermore, with this research I aim to demonstrate the centrality of food in African civil conflict 
and the urgency to address issues of food security in order to create durable peace. 
This chapter is structured as follows: Immediately below are the problem statement and the 
guiding research question. Thereafter, the hypothesis following from this research question is formulated, 
followed by some notes on the scope of the study. Subsequently, the research design and methodology of 
the study are presented.  Next, the limitations and delimitations of the study are discussed. Central terms in 
the study are then conceptualised. This chapter will round off with the structure of the thesis in the form of 
a discussion of the following chapters. 
 
1.2 Literature Review  
 
The strategic control of the different food supply lines to the civilian population during civil conflict is a 
topic that has seen surprisingly little research. The short literature review that follows is merely aimed at 
providing the proof to the aforementioned claim. After an extensive search for literature, I make mention 
here only of the most important works in the fields that most closely resemble the topic of this research. An 
extensive literature review will follow in the second chapter of this study. In the subsequent literature 
review I will demonstrate that the existing literature in this field is not sufficient to answer the questions 
put forward in this research project. 
On the one hand, we find a body of literature that deals with the correlation between conflict and 
hunger. However, the relationship between cause and effect in this literature is insufficient to explain the 
question at hand. For example, Macrae and Zwi, in their book War & Hunger: Rethinking the International 
Responses to Complex Emergencies, focus on the question in which ways warfare creates hunger. They 
offer some useful insights into the creation of hunger as a result of war. Furthermore, the authors mention 
the fact that when it comes to hunger there are both victims and beneficiaries (1994:10). Concerning the 
deliberate attempt to create hunger, Macrae and Zwi identify acts of omission, commission and provision 
(1994:10-20). However, their study is not an attempt to provide the theoretical explanation of these acts. 
The authors have not set as a goal to understand why combatants use these techniques but merely note that 
hunger is created amongst others due to the deliberate efforts by governments to subdue the civilian 
population by supplying or not supplying them with food. Macrae and Zwi’s study is definitely useful as a 
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point of reference for this research project but does not provide a full-blown attempt at theorising this 
issue.  
Another study that can be placed in this category is the volume of essays published by the French 
NGO Action against Hunger with the title The Geopolitics of Hunger, 2000-2001: Hunger and Power. The 
first part of this study provides a number of essays dealing with the topic of hunger as a weapon, out of 
which five concern African cases. However, all essays are written by different authors and predominantly 
descriptive in nature. No attempt at theorising is undertaken. Nevertheless, these case studies can serve as a 
valuable contribution to the case study research conducted in this thesis. 
Besides these works, which come closest to the topic of this research, another body of literature 
can be found that concerns the politics of Food Aid and the question whether this aid is truly beneficial or 
in fact prolongs conflicts. Barrett and Maxwell (2006) provide a critical examination of the effectiveness of 
food aid in their book Food Aid after Fifty Years: Recasting its role (2005). In Famine Crimes: Politics & 
The Disaster Relief Industry in Africa (2002), Alex de Waal argues that the persistence of famine reflects 
political failings by African governments as well as western donors and NGOs. Famines are thus man-
made. De Waal seeks to find out who is responsible for such famines and what the role of the Food Aid 
industry is in this respect. According to the author, such NGOs often do more harm than good. De Waal’s 
focus is much more concerned with the international level, than the state and regional level I would like to 
analyse in my proposed research. The “disaster relief industry” as de Waal calls it, is only one part of the 
whole, and my study chooses to focus on the broader picture. Such a partial analysis is also provided in D. 
John Shaw’s The UN World Food Programme and the Development of Food Aid (2001).  
Now that I have demonstrated why the existing literature on the relationship between conflict and 
hunger is not sufficient to provide us with theoretical insights into the control of food supply lines by 
combatants in civil conflict, it is important to clarify why also the existing and more abundant literature on 
conflict and natural resources does not suffice. Essentially, I assume there is a fundamental difference 
between the purpose of the control over natural resources as opposed to the control over food supply lines. 
Where the first serves an external goal, the latter is of an internal nature. 
The field of research that deals with resources and conflict is substantially larger than that of 
hunger and conflict (Ron, 2005; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002 and 2004; Duyvestein, 2000; Lujala, Petter and 
Gilmore, 2005; Fearon, 2005; Le Billon, 2004). In 2005 The Journal of Conflict Resolution dedicated a 
complete issue to the topic of resource wars, in which Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, who have led efforts 
to establish a correlation between resources and the incidence of civil conflict, were called upon to respond 
to the ever increasing critique on their findings (2005: 49 (4)).  
Jeffrey Herbst can be considered as one of the leading scholars on the issue of resources and 
conflict. In his article “Economic Incentives, Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa” (2000), Herbst 
argues that resources play an important part in the funding of a rebellion, yet are not automatically its cause 
(2000: 276). This more or less goes against the claim made by Collier and Hoeffler that a correlation can 
be found between a country’s propensity to experience civil war and its dependence on the export of 
primary commodities (Ron, 2005: 443; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002 and 2004). Notwithstanding the value of 
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Herbst’s work for the field, his analysis focuses solely on exportable and lootable resources. These 
resources can include food, but only to the extent that it is suited for export in a profitable manner. Such 
crops include coffee, cocoa and cotton. Food production that is destined for the local population in a 
conflict zone can hardly be said to be profitable when exported. The profit margins of such commodities 
are too low to make export profitable, especially when the increased cost of transport through a conflict 
zone has to be taken into account. Furthermore, the protectionist policies of countries in the North, such as 
the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy, prevent the import of many crops produced in the 
South. Therefore, the control over food supply lines within and into the conflict zone is exercised by 
combatants in order to subdue the local population by the omission and commission of food and possibly 
win the “hearts and minds” by selective provision (Macrae and Zwi, 1994: 11-19).  
I do not argue here that an economic rationale behind the use of food as a tactical weapon does not 
exist at all. However, in this economic rationale food supply to the own troops is central. It does therefore 
not constitute the economic foundation under the war efforts. This is an essential difference that in my 
opinion makes the use of food, excluding export commodities, as a weapon substantially different from 
other resources such as minerals and it is thus not appropriate to employ existing frameworks that analyse 
natural resources to food.  
 
1.3 Problem statement and research question 
 
The problem in this study is whether the control over food supply lines to non-combatants by combatants 
in civil conflict as a means of power displays a common pattern that holds in both cases under research.2 Is 
the control over food a deliberate and rational choice by combatants or are situations of food scarcity and 
even hunger or famines simply a consequence of war. In other words, is hunger in the conflict situations 
studied ‘man-made’ or is it an unwanted outcome by all sides in the conflict. 
 To operationalise this problem for further research, my questions will be as follows: What 
similarities exist in combatants’ control over food supply lines to non-combatants in civil conflicts in 
Darfur and Somalia? Are the similarities sufficient to permit generalisations about this issue? 
 
1.4 Hypothesis  
 
My hypotheses are fairly simple and basically twofold. First, I expect to find that there is in fact a pattern 
in the way in which combatants use the control over food supply lines to non-combatants during civil 
conflict as a means of power. This pattern will be visible in both cases and will be strong enough to allow 
me to make general statements. 
 Second, I expect that the use of food supply lines might bear some resemblance to the way in 
which combatants use the control of other natural resources to aid their conflict operations. Yet, the tactic 
differs essentially in the purpose it serves. I expect this purpose to be first and foremost the control over the 
non-combatant population to either exercise control over it by the omission of food or to win support by 
(selective) provision and only thereafter to aid in the quest for revenue. 
                                                 
2
 Explained in further detail under “Scope of study”. 
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 Following from these hypotheses, this study aims to investigate how combatants behave with 
respect to the food supply lines in their conflict area. Ultimately and if possible, I hope to find substantive 
evidence from the two cases studied in this thesis to come to some general statements as to the mechanisms 
behind the use of food supply lines for strategic purposes.  
 
1.5 Scope of study  
 
Although many more cases could be found all over the world where the control over food supply lines to 
non-combatants has been or is being used as a means of power, analysing all these cases would go beyond 
the scope of this project. Therefore, I have chosen to limit my research to the African continent and have 
selected two cases on this continent that will be the topic of this research. These two cases are Darfur and 
Somalia. In order to have the greatest chance of finding a common pattern, it is essential that the two cases 
at hand are as homogeneous as possible (George and Bennett 2004: 67-72).  
In this research the choice for these cases can be justified by the fact that in both, food has been 
used as a means of power and that both cases of violent civil conflict are still ongoing. Zimbabwe is 
another case where the supply of food to non-combatants has been used as a means of power, yet this case 
differs from the other cases in that there is no armed civil conflict ongoing in this country. 
 
1.6 Research design 
 
Due to this study’s focus on different cases of conflict that are still ongoing, this research will be 
comparative in nature. The work of George and Bennett (2004) and that of Eisenhardt (1989) dealing with 
case study research and theory building from this research, has been drawn upon in designing this research. 
The comparative nature of this research is reflected in the two cases that I have selected and that I will 
analyse according to a uniform set of questions. The answers to these questions for the specific cases will 
thereafter be compared and contrasted in order to draw conclusions from the data.  
Although quantitative data will play a role in this study, the emphasis rests on the use of qualitative 
data. This method will therefore rely on a degree of interpretative social science (Neuman 2003: 139). 
Furthermore, the study will be of an inductive quality. Since no real theory exists in this field, and at this 
point in time it cannot be assumed that food as a means of power will react in the same way as other 
resources, such as minerals, theories such as those formulated by Herbst (2000) cannot be automatically 
applied to this issue. 
 
1.7 Methodology 
 
The nature of this study will be both descriptive and explanatory. The descriptive part will be formed by 
the case studies. Here I will describe whether and how the warring parties in the two conflicts at hand try to 
control the food supply lines to non-combatants. The explanatory part will be formed mainly by the 
sections in each case study dealing with theoretical implications, as well as the concluding chapter. I will 
assemble the most important findings and will try to explain if, how and why food is intentionally used by 
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combatants as a means of power. Here I will test the hypothesis that there actually exists a general pattern 
with regard to the use of food as power.  
 I have mostly utilised secondary sources to test my hypotheses in the case studies. These sources 
include books, journal articles, papers, research reports and websites. Furthermore, I have conducted 
structured interviews with experts that work in this field and have experience with both conflict areas 
under research, such as those affiliated with the WFP.3 
 As mentioned above, in designing the case study research, I have made use of the works of both 
Eisenhardt (1989) and George and Bennett (2004). My methodology has been mainly based on George and 
Bennett’s “Method of Structured, Focused Comparison” as found in their book Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences (2004:67-72). According to this method, in order to overcome the 
previous flaws of case study research, the cases in a good comparative case study should be clearly 
identified in order to make sure that they are all instances of only one phenomenon. Second, these cases 
should not be chosen simply because they are interesting but rather because they can provide insight into a 
well-defined research objective, accompanied by a thorough research strategy. Finally, the cases should 
“employ variables of theoretical interest for purposes of explanation” (George and Bennett 2004: 69). 
What makes the above mentioned method of structured, focused comparison different from previous 
comparative research is George and Bennett’s insistence on the use of a “set of standardized, general 
questions” which will be asked of each case (2004: 69-72). It is important that these questions are general, 
not overly specific, in order to apply to each case. This, however, does not mean to say that the researcher 
should not address more specific issues in every case (2004:86). 
 In line with this research design I have compiled a list of thirteen questions that I will ask of both 
cases and that will structure my research. These questions are the following: 
 
1. What is the nature of the civil conflict? 
2. To what extent are non-combatants made part of this conflict? 
3. Who has the control over the food supply lines to non-combatants? 
4. How was the food supply to non-combatants organised before the onset of the conflict? 
5. Has this supply system changed as a result of the conflict and if yes, in what way? 
6. To what extent is the non-combatant population dependent on Food Aid? 
7. Has this dependence changed as a result of the ongoing conflict? 
8. Is the deliverance of Food Aid obstructed by the combatants?  
9. In which way are the combatants funding themselves? 
10. Which sources do the combatants use to feed themselves? 
11. What tactics do the combatants employ to exercise control over the local population? 
12. To what extent does the control over food supply lines to non-combatants form part of this? 
13. Do the combatants utilise the control over food supply lines to influence the behaviour of the 
civilian population to get the outcomes the combatants want? 
                                                 
3
 To conduct these interviews, the interviewees will be supplied with an adapted version of the list of questions 
provided on the next page. 
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These questions are basically a reformulation of the main research question split up into its component 
parts. The first two questions identify the type and severity of the conflict. Question three to seven deal 
with the nature of food supply to non-combatants before and during the conflict. Question eight to twelve 
deal with the question whether combatants influence these food supply lines and if yes, to what purpose 
this is done. Finally, question thirteen deals essentially with power as defined by Joseph Nye (2004:2).4 
This question serves to assess whether the combatants can effectively use their control over food supply 
lines to non-combatants as a means of power. By asking these questions of each case, I will be able to 
collect the data necessary to answer the research questions formulated above. Nevertheless, they are 
general enough to allow case specific information to be included in the analysis, so as not to forge an 
artificial correlation based on too far stretching generalisations. 
 
1.8 Limitations and delimitations 
 
This study will be delimited in its historical span in the sense that although an historical overview of the 
topic will be provided, the analysis focuses on current cases. Furthermore, it is geographically delimited in 
its focus on African examples. 
 The study also has a number of limitations, the most significant being the fact that there is no 
single theory that can be tested. In fact the study aims at creating the initial attempt at theorisation of this 
topic. It will therefore be less straightforward than other projects in accepting or discarding a hypothesis 
and it will be more difficult to identify which data have to be included and which have to be left out of the 
analysis. However, I feel this risk is worth undertaking in order to come to new insights into a topic that 
previously has seen little research. 
 Furthermore, the choice for only two case studies also forms a limitation. Ideally, this research 
project should be extended to a greater number of cases. However, the choice for a thorough and in-depth 
analysis of each case in the light of the length and scope of this project does not permit a greater number 
than two cases. 
 
1.9 Conceptualisations 
 
1.9.1 Food supply 
 
The notion of food supply can be divided into four categories. Firstly, the local population could rely on 
their own food produce, secondly we find food purchased at local markets, thirdly, and sadly the case in 
many African countries, the local population can or will have to rely on food distributed by donors such as 
the WFP and finally the population can be fed by what is imported from other countries. 
 
 
1.9.2 Means of power 
 
                                                 
4
 See “Conceptualisations”. 
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It is important here not to define power too narrowly. To use such a definition, which only focuses on 
traditional means of hard power, would defeat the purpose of this research. Therefore, I use Joseph Nye’s 
definition of power as “the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants” 
(Nye 2004: 2). Nye argues that it is important to note that power does not only come about through 
coercion but also through co-optation. I would propose to define a means of power therefore as anything 
that will influence the behaviour of others so as to get the outcomes one wants. In line with this reasoning, 
the control over food can be a means of power. 
 
1.9.3 Civil conflict 
 
With civil conflict I denote here any form of conflict that is being fought out primarily within the territorial 
borders of a single state primarily by actors from that state. It is important to note here the word primarily. 
Partially due to the fact that on the African continent territorial borders do not coincide with ethnic 
boundaries and that many states are hollowed out to such an extent that their sovereignty is being impaired 
and their borders become porous, civil conflict in Africa often sees a spill over effect of conflict from 
neighbouring states into conflict-ridden states. Furthermore, foreign combatants might also cross over into 
a state’s territory simply in search of the spoils of war. This however, does not change the character of the 
conflict into an interstate conflict. 
 
1.9.4 Non-combatants 
 
In my definition of non-combatants, I adhere to the description put forward in Protocol I to the four 
Geneva Conventions, which describes non-combatants as civilians not engaged in combat, as well as 
medical personnel, chaplains and soldiers who are hors de combat. Additionally, Protocol II to the Geneva 
Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, states that the 
civilian population and individual civilians “shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from 
military operations” (Part IV Art. 13 Sub 1). Furthermore, “[a]cts or threats of violence the primary 
purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.” (Part IV Art. 13 Sub 2). 
Essential here is what is stated in Part IV Art 14:  
“Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is therefore prohibited to 
attack, destroy, remove or render useless, for that purpose, objects indispensable to the 
survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of 
foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.”   
 
1.9.5 Combatants 
 
When using the notion of combatants, I refer to both “unlawful” and “lawful” combatants. In an official 
statement made by the International Convention of the Red Cross (ICRC) in July 2005, combatants were 
described as “members of the armed forces of a State party to an international armed conflict and 
associated militia who fulfil the requisite criteria to directly engage in hostilities. They are generally 
considered lawful, or privileged, combatants who may not be prosecuted for the taking part in hostilities as 
long as they respect international humanitarian law. Upon capture they are entitled to prisoner of war 
status.” Furthermore,  
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“[i]f civilians directly engage in hostilities, they are considered "unlawful" or "unprivileged" 
combatants or belligerents. They may be prosecuted under the domestic law of the detaining 
state for such action.”  
(ICRC, 2005).   
 
1.10 Structure of study 
 
The remainder of this study will have four chapters. The following section provides a short overview of 
what will be discussed in each chapter. 
 
1.10.1 Chapter 2: Conceptualizing Conflict and Hunger: An overview of the literature 
 
This chapter will provide an overview of the literature based on the set of questions used in the case 
studies. I will provide a background to the use of food as a weapon in civil conflict, including an historical 
overview. This is followed by an analysis of the fragile nature of food supply to non-combatants in Africa, 
outlining the causes of food insecurity in Africa as well as the general impact of conflict on food 
insecurity. Thereafter, a structural approach is provided to the question of how food can be abused as a 
weapon as well as an inquiry into the logic behind the use of food as a weapon. The central question here 
is: which purposes does the artificial creation of famine serve and what ends do combatants achieve by 
strategically using food in combat? Some thought will also be given to the effectiveness of the ‘hunger 
weapon’ in Africa. Does it work and if yes, why is it effective? This chapter will finally explore the 
limitations of current thinking about food and conflict, followed by a concluding summary and an 
overview of how the lessons learned will be applied in the remainder of the research project. 
 
1.10.2 Chapter 3: Civil conflict and food insecurity in Darfur  
 
An account of Sudan’s conflict history could go decennia back. However, in this research I would like to 
focus solely on the issue of Darfur since February 2003, when rebels from the Sudan Liberation 
Army/Movement (SLA/M) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) attacked a government garrison. 
The government retaliated with aerial bombardments and support for the Arab Janjaweed militia, which 
began the ethnic cleansing of African tribes. Even the deployment of the African Union Mission in Sudan 
(AMIS) could not stop the militia and attacks on non-combatants continued.  
From late 2006, attacks on aid workers and civilians increased exponentially, as rebel groups 
splintered and pursued ‘land-grab’ strategies. Attacks on food security in Darfur form an integral part of 
combat tactics on basically all sides of the conflict. Farms and villages are burned, livestock is looted and 
people are forcibly displaced, preventing them from cultivating their land or herding their livestock. 
 
1.10.3 Chapter 4: Civil conflict and food insecurity in Somalia 
 
This Chapter will analyse the use of food as a weapon in the conflict in Somalia that has lasted for nearly 
two decades now. In 1991, the Somali leader Siad Barre fled the capital of Mogadishu, leaving anarchy 
and violence in his wake. My analysis in this Chapter draws on events from the last two decades, as the 
drivers of the conflict seem to have changed little over the last 18 years. Furthermore, a longer time span 
also allows me to trace changes in the use of food as a weapon as Somalia sank ever deeper into anarchy. 
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The political situation in Somalia is very different from Sudan, in that Sudan knows an effectively 
functioning government, while Somalia is as far removed from such a government as possible. Moreover, 
Somalia is one of the most ethnically homogeneous countries in Africa. Where in Darfur fighting has been 
taking place along an ethnic divide between Arabs and non-Arabs, in Somalia clan dynamics are a crucial 
driver in the conflict. Yet, these clan dynamics are rather superficial and Somalis are known to 
pragmatically change alliances between clans.  
 Currently, a severe humanitarian crisis has unfolded in the country, with nearly half the population 
in need of Food Aid and appalling levels of Acute Malnutrition, especially among children (International 
Crisis Group 2009a). 
 
1.10.4 Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
This chapter will evaluate the hypotheses and answer the research question provided in above by using the 
data from the two case studies. I will assess whether there is enough evidence to support some general 
statements about the attacks on food security as a means of power in African civil conflict. Thereafter, I 
will highlight some important policy implications that flow from the research with regard to the negative 
side effects of Food Aid in such conflict situations and give some recommendation as to how such side 
effects could be mitigated. These two sections will be concluded by suggestions for further research. 
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Conceptualising Conflict and Hunger: An Overview of the Literature 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The methodological focus of this research project is on the use of case studies. As outlined in the previous 
Chapter, these cases will be subjected to a list of thirteen questions. However, a thorough understanding of 
the literature on the concepts of food insecurity, famine and conflict, their causes and their relations, is 
essential to interpreting the results that will be produced by the case studies. This Chapter will provide an 
overview of the literature based on the set of questions used in the case studies. Therefore, the structure of 
this review is modelled on the different focus points of the 13 questions. The first section links to the first 
two questions and will outline the use of food as a weapon in civil conflict. The second section provides 
background to questions three to seven and deals with the fragile nature of food supply to non-combatants 
in Africa. This section will pay attention to the causes of food insecurity in Africa as well as the general 
impact of conflict on food insecurity. I will also discuss the role and influence of Food Aid5 in Africa in 
this section.  
 The third section is partially based on question eight of the set of questions but is slightly wider in 
scope. This section will provide a structural approach to how food can be abused as a weapon. It will also 
outline the different appearances of this weapon, such as sieges, lying of landmines and forced 
resettlement. This section will also analyse how Food Aid can be turned into a weapon. The fourth section 
serves as the theoretical framework to questions nine to 13 of the set of questions and deals with the logic 
behind the use of food as a weapon. The central question here is: which purposes does the artificial 
creation of famine serve and what ends do combatants achieve by strategically using food in combat? 
Some thought will also be given to the effectiveness of the ‘hunger weapon’ in Africa? Does it work and if 
yes, why is it so effective? Finally, section five will provide a conclusion to the literature review. Here I 
will summarise what lessons can be learned from this review and how they will be applied in the remainder 
of the research project. 
 
2.2 Background to the use of food as a weapon in civil conflict 
 
2.2.1 Introduction 
 
This section is loosely based on the first two questions of the set of questions, dealing with the nature of 
civil conflict and the extent to which non-combatants are made part of this conflict. However, the scope of 
this section is wider than just these two questions in order to provide some background to the topic of the 
use of food as a weapon in African civil conflict. 
 I will first pay attention to the reason behind the lack of literature dealing with the relationship 
between conflict and food insecurity. The issue of famine is on the list of many International Organizations 
that focus on Africa and is part of Millennium Development Goal No.1: “Eradicate extreme poverty and 
                                                 
5
 In the interest of consistency I will use Food Aid with capitals, although both food aid and Food Aid are found in the 
literature.  
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hunger” (World Food Programme, 2009b). However, studies dealing with the relations between conflict 
and famine, and especially those dealing with the question whether famines are manmade, are few. This 
section will first try to find an explanation for this lack of literature. Thereafter a short historical overview 
will be provided to demonstrate that the use of food as a weapon in African civil conflict is by no means a 
new phenomenon. I will conclude with a brief summary of the arguments presented and how these will be 
used in the remainder of the study. 
 
2.2.2 The lack of literature on food insecurity and conflict 
 
The body of literature that seeks to explain food insecurity and famine as a (partial) result of conflict 
instead of the periodic consequence of environmental factors is still relatively small. In particular, studies 
focusing on the deliberate role of conflict in creating food insecurity are hard to find. Nevertheless, the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations estimated that conflict cost Africa over US$ 120 
billion worth of agricultural production during the last third of the twentieth century (Messer and Cohen, 
2006: 3). According to Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi, famine is not simply a consequence of conflict 
but often represents its goal (Macrae and Zwi, 1992: 301). Blaming conflict as the cause of food shortages 
complicates the work of amongst others NGOs focusing on Food Aid. When famine is the outcome of 
droughts for example, it is easier for such organizations to bring relief by handing out Food Aid. “The 
human rights dimension of famine has (…) been underplayed in favour of environmental factors, seen as 
politically neutral” (Macrae and Zwi, 1992: 301). However, in a situation where food scarcity is the result 
of conflict, Food Aid might do little to bring any sustainable relief, or, in the worst case, might even 
prolong the conflict. As Alex de Waal has argued in most of his work (1994; 2002), Food Aid is less 
important in relieving famine than peace. “In situations of conflict, assistance is even more problematic 
since it is likely to have strategic military significance. (…) Food Aid has fed wars in Africa wherever it 
has gone” (De Waal and Omaar, 1994: 6). De Waal and Omaar go as far as to say that “[t]he presence of 
Western relief agencies can give spurious humanitarian credentials to military operations designed to 
displace and impoverish rural communities” (1994:6). 
 An interesting dynamic is thus at work here, which might explain the lack of research undertaken 
concerning the role of conflict in explaining food shortages, especially with regard to combatants 
deliberately using food as a weapon against the civilian population. A great deal of reports and publications 
written about this topic is either conducted or funded by NGOs, which use it to substantiate their own 
activities. Therefore, these NGOs have significant influence on setting the research agenda. The same goes 
for journalists, who are invited to write about these humanitarian crises. Richard Dowden (2009:7) 
describes this process as follows: 
“The deal, mostly unspoken but well understood, is that aid workers tell journalists where 
disaster is breaking. The aid agencies provide plane tickets, a place to stay, vehicles, a driver, 
maybe a translator – and a story. In return the journalists give the aid agencies publicity, 
describing how they are saving Africans and using images of distress and helplessness to raise 
money”  
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However, especially since the much publicized hijacking of Food Aid supplies in recent years, most 
notably in the Gulf of Aden, it has become hard to ignore that Food Aid is not merely a benign relief effort 
operating in a vacuum, but has actually become a player in a political game, if not part of the conflict.  
 
2.2.3 Historical overview  
 
The use of food as a weapon in civil conflict is not a novelty, nor is it restricted to the African context or 
directly linked to situations of poverty. War can create famine in many different ways, including the 
destruction caused by battle and scorched-earth tactics, the requisitioning of food by armies, blockades of 
food and people in sieges, the imposition of restrictions on movement and trade, forcible relocation of the 
civilian population and enforced rationing of food. “Some counter-insurgency doctrines are tantamount to 
manuals for the creation of famine” (De Waal 2002: 117). Oftentimes a number of these methods are used 
simultaneously. 
 De Waal demonstrates that the use of food as a weapon in conflicts is not new to the African 
context. He notes how in the first generation of colonisation the colonial forces often expressly created 
famine. In a book published in 1896 titled Small Wars – Their Principles and Practice, Charles Caldwell 
wrote: 
“[W]here there is no king to conquer, no capital to seize, no organized army to overthrow … 
the objective is not so easy to select. It is then that the regular troops are forced to resort to 
cattle lifting and village burning and that the war assumes an aspect which may shock the 
humanitarian” (De Waal, 2002: 27).  
 
When land was wanted for European farming, local peoples were seen as an obstruction and were forced 
off the land, often using tactics of destroying livestock and grain stocks. In the 1890s, in an attempt to grab 
as much land for white farming as possible, and also to force the Ndebele to surrender or face starvation, 
Cecil Rhodes’ British South Africa Company prevented the Ndebele from harvesting and deliberately 
destroyed their grain stocks (Meredith, 2007: 357-361; Illife, 1990: 23-24). In Tanganyika, the forced 
recruitment of porters for the First World War had a similar effect as the deliberate destroying of food 
stocks would have had, taking necessary farm labour away and in 1916-17, scorched-earth tactics by 
retreating Germans in Rwanda-Urundi created a famine (De Waal 1997: 27). Furthermore, after the Battle 
of Waterberg, on 11 August 1904, German soldiers under General Lothar Von Trotha in what was then 
German South West Africa, decided to follow the fleeing Herero into the forbidding Omaheke Desert, and 
pursue them till their death. In the four weeks that followed, some 65,000 Herero were killed or died of 
heat, thirst and exhaustion, totalling some eighty percent of the Herero population (Meredith 2005: 3). 
Another incident of a rather different nature can be found in the use of concentration camps by the British 
during the Boer War, in which not only many women and children died of malnutrition and starvation, but 
in which also many men were prevented from working the land (Meredith 2007: 453-61 and 484). 
 A more recent African example would be the great famine that struck Ethiopia from 1983 to 1985. 
De Waal (2002: 117). argues that this famine has been widely studied but poorly understood. Although 
drought, harvest failure and economic and agricultural policies of the government contributed to the 
famine, they were not the cause. The cause was the counter-insurgency campaign of the Ethiopian army 
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and air force in Tigray and North Wollo in 1980-85. The Ethiopian government set out to undermine the 
local economy not only through the destruction of harvests and livestock, but also by making it impossible 
to trade or migrate, by forcibly relocating the population, and by the manipulation of relief programs 
(Kaplan, 2003). In 1983, the government began a seventh offensive against western Tigray, which was a 
major grain surplus producing area. “In addition to outright destruction, the army requisitioned food and 
enforced blockades of food and people. Food was routinely used as a weapon of war” (Meredith 2005: 
334). Although such a strategy would imply a war crime, the Acting Foreign Minister Tibebu Bekele was 
candid enough to tell the US Chargé d’Affairs that “food is a major element in our strategy against the 
secessionists” (De Waal 2002: 117).  
 To provide some background to the role conflict has had in creating famines, Table 1 provides an 
overview of selected twentieth-century African famines and their causal triggers as adapted from 
Mamadou Baro and Tara Deubel’s article “Persistent Hunger: Perspectives on Vulnerability, Famine, and 
Food Security in Sub-Sahara Africa”(2006).  
 
Table 1: Selected twentieth-century African famines. 
Location Years Causal Triggers  Estimated mortality 
Nigeria (Hausaland) 1902-1908 Drought 5000 
Tanzania (south) 1906-1907 Conflict 37,500 
West Africa (Sahel) 1913-1914 Drought 125,000 
Tanzania (central) 1917-1919 Conflict and drought 30,000 
Zimbabwe 1922 Drought 47 
Tanzania 1929 Drought 500 
Rwanda 1943-1944 Conflict and drought 300,000 
Malawi (Nyasaland) 1949 Drought 200 
Ethiopia (Tigray) 1957-1958 Drought and locusts 250,000 
Ethiopia (Wollo) 1966 Drought 50,000 
Nigeria (Biafra) 1968-1970 Conflict 1,000,000 
West Africa (Sahel) 1969-1974 Drought 101,000 
Ethiopia (Tigray and Wollo) 1972-1974 Drought 350,000 
Somalia 1974-1975 Drought 20,000 
Uganda (Karamoja) 1980-1981 Conflict and drought 30,000 
Mozambique 1982-1985 Conflict and drought 100,000 
Ethiopia 1983-1985 Conflict 800,000 
Sudan (Darfur, Kordofan) 1984-1985 Conflict 250,000 
Sudan (south) 1988 Conflict 250,000 
Somalia 1991-1993 Conflict and drought 400,000 
Sudan (Bahr el Ghazal) 1998 Conflict and drought 70,000 
Source: Baro and Deubel, 2006: 523. 
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2.2.4 Conclusion and implications 
 
We can conclude from the previous section that the lack of literature on the relationship between conflict 
and food insecurity is by no means the consequence of the limited importance of the issue. The tactic of 
using food as a weapon in warfare is not new to the African context. What would then explain the absence 
of a large body of literature exploring the relationship between conflict and food insecurity? Possibly, 
many players in the field prefer politically neutral explanations for food insecurity and famine, such as 
environmental factors, instead of conflict. Yet, an increasing body of authors now agrees that Food Aid 
might do little to bring any sustainable relief in the absence of peace and might even prolong a conflict. 
Interestingly, according to the latest report by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) on global food security,  
“countries that have scored successes [in reducing the number of undernourished people] 
include several that emerged from decades of civil war and conflict, offering striking evidence 
of the importance of peace and political stability for hunger reduction” (FAO, 2008: 15).  
 
Such conclusions re-emphasize the importance of this research project and it is in this light that the 
findings of this study should be interpreted.  
In the remainder of this study it is thus important to look under the surface and beyond the obvious 
explanations given by many NGOs, which might have a stake in keeping their operations in a conflict area 
going, even though it might be in the interest of a speedy termination of the conflict to cease their Food 
Aid projects. 
 
2.3 The nature of food supply to non-combatants 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
 
Now that I have briefly introduced the topic, it is important to outline the nature of food supply to non-
combatants in civil conflict. This section will provide a background to questions three to seven of the set of 
questions. These questions deal with the nature of the food supply to non-combatants prior to the conflict 
and the impact conflict has on this supply system. Essentially, these are questions pertaining to food 
(in)security in Africa. The first part of this section will summarise and analyse the debate in the literature 
about the origins of food insecurity. Here I will demonstrate how this debate has evolved from an emphasis 
on environmental factors affecting food security to a perspective that allows for political explanations. 
Thereafter, I will provide a short overview of the centrality of Food Aid in Africa when it comes to feeding 
the population of conflict zones. This section will round off with a concluding summary of the main 
arguments as well as some thoughts on how they will influence the remainder of the study. 
 
2.3.2 The origins of food insecurity in Africa: a political perspective 
 
The origins of food insecurity in Africa have been the topic of a lively debate among scholars from a 
multitude of fields. Over the past decades, the focus of potential explanations has increasingly shifted from 
environmental factors as brought forward by agricultural scientists to manmade factors such as conflict and 
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explained from the field of International Relations. This section will provide a short overview of this 
debate, with an emphasis on the relationship between food security and conflict.  
Early work on famine was heavily influenced by the ideas of Thomas Malthus in his An Essay on 
the Principle of Population (1798), who argued that famine follows strong population growth and was 
nature’s mechanism to keep populations in check. However, evidence suggests that Malthus’s theory does 
not hold, since famines have not limited population growth to any noticeable extent. Furthermore, Malthus 
assumed technology to remain constant, whereas vast technological improvements in agriculture have 
taken place since the time of his writing (Baro and Deubel, 2006: 523).  
 In the 1970s and 1980s, solutions proposed to Africa’s food security problems were mostly 
technological, placing an emphasis on production instead of equitable distribution and access to food. In 
Surrender or Starve (2003: 194), Robert Kaplan describes how in the 1980s the common opinion amongst 
academics in the United States was that “[m]oney and agricultural technology still could solve everything”.  
 In line with this emphasis on improvements on the supply-side is the argument made by the 
Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto. His main thesis is that people in developing countries have only 
informal ownership of land and goods, without interaction with the formal legal and economic systems. In 
Africa, systems of communal land tenure are commonplace, where farmers are granted the right to use the 
land by tribal leadership. This makes it impossible for the poor to convert their informal ownerships into 
capital that De Soto claims would form the basis for entrepreneurship. This leaves no rational incentives to 
invest in and improve the land, resulting in low productivity. Hence, farmers in much of the developing 
world remain trapped in subsistence agriculture (De Soto, 1989 and 2000).   
 Furthermore, population pressures, unreliable weather conditions and climate change have all been 
named as scapegoats for chronic food insecurity in Africa, yet such factors alone do not explain the 
problem. Clover poses the following questions in this regard: “If the continent’s resources far exceed its 
needs, how can it be that there is so much hunger? Why is it that countries that have millions of hungry 
people are exporting food to countries that are already well fed?” (Clover, 2003: 7). 
Thus, food security is much more an issue of both limited availability of food in conjunction with 
imperfect access to food. One of the first proponents of this new, more political, school of thinking about 
famine and food insecurity was the Indian Nobel Prize Winner and scholar of developmental economics 
Amartya Sen. In his Poverty and Famines (1981) he argued that a famine is hardly ever the result of a lack 
of food, but more often caused by people are being denied access to food. Famines affect different 
households in different ways, depending on their ability to procure food. Baro and Deubel (2006: 524) give 
the example of the 1972-74 famine in Ethiopia, where there was no significant reduction in overall food 
output and food prices remained relatively stable, but people died of starvation nevertheless. The same 
holds for the Sahel famine of the mid-1970s where Mali, Mauritania and Niger all produced enough grain 
to feed their populations, if the food would have been properly distributed. 
Sen notes that a famine has never occurred in a functioning liberal democracy.  
“The diverse political freedoms that are available in a democratic state, including regular 
elections, free newspapers and freedom of speech, must be seen as the real force behind the 
elimination of famines. Here again, it appears that one set of freedoms – to criticize, publish 
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and vote- are usually linked up with other types of freedoms, such as the freedom to escape 
starvation and famine mortality”  (De Waal, 2002: 2). 
 
Sen first proposed this hypothesis in 1981, but it was not until the 1990s that it was taken up outside of 
India, and was propagated by for example Alexander de Waal and Human Rights Watch. One of the ways 
Sen proposed to rule out famine was the rather vague notion of a “political contract”, drawn up in human 
rights terminology, protecting the right to food and the right to be free of famine on a national level (De 
Waal, 2002: 3). Sen’s approach has come under attack in the 1990s for overly relying on economic market-
based causation and neglecting the role of politics, history and social disruption (Baro and Deubel, 2006; 
De Waal, 2002). Yet, his main contribution to famine thinking, according to Baro and Deubel (2006:524), 
was his ability to shift the debate from “issues of availability to emphasizing the ability of individuals to 
obtain access to and control over food resources”. 
 Riding on Africa’s democracy wave since the early 1980s, Sen’s thesis was cause for great 
optimism, leading to an “end of history” like notion that famine could be history. Yet, as we now know, 
this optimism was premature. De Waal gives three main reasons why famines still prevail in Africa and 
why solving food insecurity in Africa is not as simple as Sen claims. First, the links between civil and 
political liberties and the protection from famine are more intricate than Sen indicates. Especially the 
notion of the political contract needs considerable review. Second and related to this political contract, it 
seems that the obstacles to creating such contracts in Africa are much more formidable than anticipated. De 
Waal argues that internal political decay is by far the most important factor in this regard. Deepening 
authoritarianism, the growth of so-called war economies, in which ruling elites strip a country of its 
resources with little long-term planning, and minimalist state strategies, which are characterized by the 
decay of service delivery are all political trends in Africa that undercut the potential for and value of such a 
political contract. Related to this argument of political decay is the poor management of vital infrastructure 
needed to ensure nationwide food security. Road and railway networks are often in poor condition, 
complicating speedy and adequate distribution of food to regions suffering shortages. The final obstacle 
mentioned by De Waal is the “rapid growth of the power of the ‘humanitarian international’- the 
cosmopolitan elite of relief workers, officials of donor agencies, consultant academics and the like, and the 
institutions for which they work” (De Waal, 2002: 3-4).  
De Waal claims that the unexpected consequences of humanitarian action complicate the problem 
of famine and starvation. “[I]ts power is exercised and its resources dispensed at the cost of weakening the 
forms of political accountability that underlie the prevention of famine (De Waal, 2002: 4). De Waal 
argues that those affected by famines should reclaim their moral ownership. Such local political 
accountability is far more valuable than the “[g]eneralized, internationalized responsibility for fighting 
famine”, which the humanitarian community has to offer. “To be precise, the intractability of famine is the 
price that is paid for the ascendancy of humanitarianism” (De Waal, 2002: 5).   
Reginald Green also points to a strong relationship between food security and conflict. He seeks to 
explain famine deaths in Africa by referring to medieval symbolism: “The Four Horsemen of the 
Apocalypse – Famine, Pestilence, War and Death – ride out together” (Green, 1994: 38). He argues that 
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without war, with the exception of Ethiopia, drought in Africa has seldom resulted in massive loss of life. 
Food production as well as relief food supplies are 
“casualties of combat zones, mass dislocation, wrecked or blocked transport routes and 
bankrupted governments. Lack of food and of medical services, combined with the physical 
stress of flight, kill about twenty times as many human beings in Africa as do bombs, bullets 
and cold steel” (Green, 1994: 38).  
 
This strong link between man-made causes such as conflict and political systems in general holds when 
analysing a number of African case studies about vulnerability to food insecurity. David Sogge describes 
the case of Angola in “Angola: Surviving against Rollback and Petrodollars” (1994). Sogge points to the 
disastrous effects of the arrival of the settler population from Portugal in the 1940s, which confiscated the 
lands of African cash croppers. Complementary to this large-scale confiscation, the settlers needed to 
mobilize cheap labour, resulting in a wageworker system, which decreased the ability of households to 
support themselves by farming. However, independence led to the collapse of commercial circuits. As a 
result, products could no longer get to the market, distribution systems collapsed, factory outputs fell and 
import streams dried up. Factories and plantations shut down, leaving the newly recruited wageworkers 
without an income. This destabilization was driven and aggravated by war. Sogge recounts how especially 
UNITA used food as a means of leverage, for example by planting mines on roads and rural pathways, as 
well as by extracting tribute in labour and food from local households (1994: 97). 
Finally, an important contribution to the debate has been made by Keen (1991; 1994) and 
Rangasami (1985), who take a functional approach to famine. Both stress that in such a situation, there are 
not only losers but also those who profit economically, politically and militarily. Oftentimes, these interests 
are closely interlinked and dependent on each other for survival. Keen illustrates this point by quoting 
Michel Foucault, who argued in relation to the imprisonment of political victims in the former Soviet 
Union: “The problem of causes must not be dissociated from that of function: what use is the Gulag, what 
functions does it assure, in what strategies is it integrated?” (Keen, 1994: 111) Contrasting Sen’s economic 
approach to famine, Keen argues in his article on the famine among the Dinka of Sudan in the 1980s that it 
was not the victim’s endemic poverty, which exposed them to food insecurity but in many aspects 
precisely their assets, for example their land, livestock and newly discovered oil, which made them 
vulnerable. These assets combined with political under representation of the southern Sudanese groups, 
most notably the Dinka, exposed them to the exploitative processes by those seeking control over their 
assets, eventually resulting in famine (Keen, 1994: 121). 
 
2.3.3 The role and influence of Food Aid 
 
A discussion of food insecurity in Africa would be incomplete without an assessment of the role and 
influence of Food Aid. Such aid deliveries form an essential part of Africa’s overall food security. In a 
2008 report, the FAO stated that the overall number of undernourished people in Africa increased over the 
last decade from 169 million to 212 million. The continent did achieve some progress in relative terms, 
bringing the percentage of people suffering from chronic hunger down from 34 to 30 percent. The increase 
of the number of hungry people can be largely attributed to just one country, the Democratic Republic of 
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the Congo (DRC), where the number of undernourished shot up from 11 million to 43 million and from 29 
to 76 percent of the population (FAO, 2008: 14-15). This large body of undernourished people is 
sometimes completely dependent on Food Aid to stay alive. 
 The United Nations’ WFP is the largest Food Aid distributor on the African continent, often 
partnering with local NGOs. Table 2 shows the development in the number of Africans receiving Food Aid 
over the last decade. This Table demonstrates that the role of the WFP in Africa has been on the rise. For 
example in Somalia, more than 2,7 million people were officially beneficiaries of WFP Food Aid. This 
represents an increase of 1,2 million from 2007. In Sudan, this number is over six million, with an increase 
of half a million from 2007 (WFP, 2009a: 4).  The population of Sudan is estimated at 41 million (CIA 
Factbook, 2009). This means that nearly 15 percent of the population is dependent on Food Aid from just 
the WFP. Furthermore, we have to take into account the fact that Food Aid deliveries are usually 
concentrated in specific areas, rather than the entire country. This makes the control over Food Aid in such 
areas an extremely valuable political, economic and military weapon. 
 
Table 2: Number of people in Africa receiving WFP Food Aid over the past decade 
Year Total beneficiaries Year Total beneficiaries 
1997 20.5 million 2003 41.0 million 
1998 20.6 million 2004 40.6 million 
1999 22.0 million 2005 49.3 million 
2000 34.9 million 2006 54.5 million 
2001 24.1 million 2007 44.6 million 
2002 34.3 million 2008 53.1 million 
Source: World Food Programme, 2009a: 3. 
 
2.3.4 Conclusion and implications 
 
In summation, thinking about food security has undergone a transformation over the years. Environmental 
and technological factors have given way to explanations focusing on the role of politics and conflict. 
Although there are many different perspectives on the causes of famine and food insecurity in Africa, the 
literature survey provided here has been carefully composed out of studies with relevance to the topic of 
this study.  
 As Sen demonstrated, food security is much more an issue of both limited availability of food in 
conjunction with imperfect access to food. Famine has never occurred in a functioning liberal democracy. 
The argument that humanitarian action is partially responsible, as De Waal claims (2002: 4), for the 
problem of famine and starvation by making it intractable, is as interesting as it is radical. The view in this 
thesis is therefore that there is definitely some validity in De Waal’s argument, but that blaming the 
humanitarian community as a whole, indiscriminate of the specific case at hand, is one step too far. 
Whether such complicity actually exists has to be established on a case-to-case basis. I will use the 
literature survey provided above as a background for establishing such complicity.  
 Furthermore, it is important to stress here the value of Green’s work for this study. Green argues 
that without war, drought in Africa has seldom resulted in massive loss of life. This perspective will 
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resonate throughout this study, as I will try to establish how conflict often deliberately aggravates food 
insecurity. Rangasami and Keen’s functional approach to famine, focusing on the balance between winners 
and losers in a famine, is also very valuable. This theory will be used in analysing the rationale behind the 
use of food as a weapon in the case study chapters. 
 Finally, the short overview of the centrality of Food Aid in Africa has shown us how vulnerable 
many societies are to the manipulation and obstruction of Food Aid deliveries. The large percentage of the 
population depending on Food Aid in the two case study chapters will call for a strong focus on the 
component of Food Aid within the aggregate of potential uses of food as a weapon. 
 
2.4 The use of food as a weapon 
 
2.4.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous section we learned about the origins of food insecurity in Africa and saw how vulnerable 
many African societies are to political changes affecting food production and procurement. This section 
will go a step further and will outline how combatants sometimes deliberately use food as a weapon in 
African civil conflict. This section partly ties in with question eight of the set of questions, pertaining to the 
obstruction of Food Aid deliveries by combatants, but is slightly broader in scope. I will aim to provide as 
broad an overview as possible of all the different ways in which food can be used as a weapon. This 
overview will be followed by an analysis of the intentional and unintentional effects of Food Aid on civil 
conflict. There are many ways in which combatants can abuse Food Aid to further their own causes. This 
section will identify the different modalities of this tactic, which will enable me to recognize them in the 
subsequent case study chapters. By means of conclusion, I will provide a theoretical model as drawn up 
from the analysis in this section and will demonstrate how this framework will be used in the case studies. 
 
2.4.2 How conflict causes hunger 
 
Conflict can cause hunger in many different ways, yet, according to Messer, Cohen and D’Costa (2000), 
“[t]he most obvious way armed conflict affects hunger is through the deliberate use of hunger as a 
weapon.” They list three groups of strategies in which combatants can starve civilians and opponents into 
submission. A first group of tactics can be labelled ‘siege warfare’ and include  
“seizing or destroying food stocks, livestock, and other assets in food-producing regions; 
cutting off marketed supplies of food in these and other regions; and diverting food relief from 
intended beneficiaries to the military and their supporters” (Messer, Cohen and D’Costa, 
2000).  
 
A second strategy aims directly at the farming population by trying to reduce their numbers. This can take 
place through direct attacks and terror, enslavement, or forced recruitment as well as by malnutrition, 
illness, and eventually death. The decline of farming populations due to either their death, their forced 
removal from the area or their abandonment of farming out of fear, leads to a fall in production, which will 
in turn lead to food deficits in an ever-widening area. A third strategy consists of making farming 
impossible by laying landmines and poisoning wells. This strategy turns temporary acute food shortages 
into longer-term insufficiencies. Such actions force the farming community to abandon their property and 
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complicate their return, in effect interrupting food production and economic activities permanently. This 
last strategy ensures that conflict-related food shortages will lead to food emergencies in years to come, 
even after fighting has officially ceased (Messer, Cohen and D’Costa, 2000). 
Macrae and Zwi have been pioneers in writing about the role of Food Aid in conflicts, as well as 
the broader topic of this thesis, the general use of food as a weapon. In their article entitled “Food as an 
Instrument of War in Contemporary African Famines” (1992), they made the first structured attempt at 
providing a framework for the role of food in low-intensity wars. According to Macrae and Zwi, “the 
deliberate targeting of food production, consumption and distribution has played an important part in 
creating and exacerbating (…) famines” (Macrae and Zwi, 1992: 299). 
 Another distinction Macrae and Zwi have made in their research concerns the different forms such 
attacks on food can take. They distinguish between acts of omission, of commission and of provision. Acts 
of omission are essentially “failures to act” (Macrae and Zwi, 1994: 11) and are instances where food 
supplies are misused or “where governments fail to monitor adequately and plan for food security in all 
sections of a country; it identifies the failure of governments to manage food reserves and to instigate and 
facilitate appropriate emergency measures” (Macrae and Zwi, 1992: 301).  
 Within this category Macrae and Zwi distinguish between the lack of facilitation of relief 
operations and the mismanagement of existing food resources. With regard to the facilitation of relief 
operations, the United Nations passed two resolutions in 1988, urging governments to facilitate the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance to victims of disasters (UN Resolution 43/131 and UN Resolution 
45/100), however, in practice, efforts to bring relief goods to conflict areas are often blocked by 
combatants. With regard to the management of existing food resources, governments have a responsibility 
towards their subjects to utilise national resources effectively. This means for example not selling off food 
stocks with the effect of making the population solely dependent on imports. A recent example of this is 
the case of Sudan where the country is “growing wheat for Saudi Arabia, sorghum for camels in the United 
Arab Emirates and vine-ripened tomatoes for the Jordanian Army”, whereas at the same time, it is 
receiving shiploads of Food Aid and people in Darfur are dying of starvation (Gettleman, 2008). 
 Acts of commission refer to the production and procurement of food (Macrae and Zwi, 1992: 303; 
Macrae and Zwi, 1994: 13-19). Acts under this heading relate to those actions that effectively undermine 
agricultural production and obstruct coping strategies. Within this category, Macrae and Zwi distinguish 
between attacks on production and procurement, which also include actions which undermine coping 
strategies, including attacks of Food Aid convoys, safe corridors and markets, and forced population 
relocation. Attacks on food production and consumption are central to the use of food as a weapon and 
hence the creation of conflict-famine. “The most important feature of these attacks is that they quicken the 
pace of destitution by blocking coping strategies, thus pushing communities further from the threshold of 
survival” (Macrae and Zwi, 1992: 303). The heading of attacks on production as defined by Macrae and 
Zwi captures most of the tactics described above by Messer, Cohen and D’Costa. Under this heading 
Macrae and Zwi list scorched-earth tactics, the poisoning of wells, seizing or killing of livestock, the laying 
of landmines but also direct attacks on farmers (1994: 14-15). Yet, the disruption of other coping 
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mechanisms is also included, such as restrictions on movement or the ability to gather wild foods, as is the 
tactic of besiegement, especially that of garrison towns. Garrison towns often serve as centres for relief and 
military attacks on relief are commonplace.  
 With regard to the second aspect of acts of commission, the forced relocation of the population, 
Macrae and Zwi argue that displaced communities, particularly those in refugee camps, are at risk, both 
from the lack of access to their lands and thus means of subsistence as well as from the disease-ridden 
environment. Furthermore, forced resettlement is usually accompanied by high levels of violence, poor 
logistical and health planning, and restrictions on the population’s ability to diversify in their food supply 
or employment opportunities (Macrae and Zwi, 1994: 18).  
 Finally, the third category refers to acts of provision, where a differential supply of food is key. 
“Food may be selectively provided to government supporters, to those from whom support is sought, or to 
lure sections of the populations to areas controlled by the military” (Macrae and Zwi, 1994: 19). Such acts 
often involve control over Food Aid and a distribution of such aid to those for whom it was not originally 
meant. It is difficult to find data on the selective provisioning of Food Aid, perhaps due to the NGOs’ 
reluctance to disclose facts on the abuse of their aid programs. Macrae and Zwi give an example of such 
selective provisioning with regard to Food Aid given by USAID in Somalia in the late 1980s. This food 
was more often than not diverted to troops and loyal government bodies and only 12 percent of this aid 
reached the civilian population for which it was destined (Macrae and Zwi, 1994: 19). 
 David Keen provides us with an excellent example of how four different exploitative processes can 
work together to create a famine, when he discusses the famine in South Western Sudan from 1991-1993 
(Keen, 1994: 112). First, raiding, often in combination with scorched-earth army tactics, disrupted 
economic life and stripped communities of their cattle and grain stores, leaving them vulnerable to natural 
adversity. Thereafter, famine victims tried to sell assets, including labour and buy grain. This led the price 
of grain to shoot up and the price of assets to plummet, further exacerbating famines. The third force was 
the restriction of non-market strategies of survival. People were barred from collecting wild foods and 
moving to areas where, for example, relatives lived. The importance of this third tactic was also shown by 
De Waal’s study of the famine in Darfur from 1984-1985 (1989). Finally, a variety of politically influential 
groups with a stake in prolonging the famine blocked the delivery of relief (Keen, 1994: 112). 
 
2.4.3 The (un)intentional effects of Food Aid on civil conflict 
 
Duffield outlines the effects of the end of the Cold War as well as recessionary pressures of the early 1990s 
on the way receiving states handled emergency assistance. Due to the aforementioned two events, 
development aid to a number of regimes with an antagonistic relationship with the West decreased and 
emergency assistance became one of the few means of income left to these states. These regimes therefore 
had a stake in creating a sustainable state of emergency to ensure the inflow of aid. “The treasuries of 
several governments in the Horn of Africa have been major beneficiaries of international humanitarian 
operations” (Duffield, 1994: 60). Furthermore, the transport and guarding of emergency Food Aid in 
conflict situations is also in itself a vital source of livelihood, as well as vehicles, and arms. Jobs associated 
 23 
with emergency Food Aid are relatively lucrative and can be given out to cronies in order to keep 
patronage networks alive (Messer, Cohen and D’Costa, 2000). 
 Yet, the control over Food Aid can serve a number of purposes other than purely economic, as 
outlined by Messer, Cohen and D’Costa (2000). They recount how in Ethiopia in the 1980s the Mengistu 
government first blocked Food Aid to starve out the opposition and thereafter employed it to remove and 
resettle opposition populations. In southern Sudan Food Aid was used as a source of power by both 
government and opposition forces, who employed it to control territories and populations and to keep their 
troops in fighting shape. In this case, food was also used a means for selective ethnic and religious 
oppression. Messer, Cohen and D’Costa argue how in both the Ethiopian and the Sudanese examples food 
shortages were first deliberately created and thereafter maintained by those able to control and divert Food 
Aid. As a final example, Messer, Cohen and D’Costa bring up the much-publicised case of the Hutu 
refugees in Goma (DRC) after the 1994 genocide of their Tutsi countrymen, who received large amounts 
of Food Aid, while the surviving Tutsi population in Rwanda at first received hardly any assistance. In 
these Hutu refugee camps, control of the food distribution process has been a vital source of political 
power. “Donated food intended for the most vulnerable women and children found its way first to powerful 
male interests, enabling them to keep invasionary hopes alive” (Messer, Cohen and D’Costa, 2000).  
In her recent behind the scenes-study of the humanitarian aid industry in Africa, Polman (2009) 
provides a well-structured analysis of the mechanisms guiding the operations of International Non-
Governmental Organisations (INGOs) in Africa, substantiated with numerous examples. As briefly 
mentioned above, Polman describes how INGOs in most conflicts negotiate access to war zones with the 
warring parties. The spoils of these negotiations are used to buy food and ammunition for their combatants, 
as well as to secure a support base amongst the population. Despite the consequences of such negotiations, 
in the absence of a binding framework guiding operations in the humanitarian field, every INGO or what 
Polman mockingly describes as MONGOs (referring to the many often celebrity founded “My Own 
NGOs”), can enter into such negotiations as they please. These negotiations are called “Shaking Hands 
with the Devil” in aid speak. Polman goes as far as to argue that INGOs are actually pushed into such 
negotiations from a Public Relations and competitive point of view. They have contracts to fulfil and 
budgets to spend (Polman, 2009: 98). Duffield furthermore recounts how it is fairly easy for a regime to 
find excuses for not allowing Food Aid into specific parts of their country. In Ethiopia and Sudan, denial of 
Food Aid to civilians in areas not under government control was accomplished by a variety of means  
“ranging from a reluctance to acknowledge emergency conditions, assurances to donors that 
relief supplies were reaching all the needy, claiming insurmountable security and logistical 
problems to account for interminable delays, denying access for assessment purposes, through 
to plain obstruction” (Duffield, 1994: 62).  
 
Furthermore, when stories about famines are being picked up by international media, people all 
around the world demand aid organizations to step up to the plate. It is much more difficult for such 
organizations to explain the intricate dynamics of the abuse of Food Aid, with the risk of either losing 
funds themselves or seeing other NGOs fill the vacuum, than to go in, help and turn a blind eye to the 
consequences.  
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An example to this point is the case of Biafra in the 1960s. The history of the conflict has been 
widely written about and will not be repeated here. This example demonstrates however how international 
Food Aid can prolong a civil conflict, which in the absence of such aid could have been terminated with 
only a fraction of the eventual casualties. The British journalist Frederick Forsyth witnessed the Public 
Relations campaign that was supposed to let as much humanitarian aid flow into the separatist province as 
possible. Although the media shocked the world with images of starving babies, the complexities of the 
problem, as well as the abuse of the aid system by the Biafran Government led by Colonel Odumegwu 
Ojukwu, were much more difficult to capture in a short camera moment broadcasted on the evening news. 
Forsyth argues: “People who couldn’t fathom the political complexities of the war could easily grasp the 
wrong in a picture of a child dying of starvation” (as quoted in De Waal, 2002: 74). It was evident 
immediately after the war that Food Aid had contributed considerably to the suffering of the starving 
Biafran people, who only saw a fraction of that aid, whereas much of the aid was diverted to Ojukwu in 
order to buy arms and feed his troops. Yet, De Waal notes that “[i]t has taken 25 years for the ethical 
implications to be faced more squarely” (2002: 77). Ian Smillie argues that  
“[t]he airlift and the broader relief effort was (...) an act of unfortunate and profound folly. It 
prolonged the war by 18 months… A great deal of post-war effort went into refuting the 
charge that churches and NGOs prolonged the war. Because if it is true, they must also have 
prolonged the suffering, contributing to the deaths of 180,000 people or more”(De Waal, 2002: 
77). 
 
Frances Stewart outlines the danger of approaching Food Aid in conflict situations solely from a 
humanitarian perspective in his article “Food Aid during Conflict: Can One Reconcile its Humanitarian, 
Economic and Political Economy Effects?” (1998). He argues that Food Aid in conflict situations 
invariably has effects not only at the humanitarian but also at the economic and political economy level 
and that serious policy mistakes have occurred as a result of a narrow-minded pursuit of humanitarian 
objectives (Stewart, 1998: 560). Stewart argues that the short-term track record of conflict Food Aid is not 
that great, but that, even worse, “in the medium term, this form of delivery tends to undermine production, 
perpetuating the humanitarian emergency, while often contributing to the prolongation of conflict” 
(Stewart, 1998: 561). He argues that conflict Food Aid might actually sustain war gains for some groups. 
While the warring parties deliberately distort and weaken the country’s food production capacity, they use 
Food Aid to sustain their own food supplies. This makes the humanitarians providing Food Aid in a way 
accomplice to aiding the winning side and worsening the prospects of the losing side (Stewart, 1998: 564). 
Duffield describes how a regime usually bases its decision to allow Food Aid into a country 
primarily on a need to feed one’s own troops. “In a sectarian asset-transfer economy the control of Food 
Aid is of vital strategic importance. In the Horn [of Africa], the diversion of Food Aid to feed troops and 
militia at the same time as denying relief to contested areas has been widespread” (Duffield, 1994: 61). 
He recounts how in Ethiopia the peasant militia in the 1980s were not paid at all by the 
government and solely received access to Food Aid in exchange for their military services. He reports how 
donors regard a five percent leakage of Food Aid as acceptable. However, due to the amounts of food and 
money involved, in Ethiopia, five percent of Food Aid amounted to food for 300,000 to 400,000 people, 
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equivalent to the entire armed forces (Duffield, 1994: 61). Furthermore, lacking an international mandate, 
NGOs are dependent on the local regime for access in order to carry out their operations and are as a 
consequence often co-opted by one or the other side in a conflict. Although there are a few exceptions, 
such as Médecins Sans Frontières, who always aim to work on both sides of the conflict, most NGOs do 
not practice this principle of ‘active neutrality’. Estimates in the case of Ethiopia hold ninety percent of 
international relief assistance to be handed out in government-controlled areas. Similar figures are reported 
for Sudan in the 1990s (Duffield, 1994: 62).6   
 
2.4.4 Conclusion and implications: The theoretical model 
 
The previous two sections have outlined different ways of classifying the use of food as a weapon in civil 
conflict and have given us insight into the abuse of Food Aid in civil conflicts. By means of conclusion, 
this section will provide a visual summary of the different views. As a start, Figure 1 outlines the ideal 
distribution of food during armed conflict. In this situation, the civilians receive food from three main 
sources, namely distributed by NGOs in the form of Food Aid7, by (subsistence) farming and by food 
procured at the local markets. In this situation, combatants do not live off the civilian population and 
procure their food at the markets. The situation in Figure 1 is indeed an ideal type and will probably hardly 
ever occur in reality. 
 
Figure 1: The ideal situation 
  
 Figures 2, 3 and 4 are probably more accurate depictions of reality and visualise my hypotheses. 
First, I propose that there is in fact a pattern in the way in which combatants use the control over food 
supply lines to non-combatants during civil conflicts as a means of power. I expect that this pattern will 
take one of the forms proposed in Figures 2 to 4. My second hypothesis follows that food is first and 
                                                 
6
 The discussion above might raise the question whether Food Aid should be stopped. Please refer to the concluding 
Chapter for a discussion on this question. 
7
 Although this might not sound like the ideal scenario, the distribution of Food Aid during armed conflict has 
become a reality and in this case, the ideal scenario refers to the ability of Food Aid NGOs to reach the civilian 
population without being hindered by the combatants.   
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foremost used in civil conflict to control the non-combatant population by omission, commission or 
provision of food. Furthermore, as also extracted from the literature review in the following section “The 
Effectiveness of the Hunger Weapon”, this control over food can serve a military, economic and/or 
political purpose. Based on the review of the literature provided above concerning the different ways in 
which food can be used as a weapon, a number of potential scenarios exists, expressed in Figures 2 to 4.  
 Figure 2 shows how Food Aid can be abused to feed combatants as well as punish or reward 
civilians (shown in red). This relates to what Macrae and Zwi have labelled “selective provisioning” 
(Macrae and Zwi, 1994: 19). Food Aid is first used to feed one’s own troops and the remainder is given to 
civilians, often by means of selective provisioning. Furthermore, Food Aid which is channeled through the 
combatants’s institutions is often ‘taxed’, serving an economic purpose. In this scenario, civilians are 
allowed to continue their production and procurement of food, through agriculture and markets. 
Combatants can choose to ignore the farming and market component of food production and procurement 
for a number of reasons, for example because they are not in effective control of the entire area, or for 
reasons of political support. 
  
Figure 2: The abuse of Food Aid 
 
The opposite scenario is also a possibility. In this scenario, either Food Aid does not exist, or it is left 
alone. As we have seen from the literature review provided above, in such instances, either markets or 
agricultural enterprises are attacked, for example by means of raids, forced resettlements or the laying of 
land mines (De Waal, 2002; Keen, 1994). This possibility is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Attacks on farming 
 
In this scenario Food Aid still reaches civilians but, due to deliberate and accidental effects of the conflict 
situation, civilians are unable to farm or trade. Figure 3 is a depiction of what Macrae and Zwi call “acts of 
commision” (Macrae and Zwi, 1992: 303; Macrae and Zwi, 1994: 13-19). Sometimes combatants also 
force civilians to work the land. In this scenario combatants control the access to farming and markets 
(depicted by the dotted lines), and thus food production and procurement. Civilians are usually not 
completely cut off from their land, but the degree of access is determined by the combatants. Due to the 
distortion of food production and procurement, I expect that in such cases the excess of food that existed 
previously will cease to exist or become unaffordable (depicted in grey) and the relationships between 
farming, cash crop production (excess food) and markets will become irregular.  
 This scenario ties in with the first three processes Keen (1994:112) describes. First, farming and 
the functioning of markets are made impossible by raids and scorched-earth tactics. This strips civilians of 
their means of existence, leaving them vulnerable to natural adversity and at the whims of the combatants. 
Subsequently, the civilians who become the victims of famine will try to sell the assets they still have, 
including labour (potentially to the combatants), in order to buy food. This leads the price of food to go up 
and the price of assets, such as labour to drop, increasing civilian vulnerability. After this second process, 
combatants might try to restrict non-market strategies of survival. These strategies have usually been 
neglected in the past, as attacks on them require a greater degree of control over the area and its 
inhabitants. In this final process civilians are barred from collecting wild foods and moving to areas where, 
for example, relatives live. 
 Finally, both scenarios can come together in the pattern visualized in Figure 4. This pattern, with 
slight variations, is the pattern I expect to find in my case studies. In this scenario, combatants are in 
control of Food Aid and manage to severely distort agricultural practices in the way described in Figure 3. 
All access to food for civilians is in some way mediated by the combatants. The dotted lines from 
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combatants to civilians show the tactics used in the selective provisioning of such food. In this scenario 
both acts of commission and provision take place. Acts of omission can also occur but are less direct and 
usually require a longer stretch of time to take effect. 
 
Figure 4: The combination scenario  
 
I will use the theoretical model outlined in this section to analyse the two case studies in this thesis. It helps 
us to clarify the relationship between civilians and combatants with regard to the different sources of food 
production and procurement. In the case studies, I will try to visualize this relationship for the specific 
cases using similar figures to the ones presented above. I will also make use of the theoretical framework 
provided by Macrae and Zwi (1991; 1994) as well as Keen (1994). 
 
2.5 The effectiveness of the “hunger weapon” 
 
2.5.1 Introduction 
 
The previous section has shown the different ways in which conflict and combatants themselves can cause 
food insecurity and even famines. An important question remains however. Why is using the “hunger 
weapon” a tactic of choice for combatants? What purposes does the artificial creation of famine serve and 
what ends do combatants achieve by strategically using food in combat? This section ties in with questions 
nine to thirteen of the set of questions, which deal with the different functions of the control over food 
supply lines and will provide a schematic outline of the different answers to these “Why?” questions. The 
conclusion of this section will summarise what has been learned in this section and will outline the 
implications of these findings on the remainder of the research. 
 
2.5.2 The logic behind the use of food as a weapon 
 
Now I have addressed the causes of food insecurity in Africa and the way conflict causes hunger, I will 
look at the logic behind the choice of food as a weapon in African civil conflict. As I noted in the 
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discussion presented above, the realisation that many famines are man-made and the result of deliberate 
wartime strategies has increasingly become part of current discourse on famine and food insecurity in 
Africa. Based on available literature, this section will argue that food insecurity and famine not only are 
often created as a result of conflict, but also serve a number of purposes for combatants. These purposes 
are compelling enough for them to actually choose the use of food as a weapon. In his 1994 book chapter 
“The Political Economy of Internal War: Asset Transfer, Complex Emergencies and International Aid”, 
Mark Duffield proposed the term complex political emergency, instead of the notion of famine. Duffield 
(1994:52) argues that complex emergencies  
“such as famine in certain parts of Africa, have a distinct political economy structured by 
relations of power and gender (…) Within this framework, it is possible to regard famine as 
one possible outcome of a process of impoverishment resulting from the transfer of assets 
from the weak to the politically strong”.  
 
Macrae agrees and argues that “war-related humanitarian crises are symptomatic of strategies of warfare 
which seek to inflict not simply a military defeat, but to disempower the opposition, to deny it an identity, 
and to undermine its ability to maintain political and economic integrity” (Macrae, 1998).  
 Keen stresses that the negative effects of conflict on food security are not simply a regrettable and 
unwanted consequence, but much rather a deliberate strategy (Keen, 1991: 150-151). De Waal concurs that 
behind the image of famine as “something simple, huge and apocalyptic” there exist a hidden agenda, 
which makes famine functional for certain political players (De Waal, 1989: 3). 
Although expressly prohibited by international law, Polman argues that starvation as a tactic of war 
is used because it is fast, effective and cheap and sanctions connected with breaching the Geneva 
Conventions are non-existent. Furthermore, a potential famine will most probably attract Food Aid, which 
the combatants can exploit to fund their war efforts (Polman, 2009: 114). 
According to Macrae and Zwi, attacks on food serve three primary functions in conflict situations 
(1992: 301). The first function is the political function. By undermining the ability of communities to 
produce and obtain food, combatants are able to render these people dependent either on themselves or on 
NGOs. This ensures that these people will become compliant, thinking it unwise to bite the hand that feeds 
them. An example of this can be found in the case of Uganda, where the government seemed to make little 
haste with solving the security problem in the North, where Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army 
terrorized civilians. Due to this lack of security the local Acholi population, a minority in Uganda, was 
often uprooted and spent a considerable amount of time in refugee camps. However, President Yoweri 
Museveni used this to his advantage, since it prevented the Northerners from aiding the Lord’s Resistance 
Army and made them dependent on government handouts (Green, 2008).  
Frances Stewart argues that food is very often used as a weapon in war. The ability to secure food 
is an essential task to sustain one’s own group and thus to guarantee the loyalty of supporters. Conversely, 
preventing enemy groups from securing food will enable their defeat (Stewart, 1998: 563). Polman 
provides another perspective on the political argument provided here. She recounts how the WFP offered 
local warlords in Northeastern Somalia to distribute Food Aid in that region in 1992. Although that part of 
the country was not hungry, there existed a considerable amount of social unrest. Local leaders were 
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confronted with the following dilemma: Since the local population did not need the food, they would 
probably sell it to acquire weapons. Yet, refusing the Food Aid was not an option, since rival clans, who 
were not hungry either, did accept the Food Aid and were arming themselves with the spoils. This way an 
arms race emerged and no clan or warlord could afford to refuse the aid (Polman, 2009: 122).  
 The second function Macrae and Zwi identify is economic. During conflicts, there are always those 
who benefit, and these people often have ties to those in power, both politically and militarily. By keeping 
food supplies limited, these merchants can make significant profits out of this situation of scarcity. This 
argument resonates with Amrita Rangasami’s view of famine. Rangasami argues that “the famine process 
cannot be defined with reference to the victims of starvation alone. It is a process in which benefits accrue 
to one section of the community while losses flow to the other” (Rangasami, 1985: 1748). Stewart concurs 
that during conflict, some groups become economic "winners". They manage to sustain and often improve 
their livelihoods, since the conflict creates economic opportunities, such as theft, black market activities 
and profit from shortages (1998; 563-64). Keen (1994: 111) describes how in the case of Sudan between 
1983 and 1988, famine promised and to some extent delivered both economic and military benefits and 
was also linked to sexual exploitation and religious indoctrination. 
Finally, the third function of attacks on food, the military function, is the most logical. Combatants 
need food supplies to feed themselves and depend on the civilian population to provide them with this. As 
a WFP spokesperson told Polman: “In every war, soldiers are the last to die of hunger. It’s frustrating, very 
frustrating” (Polman, 2009: 129). This effectively pulls the civilian population into the conflict, blurring 
the lines between civilians and combatants. Opposing forces can therefore see civilians as a legitimate 
target for attacks, resulting in numerous civilian casualties in African civil conflicts, and many others being 
forced from their settlements (Macrae and Zwi 1992:  301). Furthermore, from a military standpoint, 
combatants in African civil conflicts usually also feel entitled to a share in the international Food Aid that 
flows into the country. Polman recounts how in negotiations with INGOs in Liberia, former President 
Charles Taylor demanded 15 percent of the value of the aid goods, to be paid to him personally in cash, 
since his troops had to eat as well. In Somalia, the levies on Food Aid demanded by Somali warlords rose 
to as much as 80 percent (Polman, 2009: 97). 
Polman argues that combatants know the advantages of the use of food as a weapon in African civil 
conflicts. During extensive fieldwork in Sierra Leone, she recorded how the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) rebels had eaten all the food in the surroundings of their headquarters in Makeni, until only canned 
food remained. First they slaughtered all the cattle, then they ate the harvest and eventually the seeds that 
should have created the harvests for the next year. When she asked the rebels why they had done so, she 
was provided with the following answer: “W.A.R. means Waste All Resources, so that you [the white 
Western aid community] will come and make it better” (Polman, 2009: 161 and 165). 
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Table 3: The Different Functions of Attacks on Food and Food Aid 
Political Economic Military 
Will make population 
dependent on those who 
control the food supply. 
Merchants can make significant 
profits out of situations of scarcity. 
These groups will then again render 
political support. 
Combatants need food 
supplies to feed 
themselves. 
Preventing opposing forces to 
access food will render their 
defeat. 
Diverted or confiscated Food Aid can 
be sold in order to buy arms. 
A diversion of a few 
percent of Food Aid is 
often enough to feed an 
entire militia. 
Diverted Food Aid can be 
used to reward supporters. 
Profits from the sale of food or Food 
Aid can be used to pay combatants. 
 
Access to food and Food Aid 
can prove instrumental in 
securing local support and 
survival of the group. 
Combatants can tax Food Aid.  
 
However, three quarters of international Food Aid is being distributed by private NGOs, who have 
no binding ethical code of conduct and who are not even required to know what the conflict, in which they 
are handing out food, is all about. When local rulers allowed NGOs to distribute Food Aid in a specific 
area, this was because the population had to be lured into staying in the area. On the other hand, in areas 
where Food Aid was barred, the population was supposed to relocate (Polman, 2009: 120). This point is 
confirmed in Macrae and Zwi’s work when they argue that  
“[f]ood has been used to lure civilian populations into areas controlled by government or rebel 
forces (…) Similarly, by blocking relief aid into rural, rebel-held areas and centring relief 
efforts in garrison towns, famine affected populations may be forced to move into 
government-held areas” (Macrae and Zwi, 1992: 308). 
 
2.5.3 Conclusion 
 
This section has shown us that using the control over food as a tactic in conflict can have political, 
economic and military functions. Table 3 provides a schematisation of the main functions grouped in to 
these three categories. In the case studies, I will be analysing control over food supply according to the 
classification provided in Table 3. This means I will look at the political, economic and military 
implications of using the “hunger weapon”. 
In my opinion, it is crucial to keep in mind that in each conflict there are both winners and losers. 
Conflict in the African context most definitely serves a purpose to the few in power who are, in the words 
of the esteemed Nigerian writer Chinua Achebe in his novel A Man of the People, “the smart, and the lucky 
and hardly ever the best” (Achebe, 1988: 37). Those in power often have a stake in creating an enduring 
conflict and perpetuating conditions of famine might prove instrumental in realizing this. The economic 
value of Food Aid alone amounts to millions, not taking into account the political and military significance 
of such control. In countries like Somalia, where there is little to fight over, control over Food Aid might 
become the sole purpose of hostilities. 
Finally, another factor leads me to believe that food will increasingly become valuable to 
combatants as a tactic of war. There is currently no definite answer to the question whether the effects of 
 32 
climate change cause an increase in conflict (Barnett, 2003: 11). However, climate change makes 
agricultural practices in many parts of Africa more volatile, due to harsher and more unpredictable weather 
conditions as well as an increase in desertification. Africa, where according to the IMF 95 percent of the 
population depends on agriculture for their livelihood, is the continent that is most vulnerable to climate 
change. “In the coming years, many African countries are likely to experience more severe droughts and 
declines in water supply, which would further aggravate food shortages on the continent” (Kato, 2008). 
Furthermore, due to an increased likeliness of natural disasters, populations may seek to migrate, raising 
the risk of social conflicts. According to estimates made by the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), by 2080, almost a billion people in Asia and Africa could experience shortages of water, and 
many could face increased hunger. “In some of the poorest countries, the damage—when measured as a 
reduction in agricultural productivity—could reach devastating levels of greater than 50 percent” (Kato, 
2008). This line of reasoning leads me to believe that food may become increasingly scarce in the future in 
Africa and the control over the supply of food more valuable. Where weather conditions have become 
unpredictable, famines might occur more frequently and poor subsistence farmers may become more 
dependent on other sources of nutrition like Food Aid. Most probably, for combatants, the control over 
food production in general and Food Aid in particular will become an ever more valuable weapon. 
 
2.5.4 Conclusion and implications 
 
The aim of this Chapter was to provide background to the topic of the use of food as a weapon and to 
provide the necessary tools to place the case studies into context. Furthermore, I have drawn a partial 
theoretical framework from the literature, which I will be evaluating in the remainder of this study. 
 The first section, linked to questions one and two of the set of questions, has shown us that it is 
essential to be careful when interpreting reports and even newspaper articles about conflict situations 
where food is used as a weapon, especially when they concern the abuse of Food Aid. In the remainder of 
the study, I will therefore remain vigilant about creating a biased analysis. 
 The second section aimed to raise awareness of the importance of political factors in creating and 
aggravating food insecurity and links back to questions three to seven. Not just the availability of food, but 
more the access to food is crucial in creating famines. Food Aid can create a greater availability of food, 
but if access remains limited, little change is effectuated. Furthermore, famines are essentially a game of 
winners and losers and it is therefore crucial in the case studies to answer the question of “Qui Bono?” The 
short overview of the centrality of Food Aid has shown us how vulnerable many societies are to the 
manipulation and obstruction of Food Aid deliveries. The large percentage of the population depending on 
Food Aid in the two case study chapters will call for a strong focus on the component of Food Aid within 
the aggregate of potential uses of food as a weapon. 
 The third section, building on question eight, has provided us with a theoretical model based on the 
work of Macrae and Zwi (1991; 1994) and Keen (1994). This model has been depicted in Figures 1 to 4. In 
the case study chapters, I will be evaluating the adequacy of this model. I expect to find that the situation in 
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the case studies will most resemble Figure 4, in which the combatants both obstruct the traditional means 
of food production and procurement as well as the delivery of Food Aid. 
 The fourth section, linking back to questions nine to thirteen, outlined the different functions of the 
control over food as a tactic in conflict. These functions can be classified as political, economic and 
military. Table 3 provides a schematisation of the main functions grouped into these three categories. This 
classification will be used in the case studies, where I will be analysing control over food supply according 
to Table 3. In the two case studies, I expect to find that the control over food serves all three functions to 
different degrees. Those in power often have a stake in a perpetuation of conflict and creating famine might 
prove instrumental in realising this. This awareness is necessary to our understanding of the two case 
studies to follow. 
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Civil conflict and food insecurity in Darfur  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This section builds on the literature and theory provided in Chapter Two and applies the theory from this 
Chapter to the case of Darfur. The aim of this case study is to evaluate the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 
One in order to better understand the use of food as a weapon. The material used to research and write this 
case study is derived from reports about the situation on the ground, newspaper articles and interviews.8 
Although I aim to draw as much as possible on current information, it is not my intention to provide a 
chronological report of the humanitarian crisis that has been evolving in Darfur since 2003. Rather, I have 
analysed and presented facts in such a way to facilitate the evaluation of my hypotheses and bring insight 
into the topic at hand. In a rapidly changing conflict environment like Darfur, the challenges faced by 
NGOs as well as civilians in a given year are not necessarily the same in the next year. The nature of the 
use of food as a weapon at a given moment in time might be rather different a few months later. However, 
I feel this changing environment does not make the evaluation of my hypotheses impossible. It is my aim 
to provide insight in the “How and Why?” questions of attacks on food security, not to provide a 
chronological overview of the evolution of the use of this weapon. 
 As a format for these case study chapters, I have slightly deviated from the traditional format of 
overall description and analysis. Instead, the case study chapters will follow the format of the set of 
questions and the corresponding section as outlined in Chapter Two. This results in four separate sections 
for the case study chapters. The first section will provide a background to the conflict. The subsequent 
three sections are more analytical. Within each of these three sections, I will first provide description 
followed by a theoretical analysis, resulting in three subsections of theory, rather than one theoretical 
section. This structure, I feel, results in a more comprehensive evaluation of the different theoretical 
segments identified in Chapter Two and the case study chapters will gain significantly in clarity. The first 
section provides background to the nature of the conflict in Darfur, tying in with questions one and two of 
the set of questions. The second section deals with the nature of food supply to non-combatants and the 
question of how this supply changed due to the conflict. This links back to questions three to seven. The 
third section will build on this by providing an analysis of the use of food as a weapon in Darfur, 
essentially answering the “How” question. The fourth section, linking back to questions nine to 13, deals 
with the “Why” question. Why is control over food used as a weapon in Darfur and why is it so effective? 
Finally, the conclusion will summarise the main findings from this case study. 
 
3.2 Background to the conflict in Darfur 
 
The crisis in Darfur is the result of a conflict between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and rebel 
opposition movements in Darfur, most notably the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM). The conflict in Darfur broke out in early 2003, after the SLA and the JEM 
                                                 
8
 For a list of the interviews please see Appendix I. 
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began attacking government targets in the region.9 These rebels accused the GoS of favouring nomadic 
Arab pastoralists over black African agriculturalists and demanded inclusion in the new power sharing 
arrangements between the North and the South Sudan. 
 The conflict is thus being played out along ethnic lines, with Arab Janjaweed militia supporting the 
GoS and ethnic groups like the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit siding with the rebels. Darfur, which actually 
means land of the Fur, has a history of conflict and tension over land and grazing rights between Arab and 
non-Arab groups (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006: 32; BBC News, 2009b; Flint and De Waal, 2008). 
 There were a number of causes underlying the outbreak of violence in 2003. First, as mentioned, 
Darfur has a history of ethnic conflict of Fur, Zaghawa and Massalit versus Arab groups. Moreover, over 
the past decades, the three states that make up Darfur have been systematically marginalised by the GoS. 
At a national level, the GoS has pursued a strategy of arabisation, the so-called Arab gathering, which is 
perceived as a threat by the black African people of Darfur. On the other hand, the Arab communities 
within Darfur feel marginalised by the majority black African groups. Finally, within Darfur, due to the 
increase in drought years, competition over natural resources has become fiercer (Buchanan-Smith and 
Jaspars, 2006: 32). Effectively, the conflict has economic, political, and ethnic dimensions.  Its economic 
roots lie in the competition between Arab pastoralists and African agriculturalists over resources, such as 
land and water. Political marginalisation has also contributed to the conflict. Finally, it has acquired an 
ethnic component in which civilians deliberately have been targeted based on their ethnicity.    
 The rebellion in Darfur alarmed the Sudanese authorities, since it posed a threat to the viability of 
the country as a whole. The GoS feared that similarly neglected regions in the east would demand large 
degrees of autonomy, if not the right to independence.  Thus, the government’s response was to mount a 
campaign of aerial bombardment supporting ground attacks by an Arab militia, the Janjaweed, recruited 
from local groups and armed by the government. The Janjaweed mounted a campaign of killing, rape, 
looting and burning villages, abduction of children, poisoning of water supplies, and destroying food 
sources. However, up till the moment of writing, the GoS denies any links to the Janjaweed, who are 
accused of attempts to cleanse black Africans from the territory. President Omar al-Bashir has even called 
the Janjaweed "thieves and gangsters" (Tanner, 2005; BBC News, 2009b). 
 Since the onset of the conflict in 2003, the crisis has affected more than 4.7 million people, 
including nearly 2.7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). Most of these IDPs now live in camps. 
Darfuris say the Janjaweed patrol outside the camps, men are killed, and women raped if they venture too 
far in search of firewood or water (BBC News, 2009b; USAID, 2009). 
 According to International Crisis Group, in a March 2009 update, the Darfur conflict has changed 
radically in the past year and a half. Although there are fewer deaths than in the 2003-2004 period, the 
conflict has mutated as the parties have splintered and the number of confrontations have multiplied. In 
2008, violence again increased, and access for humanitarian agencies became more difficult. Furthermore, 
attacks by both the government and the rebel forces continue, including large-scale aerial attacks in West 
                                                 
9
 The region that comprises Darfur consists of three states: North Darfur (Shamal Darfor), with its capital Al-Fashir, 
West Darfur (Gharb Darfor) with its capital Geneina (or Al-Junaynah) and South Darfur (Janob Darfor), of which 
Nyala is the capital (BBC News, 2009b; Flint and De Waal, 2008). Please see the map at the end of this section. 
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Darfur in February 2008. An attack by government troops on an IDP camp in Kalma, in South Darfur in 
August 2008 killed more than 30 IDPs and drew widespread international condemnation (International 
Crisis Group, 2009). On the other hand, rebel signatories of the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), 
have been responsible for attacks on civilians, humanitarians, the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS) and some 
of the violence in the IDP camps. These rebels have essentially benefited from the conflict as their leaders 
have been given government jobs and land. However, they lack a clearly defined role in the new peace 
negotiations, have little to gain from them, and are thus potential spoilers (International Crisis Group, 
2009). 
 A recent USAID report estimates that between January and mid-May 2009, violence again 
displaced approximately 137,000 individuals in Darfur. Concurrently, due to increased insecurity, targeted 
attacks against aid workers and bureaucratic obstacles, humanitarian agencies have experienced reduced 
access to affected populations since 2006. Moreover, as a result of worsening relations between the GoS 
and the West, President al-Bashir announced the expulsion of 13 international organizations and closure of 
three national humanitarian agencies in March 2009. The remaining humanitarian organizations on the 
other hand are facing deteriorating access to those in need (USAID, 2009). 
 The May 2006 DPA was essentially a failure, lacking important signatories and scope. Some core 
issues that drive the conflict, among them land tenure and use, including grazing rights, and the role and 
reform of local government and administrative structures, were not addressed and will need to be on the 
agenda of any new negotiations if any significant agreement is to be reached.  
 The humanitarian consequences of the conflict in Darfur have been dire. By October 2008, there 
were an estimated 2,7 million IDPs, with an additional two million residents considered affected by 
conflict. The humanitarian crisis was at its worst in 2003-2004, with an acute malnutrition rate of 21.8 
percent and an estimated 160,000 excess deaths between September 2003 and June 2005. Between 2004 
and 2005, malnutrition as well as the mortality rate declined considerably. Yet, from 2006, food security 
and nutrition rates deteriorated again. Currently, food security is thought to have improved, yet this 
improvement is mainly caused by good weather conditions, and insecurity and restrictions on movements 
continue to be significant constraints. The population of Darfur is faced with too few livelihood options to 
construct a sustainable living and many groups are resorting to the collection and sale of natural resources, 
which in turn fuels the conflict (Pantuliano et al, 2009: 2). 
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Map 1: Darfur (University of Texas Libraries, 2009). 
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3.3 The nature of food supply to non-combatants in Darfur 
 
3.3.1 Introduction  
  
In Chapter Two, I demonstrated that food insecurity is an issue of both limited availability of food in 
conjunction with imperfect access to food. Furthermore, as Reginald Green argued, without war, drought 
in Africa has seldom resulted in massive loss of life (1994: 38). I also outlined in the previous Chapter how 
vulnerable many African societies are to the manipulation and obstruction of Food Aid deliveries. All of 
these previous arguments hold true in this case study. This section will focus on the nature of food supply 
to and livelihoods of non-combatants, corresponding to questions three to seven of the set of questions. In 
this section, I will first pay attention to the livelihoods of Darfuris before the conflict, followed by an 
analysis of the impact of the conflict on these livelihoods. The third section will answer questions six and 
seven, namely, to what extent the non-combatant population depends on Food Aid and whether this 
dependency has changed as a result of the ongoing conflict. These three sections will be followed by a 
theoretical analysis, in which I will contextualize the findings from this case study using the body of 
literature and theory as explained in Chapter Two.  
 
3.3.2 Livelihoods in Darfur before the conflict  
 
Due to its geographical location and the impact of climate change, Darfur is particularly vulnerable to 
variable and extreme weather conditions affecting food production. Bromwich and Adam provide an 
analysis of the environmental impact of the conflict in Darfur. They argue that rainfall in Darfur has 
decreased over the period for which records exist. Due to the effects of climate change, the vulnerability of 
livelihoods of the Darfuris has increased. “Increasing variability is causing a rise in the percentage of failed 
harvests” (Bromwich and Adam, 2007: 18). Furthermore, the prevailing geology is highly unfavourable 
towards the storage of groundwater, further increasing vulnerability to droughts. The increase in population 
density since the mid 1970s, in turn, puts pressure on both sedentary and pastoralist livelihood systems. 
This increased population density has caused overgrazing and intensification of cropping, resulting in 
lower yields and carrying capacities. “Whilst the environmental pressure on livelihoods is acting over the 
long term, it can be climatic extremes that trigger major shifts in livelihood strategies and this is frequently 
accompanied by conflict” (Bromwich and Adam, 2007: 21). 
 Despite these unfavourable climatic conditions however, in the absence of conflict and very bad 
droughts, the region was normally able to achieve food self-sufficiency and the more prosperous parts of 
the region even produced a surplus. Prior to the conflict in Darfur, livelihoods were based on a 
combination of farming, herding, trade and labour migration. The surplus-producing parts turned into a 
source of employment and grain for the less affluent and prosperous parts of the region. Generally, the 
northeast of Darfur is most food insecure (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006: 7). 
 Another important means of food supply to non-combatants consists of food purchased at the local 
markets. A May 2008 report prepared by Tufts University’s Feinstein International Centre on the impact of 
the conflict on trade and markets in Darfur lists the devastating effects of the conflict on Darfur’s 
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previously thriving trade system. The authors of the report argue that trade is the lifeblood of the economy 
of Darfur and one of the main ways in which different ethnic and livelihood groups interact. Darfur has a 
three-tier market network, consisting of village and rural assembly markets, where farmers and pastoralists 
sell their produce, intermediate town markets where small traders trade with larger traders, and finally 
major town markets, also the point of export of many of Darfur’s cash crops and livestock (Buchanan-
Smith and Fadul, 2008: 7). 
 Young, Osman et al. (2005: 40) argue that in recent years, the traditional distinction between 
sedentary farmers and nomadic pastoralists no longer applied as the livelihoods of the two groups have 
merged. Before the intensification of hostilities in February 2003, nearly all farmers reared cattle and 
nearly all herders farmed. However, the distinction between the two groups, often cited as a partial cause 
for the conflict, is still relevant. Pressure on natural resources has contributed to conflicts locally between 
neighbouring groups, often played out along the lines of pastoralists versus farmers.  
 
3.3.3 The effect of conflict on the food-supply to non-combatants  
 
The effect of conflict on the livelihood of the people of Darfur was almost immediate. It is estimated that 
within the first year of the conflict, the livelihoods of over a million people had been more or less 
destroyed due to a combination of population displacement, restricted movements, widespread destruction 
and looting of assets essential to the survival of the local population (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006: 
7). The sections below will deal in more depth with the different ways the conflict affected livelihoods. 
Here I will outline how these livelihoods changed because of the conflict. Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars 
argue that few people in Darfur now have access to their pre-conflict livelihoods. Alternatively, many have 
become dependent on day labouring and petty trade, which is a precarious alternative to their traditional 
means of livelihood that is better adapted to the local conditions. Generally, this day labour is poorly 
remunerated and wages have fallen even more as the job market has become saturated in some areas 
(Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006: 8).  
 Another livelihood strategy on which many people depend and especially IDPs, is the collection 
and sale of natural resources, such as grass and firewood. This endeavour is highly risky as it involves 
venturing out of towns and camps, facing the threat of attack or rape. Furthermore, access to wild foods, is 
severely restricted directly by combatants and more indirectly by the prevailing level of insecurity 
(Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2007: S62-S63). De Waal compares the apocalyptic 1984 famine with the 
current food crisis in Darfur and concludes that the main difference in coping strategies lies in the 
availability of reserves. During the 1984 famine, 100,000 people died and Food Aid did not arrive in time. 
However, Darfur society did not collapse due to the formidable survival skills of its people. Flint and De 
Waal recorded an old woman saying “[w]e don’t just starve; someone must force starvation upon us” (Flint 
and De Waal, 2008: 146).  People had stocked up on food, were able and willing to travel huge distances to 
search for food, work or charity and managed to gather wild foods from the bush. 
“Today, food reserves and animals have been stolen, and what use is the ability to gather five 
different kinds of wild grasses, 11 varieties of berry, plus roots and leaves (sic), if leaving a 
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camp means risking rape, mutilation or death? Predictions of up to 300,000 famine deaths 
must be taken seriously” (De Waal, 2004: 724). 
 
 Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars conclude that while occasional and short-lived improvements in the 
security situation have enabled localised returns to farming, in short, any livelihood strategies that have 
persisted are now operating at much reduced levels. All livelihood strategies identified before the conflict 
are directly affected by levels of insecurity and restrictions on the movement of people and livestock as 
well as on trade. Furthermore, opportunities to earn an income remain very limited for most of the conflict-
affected population of Darfur. Most importantly, people have little day-to-day control over their 
livelihoods. Combatants still determine whether people are able to return to their pre-conflict livelihoods 
(Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2007: S63). 
 Concerning the lively market system existing in Darfur prior to the conflict, Buchanan-Smith and 
Fadul (2008: 9-14) observe that Darfur’s traders have been put to the ultimate test by the current conflict. 
The current conflict has seriously disturbed Darfur’s traditional market network. Farmers are unable to 
farm and herders cannot bring their livestock to the traders, causing severe shortages on the supply side. 
Trade in locally produced grain has all but collapsed since the start of the conflict as farmers became 
displaced and it proved difficult to transport grain from traditional surplus-producing areas to the major 
markets. Many rural markets have been abandoned and movements have become more restricted for fear of 
attacks. Moreover, many markets have relocated to rebel-held territory and are outside the reach of those 
staying in GoS controlled areas. One of the most striking features observed by the researchers is the 
emergence of major new markets in the largest IDP camps near Darfur’s state capitals. These markets are 
beyond the reach of the GoS and have become de facto tax havens, forming part of the shadow economy. 
The camp sheikhs usually control trade within the camps and IDPs instead of traders now dominate 
business. This has created a class who fares well by these new conditions. Unsurprisingly, many traders 
have gone out of business in recent years. Political affiliation now plays a major role in access to trade. 
 Of concern to the prospects of post-conflict food security in Darfur is an observation made by 
Bromwich and Adam (2007: 27). They outline how many of the IDP camps are located on the outskirts of 
towns. Towns in Darfur occur in the wadi plains10 with favourable conditions for farming. This means that 
due to the IDP camps many of the most intensive areas of degradation are on prime farmland. This way, 
the soil will lose its fertility, its structure and its ability to hold water, turning into dust, which can then be 
eroded by wind or rain. As a result, crop yields are severely depleted. “This undermines the future food 
security of Darfur’s new larger settlements” (Bromwich and Adam, 2007: 27).  
 
3.3.4 The role and influence of Food Aid  
 
Food Aid is of crucial importance to the population of Darfur as the region is currently the largest 
humanitarian emergency in the world. During the current crisis, the three states that make up Darfur 
received more Food Aid than ever before in their history. During 2005, the peak of the Food Aid 
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 Wadi is the Arabic name given to a valley but it might also refer to a dry riverbed that contains water only during 
times of heavy rain. Wadis are a source of water for people living in rural areas, and most oases and villages have 
sprung up because of their proximity. 
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distribution, over 500,000mt of food was distributed to over three million beneficiaries (Buchanan-Smith 
and Jaspars, 2006: 117). The WFP currently provides monthly food rations to approximately two million 
IDPs, totalling about one-third of Darfur’s population. Furthermore, the WFP also provides aid to people in 
villages and rural areas, in an attempt to bridge the pre-harvest “hunger gap”. During these peak months, 
food distributions in Darfur reach more than 3 million people (World Food Programme, 2009c). The 
overwhelming finding of many studies on Food Aid in Darfur is how valuable and significant Food Aid is 
as a means of subsistence. Due to Food Aid distribution, the prevalence of acute malnutrition has declined 
considerably (Young, 2007: S42; Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006: 117-118). 
 However, there is another, less obvious reason why Food Aid is so important in Darfur. Food Aid 
affects its beneficiaries in two ways. It is not just used for consumption but also provides an income 
transfer. This income transfer again has two faces. Food Aid rations release income that would otherwise 
have to be spent on food but they can also be sold directly. This second function of Food Aid, the income 
transfer, is especially significant for IDPs with few other sources of income, and was frequently identified 
by them as the most important source of livelihood, contributing between 40-80%. It has been described as 
“their ticket into the market economy” (Hamid et al, 2005: 34). In the traditionally most food insecure 
North Darfur, the relative importance of Food Aid appeared greatest. 
 Food Aid has been instrumental in keeping grain prices down and keeping markets functioning. 
Due to the conflict, the trade in locally produced grain had all but collapsed as most farmers became 
displaced and transporting grain from surplus areas to deficit areas became too risky. This resulted in huge 
price differences between neighbouring areas. The trade in relief grain has compensated the collapse of the 
trade in locally produced grain to a considerable extent. As an example, cereal traders in Nyala’s market 
estimated that the quantity of relief grain traded in the market outnumbered locally produced grain three to 
one. Similar estimates were given for other markets (Buchanan-Smith and Fadul, 2008: 15). The beneficial 
multiplier effect of the trade in relief grain becomes apparent in the urban markets. It provides employment 
for porters, who load and unload the grain, to owners of the donkey carts that transport it and to flour 
millers. Yet, most importantly, the availability of relief grain for trading purposes has stabilised cereal 
prices at a time when incomes in Darfur are severely limited. Buchanan-Smith and Fadul (2008: 16) quoted 
one cereal trader saying that “without food aid there would be starvation” and “[i]f it hadn’t been for food 
aid, more traders would have gone bankrupt”. 
 
3.3.5 Theoretical implications  
  
To what extent is the impact of conflict on food security and livelihoods in Darfur in line with my 
hypothesis in Chapter Two? As Sen noted, food security is much more an issue of both limited availability 
of food in conjunction with imperfect access to food. He also argued that famine has never occurred in a 
functioning liberal democracy. This seems to hold true for Darfur. Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars observed 
that despite unfavourable climatic and geographical conditions, in the absence of conflict and very bad 
droughts, Darfur was normally able to achieve food self-sufficiency and the more prosperous parts of the 
region even managed to produce a surplus (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006: 7). However, as a result of 
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the conflict, these surpluses evaporated and any remaining surplus produce was unable to reach areas with 
a deficit. 
 Another important observation ties in with Green’s argument that without war, drought in Africa 
has seldom resulted in massive loss of life. This seems to hold true with some reservations. Although in 
Darfur droughts have caused massive loss of life during the 1984 famine, especially in the absence of Food 
Aid, the difference with the current conflict-induced famine can be found in the undermining of traditional 
coping strategies that Darfuris master. The non-combatant population either has been robbed of their 
traditional safeguards in the form of livestock and seeds, or has chosen to sell or abandon them. Bromwich 
and Adam (2007: 15) record how during the 1984 famine Darfuris chose not to eat their seed or sell off 
livestock. Instead, they withstood remarkable periods of hunger in order to retain the capacity to rebuild 
their livelihood after the famine. In the current conflict-famine situation, these traditional coping strategies 
have proved fruitless. Young, Osman et al make a similar observation about the difference between normal 
and conflict famine when they write that “[e]ven during previous region-wide famines, failures of 
livelihoods were principally in production (farming and livestock); in nearly all cases, the collection of 
natural resources, migration and the sending back of remittances continued to support rural livelihoods” 
(Young, Osman et al., 2005: 43-44).   
 With regard to the effect of the conflict on the livelihoods of people, it is important to notice how 
traditional agricultural livelihood strategies gave way to a wage labour economy. This ad hoc economic 
transformation led the price of labour to drop, following the pattern described by David Keen (1994: 112). 
After raiding and looting disrupted economic life and stripped communities of their assets, victims tried to 
sell the remaining assets, including labour in order to buy grain. This led to the price of grain to go up and 
the remuneration for labour to plummet. 
 However, the second force described by Keen (1994: 112), the plummeting of the value of assets 
in relation to sharp increases in the price of grain, has been partially avoided in the case of Darfur, due to 
the strong presence of Food Aid and the impact of relief grain on the local market. Not only has the price 
of grain remained fairly stable due to the sale of relief grain rations, enabling the majority of people to 
afford this commodity, but the availability of Food Aid has also strengthened the bargaining position of 
wage labourers, who no longer have to accept unreasonably low wages to avoid starvation. 
 
3.4 The use of food as a weapon 
  
3.4.1 Introduction  
 
The previous section outlined the direct and indirect effects of conflict on livelihood strategies in Darfur. 
Livelihoods have changed drastically and food security has been severely undermined as a result of the 
current conflict between the GoS and its Janjaweed allies and the black African militia, most notably the 
SLA and the JEM.11 
                                                 
11
 It has to be noted though that these black African militia have splintered further, limiting the chances of reaching a 
comprehensive peace agreement from which all parties are to gain, and that thus will be complied with. According to 
the UN, there are now at least a dozen factions, a number that sometimes rises and falls in the course of a single day. 
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 This section will detail how this change in livelihoods, which I outlined above came about. Here I 
will provide a broad overview of the different tactics combatants employ to undermine food production 
and procurement, as well as the delivery of Food Aid, tying in with question eight of the set of questions. I 
will follow the framework laid out by Macrae and Zwi in the previous Chapter, regarding acts of omission, 
commission and provision. I will analyse whether and to what extent each of these acts was committed in 
Darfur. Thereafter, I will evaluate the (un)intentional effects of Food Aid in Darfur. This section is 
concluded by an overview of the theoretical implications that follow when applying the hypotheses of 
Chapter Two to the case of Darfur. Here, I will give special attention to the theoretical model drawn up in 
the previous Chapter. 
 
3.4.2 Acts of omission 
 
Macrae and Zwi describe acts of omission as “failures to act” (1994:11). Such acts are instances where 
food supplies are misused or “where governments fail to monitor adequately and plan for food security in 
all sections of a country; it identifies the failure of governments to manage food reserves and to instigate 
and facilitate appropriate emergency measures” (Macrae and Zwi 1992: 301). In Darfur, there are a number 
of acts, committed mainly by the GoS, which would qualify as acts of omission. This section will provide a 
general, but by no means complete overview of these acts. 
 In the background to the conflict provided above, I highlighted the systematic marginalisation of 
Darfur by the GoS. Since the nineteenth century, the government in Khartoum has marginalised Darfur. 
Although the region’s contribution to the economic welfare of the country has been significant, it has only 
profited marginally from the ensuing development, and has had a limited say in decision-making. The most 
basic public services are lacking in the region, and those that do exist face a continual decline. This 
includes the judiciary, police, health services, infrastructure and education. Exemplary to the decline of the 
latter is the drop in literacy levels by more than one-third between 1993 and 2002, compared to only a 2.9 
percent drop in North Sudan as a whole. Furthermore, the continually declining state of infrastructure 
makes it increasingly difficult to transport food surpluses to those areas in need (Young, Osman et al., 
2005: 45). 
 Another act of omission committed by the GoS is the closing of the national border with Libya in 
May 2003. The decision to close the border with Libya served to prevent recruitment by rebel groups of 
Darfuri migrant workers in Libya. However, its effect was to stop the flourishing livestock export trade and 
to limit the rebels’ ability to accrue benefit from their control over these trade routes, for example through 
imposing taxes (Young, Osman et al. 2005: 48). However, these trade routes also served to bring food 
supplies to the markets in Darfur and were especially important in times of scarcity. After the closing of 
the border, some smuggling started. However, these smuggling operations were highly risky and therefore 
                                                                                                                                                               
These black African factions are united in their struggle against the Janjaweed, as well as by their goal of attaining 
economic and political equality for Darfuris. However, they are divided by history, internal power struggles and 
fractured lines of communication. Since the onset of the conflict, the SLA splintered into a number of factions, such 
as the SLM-Minni, not to be confused with SLM-Free Will, SLM-Unity or Greater-SLM and the SLM-Al Nur. Then 
again, the Minni faction is not to be lumped together with G-19, an umbrella group under the umbrella of the National 
Redemption Front (McCrummen, 2007). 
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only involved valuable items such as camels (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006: 60). The fact that no 
grain was smuggled is a valuable observation and is a recurrent theme in many conflicts of a similar nature. 
Kaplan (2003: 192) noticed a similar trend in South Sudan during the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-
2005) between the GoS and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). He describes how no relief 
food was reaching those in need, yet  
“[a]t this point, the only supplies not in short supply in southern Sudan were salt, sweets, 
liquor, and cigarettes, which until a few weeks before - rebel antiaircraft fire notwithstanding - 
pilots had been willing to fly in on account of the high prices these items fetched. Grain just 
brought too small a profit for a pilot to risk losing his life” (Kaplan, 2003: 192). 
 
  Finally, another important act of omission committed by the GoS concerned its policy to sell vast 
quantities of its own crops to other countries, in order to capitalize on high global food prices. This is 
clearly a failure on the part of the GoS to monitor food reserves adequately and to facilitate appropriate 
emergency measures. It should have used these food surpluses to increase levels of food security and 
should have distributed them to regions with a food deficit, such as Darfur, rather than sell them to the 
highest bidder.  This occurs at the same time when the country is receiving billions of dollars of free food 
from international donors, such as the WFP. The government in Khartoum laid out huge fields in the 
desert, cultivating amongst others beans, wheat, sorghum and melons, initially in an attempt to create 
Sudanese self-sufficiency. However, while Darfur is starving, the government decided to sell these 
reserves instead to countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In 2007, the United States 
government shipped 283,000 tons of sorghum into Darfur. That seems to be about the same amount of 
sorghum that the GoS exported (Gettleman, 2008).  
 Eric Reeves, a professor at Smith College and an outspoken activist who has written frequently on 
the Darfur crisis, called this anomaly “one of the least reported and most scandalous features of the 
Khartoum regime’s domestic policies” (Reeves, 2008).  New York Times reporter Jeffrey Gettleman quotes 
UN officials as having said that if they do not bring food into Darfur, the government surely will not. 
Director of the WFP Program in Sudan Kenro Oshidari argued that Sudan could be self-sufficient in terms 
of food production and would even have the potential to be the breadbasket of Africa. “The last time the 
government gave the World Food Program (sic) any food for Darfur was in 2006. It was 22,000 tons of 
Sudanese-grown sorghum. It was a fraction of what the people needed, United Nations officials said, and 
some of the grain was rancid and infested with weevils” (Gettleman, 2008). 
 
3.4.3 Acts of commission  
 
Attacks on livelihoods in the form of attacks on food production and procurement form an integral part of 
the different battle tactics in Darfur and a complete and detailed account of these atrocities would go 
beyond the scope of this case study. These attacks on food production and procurement fall in the category 
of acts of commission (Macrae and Zwi, 1992: 303; Macrae and Zwi, 1994: 13-19). Acts under this 
heading relate to those actions that effectively undermine agricultural production and obstruct coping 
strategies. This category also includes attacks of Food Aid convoys, safe corridors and markets, and forced 
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population relocation. They differ from acts of omission in that they do not require a large-scale 
government policy and are more direct in nature. 
 The most widely reported attack on food production in Darfur consists of the burning of farmland 
and villages. Two departing leaders of the current UN/African Union peacekeeping mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID) recently claimed that the war in Darfur is over, and has devolved into a “low-intensity” 
security problem. Eric Reeves reacted to this statement that the only reason why the conflict in Darfur 
could currently be described as “low intensity” would be that “there is relatively little that remains in the 
way of promising new targets of opportunity among the villages and lands of non-Arab or African 
populations of Darfur” (Reeves, 2008). The black African population of Darfur made up over two-thirds of 
the population prior to the conflict. Most statistics put the entire population of Darfur at six million before 
2003. Taking current estimates of the remaining non-Arab population in Darfur into account, this means 
that approximately 70 to 85 percent of the African population is either displaced or dead (Reeves, 2009).   
 Furthermore, new data released by Google Earth show that over 3,300 villages in Darfur have been 
destroyed during the period of greatest violence immediately following the intensification of hostilities in 
February 2003. The highly detailed photographs available via Google Earth do not indicate the villages 
that were simply abandoned for fear of impending attacks (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 
2009). The total share of abandoned and destroyed villages is estimated around 80 to 90 percent (Reeves, 
2009). The next page shows a map of villages in Darfur that have been damaged or destroyed from the 
beginning of the conflict in 2003 until August 2009. Flint and De Waal recount how in the early stages of 
the conflict “[g]overnment and Janjawiid (sic) forces destroyed everything that made life possible. Food 
that could be carried away was; the rest was burned. Animals that could be taken away were; the rest were 
killed” (Flint and De Waal, 2008: 145). Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars (2006: 43) recognize a pattern in 
which the destruction of assets took place.  
“Typically attacks on villages resulted in: the burning of houses and all household goods; the 
loss or destruction of agricultural tools; the looting and destruction of food and seed stocks; 
looting of livestock; the looting or destruction of irrigation pumps; attacks on shops and 
grinding mills; and the looting of deployment assets such as revolving funds and grain banks.” 
 
 Furthermore, during the attacks aimed at the different black African groups, the Janjaweed are 
meticulous in leaving nothing useful behind for those wishing to return home. Their tactics strongly 
suggest a degree of central coordination and different sources provide accounts of the Janjaweed rebels 
being instructed by Khartoum to leave nothing behind that would enable the local population to return 
(Sundberg and Stern, 2007). By cutting down fruit trees or destroying irrigation ditches the Janjaweed 
eradicate farmers' claims to the land and ruin their livelihoods (De Waal, 2004: 73-24). “Pumps were 
smashed and wells polluted – often with corpses” (Flint and De Waal, 2008: 145). Buchanan-Smith and 
Jaspars (2006: 44) confirm this observation. The Janjaweed seem to have deliberately attacked important 
natural assets. Fruit trees, which usually require approximately fifteen years to grow back and carry fruit, 
were cut down and hand-dug wells had been destroyed or contaminated.  
 The different livelihood groups, farmers versus pastoralist, use their means of livelihood to 
actively destroy that of the other group. The incidence of the destruction of crops by grazing animals is a 
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common feature for farmers in Darfur. This represents an effort to destroy the livelihoods of these farming 
communities. On the other hand, pastoralists have reported instances of extensive burning of fields by 
farmers, in order to make them useless for herders to graze their cattle (Bromwich and Adam, 2007: 18). 
 
Map 2: Damaged and Destroyed villages in Darfur February 2003- August 2009 (United States 
Department of State - Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU), 2009). 
 
 Although the burning of farmland mostly affected the sedentary black African farmers, all sides 
suffered raids on livestock. The majority of the population of Darfur seems to have lost their livestock. Not 
only raids caused these livestock losses. Both Arabs and black Africans feared that owning livestock would 
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make them more vulnerable to attacks and thus resorted to distress sales. In 2004, the FAO estimated that 
livestock losses in GoS-held areas were around 90 percent. In SLA-controlled areas, this percentage was 
between 60 and 90. In the first year of the conflict, livestock prices more or less collapsed due to the 
flooding of the market (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006: 45-46).  
 Flint and De Waal (2008: 136) remark how black African militia sometimes deliberately target 
food production in the form of livestock in order to ambush civilians. In March 2004, Minni Minawi’s 
troops attacked west of the town of Mellit and seized a small herd of goats as well as a retarded shepherd. 
When the villagers found out about the attack, they deliberated about what to do. “The Mahamid [this 
specific Arab group] had learned earlier that when the Zaghawa [the attacking group] attack and capture 
animals, if you go after them, you will fall into an ambush”. Initially, the villagers decided not to pursue 
the attackers and just take the same number of goats from any Zaghawa group they would come across at a 
later stage. However, after being accused of cowardice by some of their women, a party of over 20 men set 
out to recapture the animals. Early in the morning, they were ambushed and only four made it back. The 
other men were killed and their bodies severely mutilated. Cynically enough, Reeves observes that “[t]he 
looting of cattle and livestock is no longer as powerful an incentive for Janjaweed militia precisely because 
of the ghastly successes of previous village raids” (Reeves, 2008). 
 Yet, according to many sources, the most fundamental problem currently affecting the population 
of Darfur in terms of livelihoods is the profound level of insecurity (Reeves, 2009). This state of insecurity 
continues as a result of the continued fighting. Consequently, the towns in Darfur have come under siege, 
as venturing outside of the towns or camps is a life threatening expedition. People living in SLA controlled 
areas often find no markets within reach but are barred from visiting markets in GoS controlled areas. The 
high levels of insecurity have also severely limited the cultivation of fields and blocked migration routes 
have led to overgrazing as livestock is unable to move (Young, Osman et al., 2005: 46-47; Bromwich and 
Adam, 2007: 22).  
 Although the UNAMID peacekeepers labelled the situation in Darfur a “low-intensity” conflict, 
humanitarian aid organizations are severely affected by the continuing insecurity. A number of prominent 
organisations, such as the WFP have announced on multiple occasions that if the security situation does not 
improve significantly, they will have to suspend food distributions in Darfur until the security situation 
improves. “If insecurity - from whatever source(s) - collapses present international humanitarian 
operations, there will be hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths, and it will not matter whether or not they 
are described as “low intensity”” (Reeves, 2009). 
 Proof for the statement that the Janjaweed deliberately aimed to undermine and annihilate the 
means of existence of black African groups can be found in other types of attacks than the ones mentioned 
above. Flint and De Waal (2008: 134) describe the case of the village of Girgira close to the border with 
Chad, where militia from West Darfur were said to have killed 148 people in a raid. At the scene “[m]any 
hundreds of cooking bowls and utensils were littered around – they all had had a bullet put through them, 
rendering them useless (...). This was not just a frenzy of murder. Time had been taken to target the things 
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that would make it difficult for people to survive”. In essence, such attacks are attacks on coping strategies, 
as identified by Macrae and Zwi. 
 A related strategy is the deliberate targeting of firewood patrols. This is gender-based violence, as 
women venture out of the towns and camps in search of firewood. Men searching for firewood risk a fatal 
beating, while women risk being raped (Flint and De Waal, 2008: 145; Young, 2007: S50). However, 
cooking fuel is necessary in order to prepare the food rations distributed by the WFP. Moreover, there are 
numerous accounts of how armed men, “guarding” the IDP camps stopped food entering the camps, even 
the wild foods gathered by the IDPs and took it for themselves and their camels (Flint and De Waal, 2008: 
146). 
  
3.4.4 Acts of provision: attacks on Food Aid  
 
Finally, this section will highlight acts of provision, which involve a differential supply of food. “Food 
may be selectively provided to government supporters, to those from whom support is sought, or to lure 
sections of the populations to areas controlled by the military” (Macrae and Zwi, 1994: 19). Such acts often 
involve control over Food Aid and a distribution of such aid to those for whom it originally was not meant. 
Acts of provision, especially involving the obstruction of Food Aid distribution have been commonplace in 
Sudan in previous conflicts and form an essential part of the current conflict strategies. “The government 
deployed long years of expertise in delaying and blocking relief operations with a farrago of bureaucratic 
entanglements” (Flint and De Waal, 2008: 145). 
 Thus, humanitarian aid workers face a wide array of obstructions that inhibit the effective 
distribution of Food Aid. Not only are relief workers severely obstructed, but also the militia responsible 
for high levels of insecurity remain unhindered. “In spite of government of Sudan promises to expedite the 
provision of assistance, bureaucratic barriers placed in front of aid agencies significantly inhibit immediate 
action” (Moszynski, 2004: 1275). 
 According to Flint and De Waal, “[h]uman catastrophe was a deliberate act” (2008: 145). Between 
the start of the conflict and the beginning of 2005, nearly two million people had been driven to camps and 
towns inside Darfur, and another 200,000 had crossed the border into Chad. However, the GoS made it 
their goal to prevent humanitarian aid organisations from reaching the IDPs. “Aid workers needed visas to 
enter Sudan, travel permits to Darfur, daily travel permits to leave the state capitals, and fuel permits to 
travel around Darfur” (Flint and De Waal, 2008: 146). 
 Yet, when conditions in the camps became intolerable, instead of allowing relief into the camps, 
the GoS tried to make the camps go away. In 2007, International Crisis Group wrote that the GoS was 
aware that the plight of the IDP’s galvanised world opinion. The IDPs managed to keep Darfur in the 
world’s spotlights, due to the horrifying reports coming out of the camps. Thus, part of Khartoum’s 
strategy has been to push the IDPs to leave the camps. For example in 2005, the government attempted to 
get residents of Kalma and other camps to return home. To this end, Khartoum paid leaders of the different 
ethnic groups, and offered the IDPs food and transport. When all else failed, the government troops 
resorted to force. Furthermore, the GoS also upped the pressure on NGOs and the UN to empty the camps, 
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by insinuating that they were not doing enough to encourage IDPs to return home. The GoS even went as 
far as to blame the humanitarian community for prolonging the crisis for “ulterior motives” (International 
Crisis Group, 2007: 7).  
 In July 2004, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan visited a number of camps in Darfur. At the first 
camp he was supposed to visit, in al Fasher, upon arrival he only found “stagnant puddles and dead 
donkeys”, but no people. According to the GoS officials present, the camp had been cleared just a few days 
before for the unlikely reason that it had “no sanitation”. Another camp near al Fasher was equally 
deserted, while Annan’s aides had seen it brimming with life a mere 24 hours earlier. According to 
government officials, the IDPs moved to the outskirts of town because the camp would flood when the 
rains came. What really happened was this: the IDPs were simply loaded onto trucks and dumped at the 
gates of another already overcrowded camp (Flint and De Waal, 2008: 146-47). 
 As mentioned above, the current state of insecurity in Darfur cripples Food Aid operations. 
Protecting humanitarian aid just seems not to be in Khartoum’s interest. According to one well-informed 
UN official, “[t]he vast majority of attacks on humanitarians occur in main towns and state capitals - where 
the Government of Sudan has absolute control. It is simply not in their interests to improve security” 
(Reeves, 2008). Maps 3 and 4 depict the decline in humanitarian access from 2006 to 2008, as well as the 
current situation in 2009. 
 Since the beginning of 2008, the WFP has been warning that banditry and attacks have been 
impeding its operations. The dramatic decline in security has caused a major reduction in food deliveries to 
Darfur (World Food Programme, 2008a). Most humanitarian operations and international humanitarian 
workers have retreated to urban areas, where there are still shockingly violent attacks, official harassment, 
car jackings, and banditry. There has also been an alarming increase in the kidnapping of aid workers.  
 Between March and August 2009, five groups of international humanitarian workers were 
kidnapped throughout Darfur. At the moment of writing, two international aid workers remain hostage 
following their abduction in July in North Darfur (USAID, 2009). “Much of this violence is clearly 
condoned by Khartoum in a ruthless war of attrition against humanitarian operations” (Reeves, 2009). In 
2008, the WFP even put the following plea on its website: “We urge other groups who have seized trucks 
and drivers to release them, unharmed. At stake are thousands of people in Darfur, who are reliant on the 
food lifeline the relief truck convoys provide” (World Food Programme, 2008a). 
 In March 2009, the GoS singlehandedly decided to expel 13 important international aid groups. 
The decision to expel the aid groups was made well before the International Criminal Court announced its 
arrest warrant for the Sudanese president Al-Bashir, but seems to be clearly linked to this event. The GoS 
accused the NGOs of collaborating with the Court by providing evidence and helping prosecutors gather 
testimony from victims (Addario and Polgreen, 2009). The aid agencies affected include the International 
Rescue Committee, CARE, Oxfam Great Britain, Save the Children and Médecins Sans Frontières. 
Together, they represent about 40 percent of the international and local aid workers in Darfur. Although 
other NGOs announced their intention to take over wherever possible, the decision by Khartoum was 
expected to leave 1.1 million people without food (MacFarquhar and Simons, 2009). 
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Map 3: Decline of humanitarian access 2006-2008 (Young and Maxwell, 2009: 13). 
 
 
Map 4: Humanitarian access as of July 2009 (United Nations Office for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 
2009). 
 
 The expulsion of the aid workers was carried out with utmost efficiency as well as aggression. 
Government forces arrived at the offices of several charities and ordered workers to leave, before seizing 
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valuable equipment (Addario and Polgreen, 2009). Some aid workers were detained, while Sudanese 
officials walked off with computers, cash and other assets (MacFarquhar and Simons, 2009). The New 
York Times quoted one senior aid official involved saying: “This was in the works for a long time (...). 
They had been waiting for a chance to strike out at these organizations” (Addario and Polgreen, 2009). 
 However, selective provisioning of food is not solely confined to the distribution of relief rations. 
Young, Osman et al (2005: 48) describe the restrictions placed by the GoS on food purchases and 
movements. Buchanan-Smith and Fadul (2008: 12) observe a similar pattern concerning access to trade.  
“Political affiliation now plays a role in terms of access to trade. Politics has forced some urban traders out 
of business, and members of political/rebel movements are given preferential treatment to move 
commodities through areas controlled by their faction.” Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars (2006: 72) note how 
in certain areas, some groups are favoured over others in terms of restrictions on movement and thus their 
ability to farm or herd livestock. In GoS held areas, “Arab pastoralist populations and other tribes aligned 
with the GoS are able to move freely throughout the area, but (...) the movement of the Fur and some other 
groups is extremely restricted.”  
 An example in this regard is the town of Kutum, which hosts an important market for North 
Darfur. Kutum market is vital to the rural areas, including those controlled by the SLA. Furthermore, there 
is now a large IDP camp on the outskirts of the town. Khartoum’s Military Intelligence and Security (MIS) 
carefully monitors and controls access to the market by residents living outside the town boundaries inside 
rebel territory, including IDPs from the camp. These people have to apply for a permit, which allows them 
to buy a limited quota of goods and to transport them beyond the town boundary. The permit is costly and 
only valid for a day. Only the items listed on the permit may be purchased and the goods are inspected at 
military checkpoints. Any goods not specified on the permit will be confiscated (Buchanan-Smith and 
Jaspars, 2006: 72). 
 
3.4.5 The (un)intentional effects of Food Aid on the conflict  
 
Although accounts of Food Aid distribution in Darfur have generally been favourable, especially when 
taking the sheer magnitude of the operation into account, some malignant effects of Food Aid have been 
recorded. Young, Osman et al. (2005: 46) describe how Food Aid is generally biased against the Arab 
population.  
“[S]ince the first major international relief programmes of the 1980s, Arab groups have been at 
the back of the queue for relief, in that they are usually considered last and receive less than 
their fair share. Several Arab groups commented that international organisations rarely employ 
Arabs; this is seen as part of their wider marginalisation in Darfur and as a strategy on the part 
of non-Arab groups to dominate these external resources.” 
In the case of Darfur, the fact that these Arab pastoralists were the last to receive relief has also been 
discussed by Keen (1991), who argues that these remote pastoralist groups have a history of being last in 
line for any Food Aid. 
 Furthermore, in some instances, leaders have also been able to distort aid for their own benefit. In 
part due to the disorganised nature of many IDP camps, many groups have become separated from their 
leadership and numbers of aid beneficiaries are therefore not always clear. “In some places, leaders have 
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misused their authority to manipulate and profit from aid distributions” (Young, Osman et al, 2005: 46). At 
a later stage, Young writes: “[r]eports of manipulation [of Food Aid] by sheikh cartels, and resulting errors 
of inclusion and exclusion and over-registration, were widespread” (2007: S50). She reports that in Darfur 
there have been instances of taxation of food and a great deal of manipulation in order to maximise the 
amount of Food Aid to be delivered. Young argues that in Darfur, too little attention has been given to the 
way Food Aid supports “wider local interests, power politics and a developing war economy” (Young, 
2007: S51).  
 Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars confirm this observation. They argue that the ability to influence food 
distribution creates a very powerful position, especially in the IDP camps, where Food Aid is essentially the 
only resource available. The impact of Food Aid is not just confined to the realm of traditional leadership 
but also extends to political and military leadership.  
“The presiding authorities, whether different SLA factions or GoS officers, compete for aid 
resources in areas they control or want to control. The distribution of food aid can be seen as 
legitimising their control, and the more resources they can pull in the better the leadership may 
be perceived. This in turn leads to political leadership being increasingly vocal about needs in 
their particular areas of control, tending to exaggerate numbers in need” (Buchanan-Smith and 
Jaspars, 2006: 122). 
 
 Essentially, targeting decisions made by Food Aid distributors like the WFP not only affect who 
receives which amount of Food Aid, but also stimulates local systems of patronage, which at a later stage 
could be a renewed basis for conflict. In Darfur, it is not uncommon that local leaders charge the group 
members in cash or kind for services like getting the food from the distribution centre. This payment is 
usually one Sudanese pound per household every month directly to the sheikh. A 2007 WFP report 
estimated that 13 percent of households had to pay to receive their relief rations (Young and Maxwell, 
2009: 28).  
 An interesting aspect of these unintentional effects of Food Aid on conflict dynamics relates to the 
question whether organisations like the WFP are responsible for the protection of the beneficiaries of their 
relief, when dangers to these beneficiaries’ security directly arise out of the distribution of the 
aforementioned aid. Observations in Darfur confirm the idea that militia specifically target those groups 
that possess foodstuff or other valuable items, which they can loot. During 2004, Young recorded that IDPs 
did not want to receive any food rations or other types of relief, as they felt this would actually attract 
Janjaweed and security forces to their town. They made it clear that they required protection rather than 
assistance (Young, 2007: S49). This confirms Keen’s (1994: 121) observation during a previous conflict in 
Sudan, where it was not the victims’ endemic poverty, which exposed them to food insecurity but in many 
aspects precisely their assets, which made them vulnerable. These assets combined with political 
underrepresentation of the southern Sudanese peoples, most notably the Dinka, exposed them to the 
exploitative processes by those seeking control over their assets, eventually resulting in famine. A similar 
rationale holds true in the case of Darfur. 
 Young records a gender-based protection issue associated with Food Aid. This related to the need 
for women to venture out of the relative safety of the IDP camps in search of firewood needed to cook the 
WFP rations they received. The risks facing men in undertaking such an endeavour were even worse than 
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those facing women. Men had a high chance of receiving a fatal beating by the militia patrolling outside the 
camps. Women on the other hand were often raped on these trips. To anticipate this danger, the African 
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) occasionally set up firewood patrols, during which they accompanied the 
women on their search for cooking fuel. However, these patrols were occasionally attacked as well, and 
were in any case too irregular to form an effective solution to the problem (Young, 2007: S50). 
 Finally, Gettleman makes the point that food relief has justified far-reaching social transformation. 
The government of Sudan has prioritised attracting large-scale commercial agricultural projects. These 
projects often require significant relocation of populations. This leads smallholder food production to go 
down and commercial food production to go up. Food relief serves as a “subsidy” to this transformation, 
since it keeps the displaced alive. The Sudanese government has been widely accused of running many in 
Darfur off their farms and in turn making them dependent on humanitarian handouts. Their land could then 
be resettled by those loyal to the government (Gettleman, 2008). 
 
3.4.6 Conclusion and theoretical implications  
 
The use of food as a weapon in Darfur bears strong resemblance to the theoretical framework outlined in 
the previous Chapter. The division made by Macrae and Zwi between acts of omission, commission and 
provision applies to this case, although the lines are sometimes blurred and several acts might qualify for 
multiple headings. It is interesting to note how all three types of acts work to reinforce each other and 
should be seen as part of a complete strategy for civil conflict, used by most sides, in which the use of food 
as a weapon plays a crucial role. Food production and procurement in Darfur forms the foundation under 
the existence of the different ethnic groups living in the region. They are indeed defined by their means of 
food production, as farmers and pastoralists have turned on one another. 
 Furthermore, the four phases described by David Keen (1994: 112) were all present in Darfur. 
First, raiding, looting and the burning of villages disrupted economic life and led to major population 
displacement. Thereafter, victims tried to sell the remaining assets, often out of fear of such assets 
exposing them to more violence. Grain prices initially shot up and the livestock market nearly collapsed. 
However, contrary to Keen’s analysis, in Darfur, the large-scale sale of relief grain had an immensely 
stabilizing effect on the grain market. In line with Keen, the third force consisted of the restriction of non-
market strategies of survival. After the IDPs reached the camps and were unable to farm, they resorted to 
collecting wild foods. However, such trips turned into hazardous expeditions after rebel movements 
virtually laid siege to many of the camps. Finally, Keen predicts that a variety of politically influential 
groups with a stake in prolonging the conflict will try to prevent the delivery of relief. This fourth force is 
also present in Sudan, where the GoS largely engineered the humanitarian crisis. The delivery of Food Aid 
is being undermined on a daily basis. The next section will pay more attention the rationale behind the 
attacks on Food Aid and the use of food as a weapon in general.  
 Figure 5 provides a visual summary of the use of food as a weapon in Darfur. In the previous 
Chapter, I provided four different scenarios relating to the use of food in conflict. The summary provided 
in Figure 5 is slightly different from these scenarios, yet most closely resembles Figure 4. As displayed in 
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Figure 5, the different groups of combatants, whether being government troops, Janjaweed, SLA or other 
militia, fundamentally place themselves as a barrier between civilians, their livelihoods in the form of 
farming and/or herding, the delivery of Food Aid to these civilians and their access to the markets. The 
combatants obstruct this access directly or indirectly, by means of the general level of insecurity they 
create. Yet, the main difference between Figure 4 and 5 is the fact that this obstruction of access is not as 
complete or linear as expected. NGOs manage to reach the civilian population, yet first have to surpass 
combatant restrictions. Similarly, civilians sometimes manage to reach their farms and cultivate or herd, 
yet are often obstructed or can only do so on a limited scale. The red arrows display such incomplete 
access. Furthermore, the grey blocks show that farming and herding, as well as market activity are greatly 
reduced. The dotted lines around the combatants display the obstruction they form in the natural flow of 
the relations between the different forces that make up normal food supply patterns. Finally, excess food, 
which I expected to disappear in Figure 4, has been replaced by the sale of excess relief rations. This has 
kept markets functioning. 
 
 
Figure 5: The use of food as a weapon in Darfur 
 
3.5 The effectiveness of the “hunger weapon”  
 
3.5.1 Introduction 
 
This section essentially deals with the “Why?” question regarding attacks on food security in Darfur. As 
derived from the previous Chapter, attacks on livelihoods and food security essentially serve three different 
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purposes, namely political, economic and military (Macrae and Zwi, 1992: 301). In this section, I will 
outline to what extent these three different “logics” behind the use of food as a weapon apply to the case of 
Darfur and to what extent they are deliberate and important. This section ties in with question nine to 13 of 
the set of questions. The separate sections about these logics are followed by a section analysing the 
theoretical implications of these findings.   
 
3.5.2 The political logic  
 
Flint and De Waal argue that in Darfur “[s]tarvation was not mere negligence – in some terrible instances, 
it was military strategy” (2008: 146). In 2004, in Kailak IDP camp in South Darfur, the death rate appeared 
to be 41 times higher than expected under a normal ‘emergency’. Attacks on villages in Darfur have 
destroyed between 80 to 90 percent of the total and the region, whose population was two-thirds black 
African, is now almost exclusively Arab. A critical part of Khartoum’s strategy has been to contain the 
ethnic groups affiliated with the rebels, such as the Fur, Massaleit and Zaghawa. By creating a human 
catastrophe that forces these groups into IDP camps, their land will become available and can thus be 
resettled by communities loyal to the government. Especially in the wake of the arrival of an extended 
peacekeeping force after the signing of the DPA in 2006, Khartoum has pursued this strategy with more 
aggression. By allowing the Janjaweed to destroy the livelihoods of rebel groups, Khartoum has been 
helping settle friendly peoples. These groups were often resettled in strategic locations, for example along 
the border with Chad, in order to isolate non-Arabs from their kinfolk on the other side of the border 
(International Crisis Group, 2007: 10-11).  
 The GoS is also helping to settle Arabs in areas where demographic change is essential to secure 
electoral victories. In an interview conducted in August 2009, Oriano Micaletti, UNAMID humanitarian 
liaison in Darfur confirms this strategy (Micaletti, 2009). By destroying the livelihoods of the sedentary 
non-Arab groups, who used to farm in these areas, and thus forcing them to either cross over into Chad or 
leave for IDP camps, the leading Arab-dominated National Congress Party (NCP) invests to secure 
electoral victories in these regions for years to come. The Arabs who settle in these areas are not 
necessarily part of the Janjaweed. They only arrive after the original villages are either destroyed by 
Janjaweed militia or given to them by the authorities. Once these groups are in place they are often heavily 
armed by the government on the pretext of maintaining security. However, by settling these groups in 
hostile territory, Khartoum effectively makes them dependent on GoS and Janjaweed protection. Protection 
of these ethnic groups also forms a pretext to supply the Janjaweed and other loyal militia with more arms 
(International Crisis Group, 2007: 10-11). Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars (2006: 33) also report that many 
villages were burnt either by the GoS or the Janjaweed, even after they were deserted. This leads to 
speculations about a GoS strategy to prevent  non-Arabs from returning home. 
 For the Janjaweed it is also important to create a sustainable crisis. In such a crisis, Khartoum will 
continue to depend on its ally in Darfur and supply it with weapons and other necessities. The Janjaweed 
continue to create tremendous insecurity in and around many of Darfur’s IDP camps, as well as in the rural 
areas. Many of the Arab communities have resettled exactly in these rural areas, where most arable land is, 
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and new recruits for the Janjaweed’s militia are drawn from these Arab groups. “[I]ndeed, this is the 
primary form of payment that Khartoum has offered, and the lack of additional land to seize has created 
tensions between various Arab tribal groups” (Reeves, 2008).  
 Furthermore, the population in the camps, although often hostile to the GoS knows that they are at 
the mercy of Khartoum, when it comes to food security. Moreover, the combatants are also aware of the 
power they exercise over the civilian population in terms of livelihoods. Micaletti argues: “To control food 
supply is a way to control the population and their action as well as their vote... this is well understood by 
all parties involved in the conflict” (Micaletti, 2009). When asked whether the combatants utilise the 
control over food supply lines to influence the behaviour of the civilian population to get the outcomes the 
combatants want, Micaletti remarks: “Very often” (Micaletti, 2009). 
 The attacks on humanitarian aid organizations as outlined above also form an essential political 
pressure tool for the GoS. These attacks serve as a way for the GoS to act on its discontent towards the 
West, since many of the aid workers are westerners and the West heavily funds the humanitarian operation 
in Darfur. In the history of the conflict, there have been two major waves of increased levels of violence 
against and obstruction of the work of relief agencies. Above, I described the second wave of attacks, 
which coincided with al-Bashir’s arrest warrant from the ICC in The Hague.  
 The first wave coincided with the potential of a UN intervention into Darfur. In 2006, AMIS 
would be integrated into a joint UN operation. AMIS’ record of accomplishment until then was extremely 
poor and the mission was easily circumvented and overrun by Khartoum. The GoS was afraid of losing the 
upper hand in case of a UN intervention in the country, especially since the mission, lacking the consent of 
Khartoum, was expected to be biased against the GoS. Many humanitarians believed the mere threat of UN 
intervention had increased the dangers facing humanitarians. Khartoum responded with xenophobic 
propaganda, likening Western humanitarians to “new crusaders”. An MSF employee in Khartoum argued 
that “the increased violence against humanitarian personnel results from a deliberate strategy by the 
government aimed at confining aid organizations to garrison towns [and] also at resisting the threat of 
international intervention by holding humanitarian workers hostage” (Flint and De Waal, 2008: 197).  
 
3.5.3 The economic logic  
 
The economic logic of attacks on food security ties in with Keen’s and Rangasami’s argument of winners 
and losers during a conflict famine. Young, Osman et al. (2005: 44) record the economic logic of 
perpetuating conflict famine. Much of the profit that can be made out of a humanitarian crisis relates to the 
mere presence of the humanitarian community. These aid workers need accommodation and often have 
large budgets, which need to be spent on the construction of, for example, watering holes and schools. 
“Profits are being made by those who exploit the situation. Rents for houses and plots of land have 
increased by up to five-fold, and a building boom is visibly occurring” (Young, Osman et al., 2005: 44).  
 Furthermore, the control over territory and trade routes can result in significant economic gains. 
Those lucky enough to be able to access their farms in territory held by the opposing side in the conflict 
can be taxed and traders find themselves stopped at numerous checkpoints, which all require some form of 
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payment. “Those collecting the checkpoint fees and making a livelihood out of providing protection are the 
ones who gain most from the current situation” (Buchanan-Smith and Fadul, 2008: 14). Centuries back, 
Darfur entered into the world economy by means of the camel caravans that crossed its territory. Currently, 
such caravans can consist of thousands of camels with a combined worth of over a million dollars. Those 
controlling the territory crossed by these caravans can make a lot of money by controlling this trade. 
 The question remains what happened to the looted livestock in Darfur. Nobody seems to know the 
full answer to this question. The economic logic of such looting would either entail that those perpetrating 
this crime would keep the livestock themselves, or try to sell it for personal gain. There are only anecdotal 
reports of livestock being taken out of Darfur and sold in Chad. Others report that it was killed locally to 
feed the militia or those who had stolen it or that it was now part of the herds of the looters. However, 
these anecdotal reports cannot be said to be conclusive on this point (Buchanan-Smith, 2006: 47). 
 Profit can also be made from the sale of relief grain rations, as traded in the IDP camps. Moreover, 
these rations partially make it out of the camps and are traded at the local markets. Buchanan-Smith and 
Fadul (2008: 17) mention evidence of military involvement in the trade of these relief rations. This means 
that the same groups that necessitate the distribution of Food Aid, due to the level of insecurity they create, 
are those that benefit economically from this Food Aid. Obviously, this creates a reinforcing cycle. 
 Related to this economic profit resulting out of the continued need for humanitarian assistance is 
the GoS’ seizure of funds of the expelled NGOs in March 2009. The reasons for this expulsion were 
mentioned above. The expulsion and the subsequent confiscation of assets has been a windfall for the GoS. 
In September 2009, Great Britain and the European Commission urged the GoS to return the assets, worth 
millions of dollars. Khartoum however said that it had acted within the confines of the law when it 
expelled the aid groups and was now allowed to redistribute the seized funds as it saw fit (Heavens, 2009).  
Polman (2009: 134) confirms that what the GoS did was within the confines of the crystal clear 
defined Sudanese Organisation of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act. She argues that the NGOs knew 
what they were getting into and that the GoS had employed the rights issued to it by means of this Act 
frequently and heartily before the mass expulsion of March 2009. The NGOs were at the mercy of the GoS 
and were well aware of the fact that the regime turned them into cash cows. She quotes one UN employee 
as saying that it is a public secret amongst NGOs and donors that the GoS makes millions of dollars every 
three months off visas, travel and work permits and the regular extensions needed on all the above. 
Entering and leaving Sudan costs money. Without a permit, foreigners are not allowed to take up residence 
anywhere else then in Khartoum. These permits cost money and need to be reissued every two months at a 
cost. The amount of money and the waiting time involved in obtaining such a permit depend on the civil 
servant processing the permit. 
The GoS’ Humanitarian Activity Council (HAC) has to approve the registration of new NGOs, at a 
cost, and the HAC recruits local staff for them. These local employees are obviously loyal to the GoS and 
function as informants. The Ministry of Finance requires the NGOs to pay income tax and insurances for 
all employees. The Ministry of Communication benefits as well. NGOs are not allowed to equip their staff 
with satellite phones. Instead, they have to get a permit with the Ministry, at a cost, which in turn allows 
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them to take out a contract with the state-owned Internet and telecom provider. Then there are import taxes 
on everything the NGOs require to operate, from their cars, which they have to rent at rental companies 
owned by cronies of the regime, to drugs and relief food supplies. In theory, humanitarian goods are 
exempt from import taxes, but not in the real world, where the GoS makes stunning amounts of money off 
NGOs. Polman estimates that the GoS makes approximately ten million dollars every three months off the 
humanitarian community (Polman, 2009: 133-36).  
 Finally, the primary economic logic of these attacks on food security ties in with the war economy, 
which is emerging in Darfur. As Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars (2006: 35) argue “[a] war economy has 
developed based on looting and extortion, from which certain groups in Darfur are able to benefit” 
(Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006: 35). As the conflict evolved, the political rationale behind attacks on 
food security lost much of its meaning. This was not in the least caused by the fact that the political aim of 
such attacks, namely the resettlement of the most arable land by those loyal to the GoS, was to a significant 
extent realised.  
“Officials monitoring the region and aid groups say that as the rebel groups splinter, they are 
increasingly moonlighting as roving bandits, attacking humanitarian organizations, African 
Union soldiers and whoever else might have the coveted trucks and satellite phones that are the 
means to power in this rugged region” (McCrummen, 2007). 
 
3.5.4 The military logic  
 
The military logic of attacks on food security is more traditional and straightforward. Militia in Darfur 
need to pay and feed their troops. Micaletti confirms that amongst other important fundraising techniques, 
such as relatives abroad, acts of looting and banditry form an integral part of the militia’ strategies 
(Micaletti, 2009). Flint and De Waal note the need of unpaid militia to carry out attacks on food security so 
they can eat. In 1999 and increasingly in 2000, the black African militia started to attract more and more 
young men and needed a source of food.  
“From where were they going to get their supplies? (...)[M]ost often they would look for 
animals to capture and slaughter. If they went after the property of their own people they 
would lose support, so it is better to attack their neighbours, and it so happened that those 
neighbours were Arabs” (Flint and De Waal, 2008: 136). 
 This logic also reflects in the issue of the looted livestock, which was sometimes slaughtered at the 
scene, in order to feed the militia (Buchanan-Smith, 2006: 47). However, when the conflict fully erupted in 
2003, this military logic seemed to give way to a more political and economic logic and attacks on food 
security quickly surpassed those that would be justifiable from a military perspective. “With few 
exceptions, the abuses appeared to have no military ‘justification’” (Flint and De Waal, 2008: 145). 
 
3.5.5 Conclusion and theoretical implications  
 
It seems to be the case in Darfur that, as the parties to the conflict splintered, the use of food as a weapon 
became less deliberate and more a matter of looting for personal gain and for the factions’ own nutritional 
needs. A political rationale was fundamental to the origins of the conflict, and still forms part of the story. 
However, as the conflict evolved and the groups involved splintered, this political rationale, which requires 
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a certain degree of coordination and planning, became less important, not in the least because the GoS and 
the Janjaweed more or less realised their primary political aim. A politically loyal Arab population has 
managed to replace the predominantly non-Arab population of Darfur.  
 Attacks on food security in Darfur now follow the lines of a war economy; the economic gains 
sustain and enrich the militia and from a military perspective, looting and pillaging provide food to feed 
these troops. In my opinion, the prominence of the political logic underlying attacks on food production 
and procurement displays a strong relationship with the degree of organisation and power of the leadership 
of the attacking forces. To carry out large-scale attacks on food security that surpass pillaging and looting, 
for example in the form of acts of omission, combatants require a certain degree of organization. 
Furthermore, I expect that the presence of a binding ideology or shared cultural beliefs might explain the 
importance of this political logic. In the case of Darfur, Arab militia allegedly talked about the black Arabs 
as “slaves” (Sundberg and Stern, 2007). Such slaves were deemed unworthy of the land they occupied and 
the food they consumed. When a common ideology, for example one that regards a certain ethnic group as 
inferior, is present, it might facilitate a more large-scale and organised attack on food security. In the 
absence of such a political logic do attacks on food security acquire a more economic nature, where 
combatants loot and pillage for personal gain. 
 Yet, despite the fact that competition over resources in the form of watering holes and arable land 
was getting increasingly fierce in Darfur, this is in my opinion not enough to warrant such a massive 
operation organized from Khartoum. The GoS could have left the dirty work to the Janjaweed and kept its 
own hands clean. This might have improved its relationship with the West and saved it valuable resources. 
These resources cannot be offset by major oilfields, as was the case in the GoS’ war with the SPLA in the 
South. Flint and De Waal (2008: 149) have asked themselves the same question: “What was Khartoum’s 
calculation? How could it inflict such atrocities on a civilian population, creating such a humanitarian 
catastrophe, and expect to escape crisis at home and censure abroad?” 
 Part of the answer to this question can be found in the fact that the operation in Darfur was in the 
hands of the MIS, which had no interest in either internal dissent or external pressure. While Darfur was 
screened off by the different Security agencies, the rest of the GoS went into denial. Furthermore, 
government leaders miscalculated the extent and the length of the operation, as well as the outrage this 
operation caused in the West (International Crisis Group, 2007). “[B]ecause Darfur has neither Christians 
nor oil, in any significant quantities, they thought that the western world would give them a free hand in 
Darfur, happy to see peace in the South at last” (Flint and De Waal, 2008: 149). These calculations proved 
to be fatally flawed. 
 
3.6 Conclusion and implications  
 
The aim of this chapter was to analyse the use of food as a weapon in the conflict in Darfur, using the 
theory derived from Chapter Two. By applying this theory to the case of Darfur, I was able to distinguish a 
certain pattern in the actions of combatants that manipulate food security in order to get specific outcomes 
that favour their position. 
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 The first section provided a background to the conflict. The conflict in Darfur has economic, 
political, and ethnic dimensions. The competition between Arab pastoralists and African agriculturalists 
over resources, such as land and water, form the main economic dimensions. Marginalisation of Darfur 
within Sudan and the Arabs within Darfur form the political component. Finally, the ethnic component 
means that civilians deliberately are being targeted based on their ethnicity.  
 The humanitarian consequences of the conflict in Darfur have been dire. Close to three million 
people have been internally displaced. Estimates from a number of international agencies put the total 
civilian mortality rate due to the conflict at more than 200,000. This includes deaths from violence, 
malnutrition and disease. These same estimates hold the Sudanese government and Janjaweed militia 
responsible for 79 percent of civilian deaths. Of those killed by the GoS and the Janjaweed, 88 percent are 
civilians. For the conflict as a whole, civilians account for between 65 and 70 percent of all fatalities 
(Genocide Intervention Network, 2009). Many people have lost their homes and their livelihoods and have 
become dependent on relief handouts. The population of Darfur is faced with too few livelihood options to 
construct a sustainable living (Pantuliano et al, 2009: 2).  
 The second section outlined the effects of the conflict on livelihoods in Darfur. This section 
confirmed the suspicion that food insecurity in Darfur is much more an issue of both limited availability of 
food in conjunction with imperfect access to food. In the absence of conflict and very bad droughts, Darfur 
was normally able to achieve food self-sufficiency and the more prosperous parts of the region even 
managed to produce a surplus (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006: 7). Although in Darfur droughts have 
caused massive loss of life during the 1984 famine, the difference with the current conflict-induced famine 
can be found in the undermining of the traditional coping strategies that Darfuris master.  
 As a result of the conflict, traditional agricultural livelihood strategies in Darfur gave way to a 
wage labour economy. This ad hoc economic transformation led the price of labour to drop, following the 
pattern described by David Keen (1994: 112). After raiding and looting disrupted economic life and 
stripped communities of their assets, victims tried to sell the remaining assets, including labour, in order to 
buy grain. This led the price of grain to go up and the remuneration for labour to plummet. However, the 
plummeting of the value of assets in relation to sharp increases in the price of grain, has been partially 
avoided in the case of Darfur, due to the strong presence of Food Aid and the impact of relief grain on the 
local market.  
 In the third section, I noted that the use of food as a weapon in Darfur bears strong resemblance to 
the theoretical framework outlined by Macrae and Zwi in the previous Chapter. The division between acts 
of omission, commission and provision applies to this case, although the lines are sometimes blurred and 
several acts might qualify for multiple headings. Keen predicts that a variety of politically influential 
groups with a stake in prolonging the conflict will try to prevent the delivery of relief. In Sudan, the GoS 
largely engineered the humanitarian crisis and the delivery of Food Aid is being undermined on a daily 
basis. In this section, I presented a visual summary of the use of food as a weapon in Darfur. In this case, 
the different groups of combatants, whether being government troops, Janjaweed, SLA or other militia, 
fundamentally place themselves as a barrier between civilians, their livelihoods in the form of farming 
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and/or herding, the delivery of Food Aid to these civilians and their access to the markets. The combatants 
obstruct this access directly or indirectly, by means of the general level of insecurity they create.  
 The main difference between the situation in Darfur and the scenario provided in Figure 4 of 
Chapter Two is that the obstruction of access to means of livelihoods by combatants is not as complete as 
expected. NGOs first have to surpass combatants’ restrictions, but manage to reach the civilian population 
to a considerable extent. Likewise, civilians sometimes manage to cultivate or herd, but are often 
obstructed or can only do so on a limited scale. Farming and herding, as well as market activity, is greatly 
reduced, but has not disappeared altogether. In Darfur, excess food, which I expected to disappear in 
Figure 4, has been replaced by the sale of excess relief rations, which kept markets functioning. 
 Finally, section four outlined the three different logics behind the use of food as a weapon in 
Darfur, namely political, economic and military. All three logics have been and to some extent are still 
present in this case, yet their relative importance has changed over time. It seems to be the case in Darfur 
that, as the parties to the conflict splintered the use of food as a weapon became less calculated and more a 
matter of looting for personal gain and for the factions’ own nutritional needs. Attacks on food security in 
Darfur now follow the lines of a war economy; the economic gains sustain and enrich the militia and from 
a military perspective, looting and pillaging provide food to feed these troops. An important exception to 
this trend is the fact that the GoS manages to make a considerable amount of money off the humanitarian 
agencies operating in the country.  
 In my opinion, the prominence of the political logic underlying attacks on food production and 
procurement displays a strong relationship with the degree of organisation and power of the leadership of 
the attacking forces. Furthermore, I expect that the presence of a binding ideology or shared cultural beliefs 
might explain the importance of this political logic. 
 Yet, despite the fact that competition over resources in the form of watering holes and arable land 
was getting increasingly fierce in Darfur, this is in my opinion not enough to warrant such a colossal 
operation organized from Khartoum. Government leaders miscalculated the scope and the duration of the 
operation, as well as the outrage it caused in the West (International Crisis Group, 2007). They expected 
that the West would turn a blind eye, since the Darfur region possessed no significant mineral wealth, nor a 
large Christian population, and would give preference to the peace process in the South (Flint and De 
Waal, 2008: 149). It turned out that Khartoum had made a major miscalculation in this respect.   
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Civil conflict and food insecurity in Somalia  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this second case study, I will apply the theory and literature from Chapter Two to the case of Somalia.12 
Just as in the previous case study concerning Darfur, I will be evaluating the hypotheses outlined in the 
first Chapter in order to provide insight into the use of attacks on food security as a weapon in African civil 
conflict. In order to write this case study, I have made use of reports and studies, mainly from the 
humanitarian field, as well as numerous newspaper articles. Furthermore, I have conducted an interview 
with Keith Ursel, Senior Programme Advisor for the WFP in Somalia.13  
 This case study will analyse a greater time span than the previous one. The current state of violent 
anarchy in Somalia is essentially a continuation of the civil conflict, which erupted in the country after the 
overthrow of Siad Barre’s government in 1991. In the 18 years since then, Somalia has effectively only 
known six months of peace (Gettleman, 2009c). In their 2008 report, Jaspars and Maxwell (2008: 8) divide 
the last nearly two decades of conflict in Somalia into three broad phases. The conflict started with the 
disintegration of the state and fighting between clan based militia (1991-2000). This was followed by the 
formation of new governments, undermined by armed opposition by clans, which felt marginalised within 
these new governments (2000-05). The third phase can be characterised as the rise of Islamists and the 
Ethiopian occupation (2005-2009). The last Ethiopian troops left the country in early 2009, having failed to 
stem the insurgency. Currently heavy fighting continues, mainly between government forces and gunmen 
loyal to the Muslim fundamentalist group al-Shabaab,14 which means the Youth in Arabic.  
 However, during these 19 years, fighting never ceased, except for a mere six months following the 
Union of Islamic Courts’ (UIC) takeover of Mogadishu in 2006 (Reuters Alertnet, 2009). Although my 
analysis will emphasise developments in recent years, many current events cannot be explained without 
reflecting on conflict dynamics, which go many years back. Furthermore, by starting my investigation in 
1991, it allows me to analyse how attacks on food security as a tactic in this conflict have evolved with the 
ongoing disintegration of the Somali state. In the previous case study, I outlined how the level of 
organisation and strategy behind such attacks is a reflection of the level of control and organisation of the 
government. Whereas in Sudan, president al-Bashir is firmly in power, in Somalia, there is no such central 
control. 
 Since the period under investigation spans nearly two decades, it is not my intention to provide an 
up-to-date overview of conflict dynamics. I will, thus, analyse and present the outcomes of my research in 
a stylized and not always chronological manner. This enables me to evaluate my hypotheses more 
adequately. Furthermore, following Jeffrey Gettleman, Somalia might well be the most dangerous place on 
earth (Gettleman, 2009c). This obviously affects data gathering. It was not always possible to get the 
                                                 
12
 The focus of this case study will exclude the autonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland. 
13
 For a list of the interviews please see Appendix I. 
14
 The Islamist group al-Shabaab knows many different ways of spelling throughout the literature. For clarity, this is 
the one used here. 
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current or reliable statistics on all aspects of the topic at hand as “few foreign journalists travel into 
Somalia anymore. Kidnapping is the threat du jour... Nowadays, as soon as I land, I take 10 gunmen under 
my employ” (Gettleman, 2009c). The analysis provided in this case study thus serves as an indication of 
the dynamics and rationale behind attacks on food security, rather than a complete and infallible report. 
Similar to the previous case study, it is my aim to answer the “How and Why?” questions of attacks on 
food security, rather than to provide a chronological overview of conflict dynamics. 
 The format for this case study is identical to that of the previous Chapter. The first section will 
provide a background to the conflict in Somalia. This is followed by an analysis of the impact of the 
conflict on the food supply to non-combatants in the second section. The third section revolves around the 
“How” question of the use of food as a weapon, followed by a fourth section dealing with the “Why” 
question. Why are attacks on food security in Somalia an attractive option to combatants? The conclusion, 
finally, will summarise the most important findings from this case study. 
 
4.2 Background to the conflict in Somalia 
 
Few countries in Africa are ethnically as homogeneous as Somalia. Jeffrey Gettleman, East Africa bureau 
chief for the New York Times, describes the country as a “political paradox -unified on the surface, 
poisonously divided beneath” (Gettleman, 2009c). It is one of two countries on the continent where nearly 
all of the inhabitants share the same culture, ethnicity, language, and the same religion (Dowden, 2009: 
93). Yet, in Somalia, everything revolves around clans. “Somalis divide themselves into a dizzying number 
of clans, subclans, sub-subclans, and so on, with shifting allegiances and knotty backstories that have 
bedeviled (sic) outsiders for years” (Gettleman, 2009c). Richard Dowden concurs when he argues that 
“[f]or every generalization about Africa, Somalia is always the exception. And Somalis know it” (Dowden, 
2009: 93). 
 Somalia gained independence in 1960, but it quickly became a piece on the Cold War chessboard, 
due to its strategic location in the Horn of Africa. First the Soviets and later the Americans pumped large 
amounts of weaponry into the poor, mostly illiterate and nomadic country (International Crisis Group, 
2008a). Siad Barre ruled as a dictator from 1969 to 1991, but was at some point referred to as the “mayor 
of Mogadishu”, denoting his practically non-existent control over the country (Gettleman, 2009c; 
Meredith, 2005; Dowden, 2009). “Siad Barre deliberately and deftly used clan affiliation as the main 
instrument for his divide-and-rule tactics” (De Waal, 2002: 161) and when clan warlords finally ousted 
him in January 1991, the country quickly fell apart along clan lines. 
 In the first years after the demise of Barre, warlords turned on each other, using all the military-
grade weaponry left over from the Cold War and turned the country into a battlefield where every port, 
airstrip, telephone pole and any other object of strategic or monetary value was fought over. As Gettleman 
(2009c) argues in Foreign Policy,  
“The chaos gave rise to a new class of parasitic war profiteers—gunrunners, drug smugglers, 
importers of expired (and often sickening) baby formula—people with a vested interest in the 
chaos continuing. Somalia became the modern world’s closest approximation of Hobbes’s 
state of nature, where life was indeed nasty, brutish, and short.”  
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Between 1991 and 1993, large-scale fighting between rival clan based militia took place mainly in 
Mogadishu and in the riverine and inter-riverine areas of Middle and Lower Shebelle, Lower Juba and Bay 
Region, which were the most fertile and resource rich areas of the country (Jaspars and Maxwell, 2007: 
8).15 In 1992, the UN Security Council authorised a limited peacekeeping operation, the UN Operation in 
Somalia (UNOSOM I), mandated to provide security to the delivery of humanitarian aid. Yet, as violence 
continued and this operation could only use force in self-defence, the UN organised a military coalition to 
return peace and security to the country. This mission, which came to be known as Operation Restore 
Hope,16 had the same aim as the previous mission, but a wider array of means to its disposal to accomplish 
this aim. Operation Restore Hope was followed by UNOSOM II, which focused on restoring peace and 
stability as well as national reconciliation in order to create a democratic Somali state. None of these 
missions, however, was successful in creating the much-needed secure environment for the distribution of 
humanitarian assistance. After the well-known “Black Hawk Down” incident in October 1993, which left 
18 US marines dead, the United States, a major contributor to these operations, withdrew. UNOSOM II 
finally pulled back in March 1995 (International Crisis Group, 2008a). 
 By the late 1990s, parts of Somalia were occupied by different militia and some even declared 
autonomous states. At this time, nearly a decade into the conflict, fighting had become mainly “sub-clan 
affairs as a response to crimes, or clashes within clans over resources and political power” (Jaspars and 
Maxwell, 2008: 8). Since 1995, the Western world significantly limited its involvement in Somalia. Yet, 
the Arab world spotted a chance and Arab organizations, many from Saudi Arabia and followers of the 
strict Wahhabi branch of Sunni Islam, stepped in. These organisations provided mosques, Koranic schools, 
and social service organisations, sparking a revival of Islamic sentiments (Gettleman, 2009a).  
 The turn of the millennium saw a peace conference in Djibouti, which led to the formation of the 
Transitional National Government (TNG). The Mogadishu-based Hawiye clan, however, dominated this 
government, and violence fuelled by those clan leaders unhappy with the Djibouti arrangement persisted 
until 2002, when 21 factions and the TNG signed a ceasefire agreement. In the subsequent two years, 
fighting continued as talks dragged on, until in August 2004, a 275-member parliament chosen by clans 
was sworn in in Nairobi, Kenya. This new government, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) 
suffered one fundamental flaw: both the president and the prime minister were close allies of Ethiopia and 
many clans, including the Hawiye, that were strong in the previous TNG now felt marginalised under the 
TFG (Jaspars and Maxwell, 2008: 8-9; International Crisis Group, 2008a). 
 The early 2000s also marked a further increase in Islamist sentiments as Mogadishu’s clan elders 
set up a loose network of neighbourhood-based courts, which delivered a degree of much needed order. 
These courts, based on Islamic sharia law, used medieval but effective techniques. This network came to 
be known as the UIC (International Crisis Group, 2008a; Gettleman, 2009c). 
 Mogadishu’s business community, flourishing against the odds, spotted an opportunity amid the 
chaos. Gettleman recounts how in Mogadishu, there are warlords and moneylords.  
                                                 
15
 For a map of Somalia see Map 5 at the end of this section. 
16
 The actual name of this coalition was United Task Force (UNITAF). 
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“While the warlords were ripping the country apart, the moneylords, Somalia’s big-business 
owners, were holding the place together, delivering many of the same services -for a tidy 
profit, of course - that a government usually provides, such as healthcare, schools, power 
plants, and even privatized mail” (Gettleman, 2009c).  
These moneylords recognised the UIC’s potential to restore a degree of order, at least in the capital. The 
UIC provided protection to the moneylords’ interests without the extortion and taxation that accompanied 
hired gunmen and militia. Thus, the moneylords began arming the Islamists (Gettleman, 2009c). 
 Le Sage and Najid (2002: 11-12) argue that “orthodox” explanations of the civil war in Somalia 
have overstated the importance of clan dynamics as well as environmental stress, and understate the 
economic stratification of Somali society and the role of self-interested elites. Existing socio-economic 
inequalities in society were accelerated by Siad Barre’s nationalisation of arable land, which was then 
again distributed to supporters of the regime, leaving landless Somalis as an underclass dependent on wage 
labour. Warlords, throughout the conflict, have used their militia to appropriate land for agricultural export 
production and livestock shipment. Power struggles between these elites have enflamed competition for 
resources. “In this struggle no groups or individuals can claim outright victory. In fact, many appear 
content with the functioning status quo of competition. Yet, large numbers of outright losers are produced” 
(Le Sage and Najid, 2002: 12). 
 Under UIC rule, Somalia saw the only six months of relative peace. Yet, neighbouring Christian 
Ethiopia, which feared that the UIC might back Eritrean war efforts against Ethiopia, saw the Islamist 
character of the regime as an existential threat. Furthermore, the United States wanted to act upon 
intelligence that a few al-Qaeda operatives were enjoying safe haven in southern Somalia. In December 
2006, the Ethiopian government, with US backing, intelligence, and even some US Special Forces, invaded 
Somalia and routed the UIC within weeks. The TFG returned to Mogadishu (Jaspars and Maxwell, 2008: 
9; International Crisis Group, 2008c: 1-2). 
 There was widespread resistance against the TFG and within days, an insurgency campaign ground 
into gear. This led to large-scale displacement from the capital between February and May and again in 
October 2007. The TFG has failed to consolidate its authority. “Far from shoring up the government’s 
shaky legitimacy, it has deepened public disaffection, inflamed Somali nationalism and intensified the pace 
of religious extremism and radicalisation” (International Crisis Group, 2008c: 1). Furthermore, the 
Ethiopian troops outstayed their welcome (Gettleman, 2009a). The insurgency was, broadly speaking, a 
coalition of three distinct groups; clan militia, most notably Hawiye sub-clans; a small and ever-shrinking 
multi-clan group of former UIC combatants and finally the UIC splinter faction al-Shabaab, the most 
militant, well-organised, well-financed and active of the three (International Crisis Group, 2008c: 11). 
 In February 2007, the UN Security Council authorised a six-month African Union (AU) 
peacekeeping mission (AMISOM). The mandate has been extended ever since, with the most recent 
extension, for seven months, approved on 15 June 2009. However, both the UIC and al-Shabaab 
announced they considered the AU soldiers enemies (Mohamed, 2009).17  
                                                 
17
 For example early October 2009, when Somalia’s two main rebel groups, al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam agreed a 
truce, they announced they would now cooperate to fight both the government and the AU peacekeepers (Mohamed, 
2009). 
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 Early 2008, security worsened dramatically in Somalia. The Islamist insurgents, led by al-Shabaab 
had spread to the Lower Shebelle, Hiran, Bay, Bakool and Juba regions. This was accompanied by 
retaliatory attacks by Ethiopian forces and renewed US airstrikes on Islamist bases. In April, key districts 
fell to insurgents and Mogadishu witnessed some of the heaviest fighting in a decade (International Crisis 
Group, 2008a). 
 In January 2009, it became apparent that the Ethiopian intervention had failed and the Ethiopian 
troops retreated, setting Somalia back to where it had been in 2006, with 17,000 people killed in the 
process. President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, who was an ally of Ethiopia and an enemy of the Islamists, 
stepped down (BBC News, 2009a). Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmad, elected by parliament residing in 
Djibouti in order to avoid the violence back home, replaced Ahmed. Sheikh Sharif enjoys widespread 
grass-roots support inside Somalia and gets extensive help from outside nations, who are counting on 
Sheikh Sharif to tackle piracy and the spread of militant Islam (Gettleman, 2009a) 
 Renewed American engagement with the Somali government translated itself in major weapons 
shipments in order to keep Sheikh Sharif’s government alive. However, the Somali armed forces are “like 
sieves”, with many commanders still maintaining ties to al-Shabaab. Several government officials have 
conceded that a large share of the American weapons have slipped into rebel hands (McCrummen, 2009). 
This is hardly surprising, since Sheikh Sharif’s regime effectively only controls a few blocks in Mogadishu 
and is dependent on the approximately 5,000 AU troops in the country for protection.  
“[I]f those troops were not guarding the port, airport and the hilltop presidential palace called 
Villa Somalia, many Somalis believe Sheik Sharif's government would quickly fall. Insurgents 
have been attacking the peacekeepers relentlessly, often with suicide bombs” (Gettleman, 
2009a). 
 
 Currently, the situation in Somalia seems to have changed little, with massive humanitarian 
consequences. A majority of the population is currently in need of humanitarian assistance and the 
internationally recognised, but practically powerless, government is in no position to alleviate even slightly 
the plight of the local population. Somalia has become the war that nobody seems to be able to win. None 
of the factions seems powerful or popular enough to overthrow the others and some in Somali society seem 
to fare well by the state of chaos that by now has spanned a generation. Gettleman (2009c) argues that 
Somalia does not even qualify for the concept of “failed state” anymore: 
 “To call it even a failed state was generous. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a failed 
state. So is Zimbabwe. But those places at least have national armies and national 
bureaucracies, however corrupt. Since 1991, Somalia has not been a state so much as a 
lawless, ungoverned space on the map between its neighbors and the sea. Since 1991, life in 
Somalia resembles a scene from a Boris Pasternak movie, with large masses of people being 
caught between different armed groups, militia and bandits, constantly being pushed back and 
forth.” 
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Map 5: Somalia (International Crisis Group, 2008c: 32). 
 
4.3 The nature of food supply to non-combatants in Somalia 
 
4.3.1 Introduction   
 
The previous case study confirmed that food insecurity is the result of both limited availability of food 
combined with imperfect access to food. I will now assess whether this observation also holds true in the 
case of Somalia. The situation in this country is fundamentally different from Sudan in general or Darfur in 
particular in the sense that Somalia does not have a government with even the slightest ability to exercise 
systematic control over Food Aid deliveries, like the government of Sudan. Virtually the whole of Somalia 
is in desperate need of Food Aid, with little surplus being produced. Furthermore, due to conditions of 
drought and the absence of the rains in the Horn of Africa, Somalia’s food insecurity is forecast to take a 
devastating turn for the worse in short term. 
 In this section, I will provide an analysis of food production, procurement and livelihoods and how 
these were affected by the current conflict. I will profile the potential livelihoods Somalis can have in the 
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absence of conflict. This draws on data pertaining to the location, climate, and agricultural potential of the 
country, as well as the traditional livelihoods of the population and how these livelihoods operate under 
periods of relative calm. This is followed by an analysis of how the conflict affected this potential and 
these livelihoods. The third section will deal with the population’s dependence on Food Aid and how this 
dependency is affected by the conflict. These three sections will be followed by a theoretical analysis 
drawing on the findings of Chapter Two.  
 
4.3.2 Livelihood potential in Somalia  
 
Somalia is located in the Horn of Africa and shares its borders with Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. It has a 
wide range of climates. The north is very dry, yet allows for pastoralism and oasis agriculture. The south 
provides many possibilities for irrigated agriculture; along rivers, in the Bay and Bakool regions, and even 
in some central regions. Before the conflict, these areas were characterised by huge areas of rice fields, 
banana trees and sugar cane. The central regions beside rivers, where irrigation systems have broken down, 
allow for agricultural activities during the two rainy seasons, the Gu, which ideally lasts from April to June 
and the Deyr, from October to late November or early December (ICRC, 2009).  
 Due to fluctuating climatic conditions, on average, one in every five harvests is a partial failure 
with one in every ten a complete failure. Most parts of the country are structurally food insecure, which has 
been aggravated by the last twenty years of conflict. Furthermore, food insecurity itself also sparked 
conflict as it made the struggle for limited resources more intense (Mattinen and Ogden, 2006: 298-99; Le 
Sage and Majid, 2002: 19). An insightful Somali proverb therefore holds that “when food is not enough, 
there will be a lot of quarrels” (Jaspars and Maxwell, 2008: 1). 
  Just 13 percent of the land is potentially arable, with another 45 percent potentially suitable for 
pastoralism. The two permanent rivers in the country, the Juba and the Shebelle, allow for riverine 
agriculture, using mainly flood-recession and pump-irrigation farming techniques. This production takes 
place on commercial irrigated farms, generally owned by business groups in Mogadishu, as well as on 
smaller rain-fed plots (Mattinen and Ogden, 2006: 298-99; Le Sage and Majid, 2002: 19). 
 In Somalia, several factors combine to cause vulnerability to food insecurity. Conflict and 
displacement are a critical component. Clan affiliation has proved crucial in obtaining access to limited 
resources. Furthermore, droughts, floods, and economic shocks form a structural component of food 
insecurity in the country, which create situations of acute food insecurity and humanitarian crises for large 
numbers of people (Jaspars and Maxwell, 2008: 10 and 12).18 In their study on vulnerability in Somalia, Le 
Sage and Najid (2002: 15) observed that different groups in Somalia survive, prosper and suffer in 
different ways, since they have different mechanisms for adapting to physical and social environmental 
change. They identified over 20 different “food economy groups”. Those important for food security, 
regarding food production and procurement can be grouped into three broad categories.  
                                                 
18
 As an illustration, in the last fifteen years, droughts occurred in 1995/1996, floods in 1997, followed by frequent 
drought between 1999 and 2002 and again in 2005/2006 and 2007 (Jaspars and Maxwell, 2006: 12). Currently, 
according to UN official Mark Bowden, Somalia faces the worst drought in twenty years (Nyakairu, 2009a). 
Conditions of drought have continued for the last five years in Somalia (Nyakairu, 2009b and FSNAU, 2009c: 8). 
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 The first category concerns the pastoralist population. Pastoralism and trade of livestock remain 
the principal livelihood for the majority of Somalis and accounts for approximately 80 percent of export 
earnings per annum. Livestock consists primarily of camels, cattle, goats, and sheep and serves different 
purposes. It provides milk and meat for domestic consumption, as well as hides and skins for export 
(Nyakairu, 2009a).  
Generally, pastoralists derive the majority of their food needs from the purchase of cereals, sugar, 
and oil. Milk and milk products comprise a significant additional food source. The income needed to 
obtain these food items is mainly derived from the sale of livestock and milk and milk products mentioned 
above (Le Sage and Majid, 2002: 16; Montani and Majid, 2002: 3). Le Sage and Majid (2002: 16-17) note 
a strong stratification in the wealth of different pastoralist groups. Poorer groups, whose herds are of 
smaller size, supplement their food supply by activities such as petty trade, gathering of wild foods and 
firewood and casual labour. Furthermore, gifts to the poor from within the clan or community, such as 
lactating livestock, food and cash, are also common. 
In general, pastoralists have been considered the least vulnerable to food insecurity. This can be 
attributed to both political and natural circumstances. Pastoralist clans have historically formed a majority 
in Somalia and this is mirrored in their politico-military power. Furthermore, due to the nature of their 
source of livelihood, which is highly mobile, they have been able to avoid the worst effects of both natural 
adversity and conflict. However, these positive trends have been partially interrupted by continuing 
drought conditions, which have severely limited access to watering holes for animals, as well as two bans 
in recent years on livestock imports from Somalia in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, due to Rift Valley Fever 
(Le Sage and Majid, 2002: 16-17; FSNAU, 2009b). 
 The second group comprises agro-pastoralists. The majority of the agro-pastoralist population lives 
along or between the Juba and Shebelle river valleys. Smaller groups are found in scattered pockets of the 
north-eastern regions. These regions are the most fertile part of the country, and the peoples of the inter-
riverine regions were not accustomed to famine prior to 1991. De Waal quotes one of the proverbs of these 
peoples, which holds that “the drought that hits the south is not serious, but that of the north is terrible (De 
Waal, 2002: 162). Cattle are the dominant livestock species and sorghum the primary cultivated crop. 
Typically, these groups derive the majority of their food needs from their own production, supplemented 
by some purchase. They make some money from the sale of livestock and crops. For poorer groups, this 
income is supplemented by different sources such as petty trade, casual labour and collection of wild foods 
and firewood (Le Sage and Majid, 2002: 18; Montani and Majid, 2002: 4) 
Since 1991, agro-pastoral clans are considered the most food-insecure in Somalia, for reasons that 
will be explained in more depth in the following subsection. Politically and militarily, they have been 
marginalised and they have been the greatest victims of violence after 1991. Poor rains over the last years 
have resulted in poor harvests. This in turn has led to significant asset losses, both in terms of food and 
livestock, and displacement has created large-scale food deficits (Le Sage and Majid, 2002: 18; Montani 
and Majid, 2002: 4).  
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 The third group consists of the riverine populations of the coastal end of the Juba and Shebelle 
rivers. This group generally has very small herds of livestock or no livestock at all. These farmers derive 
most of their income out of irrigated food production, both subsistence as well as cash crop. Poorer groups 
supplement their income with casual labour, mainly on other farms, as well as with petty trading and the 
collection of firewood and wild foods. Dominant pastoralist clans consider riverine farmers a lower caste 
and they were politically marginalised. Since 1991, these riverine communities have been vulnerable to 
discrimination by armed pastoralist militia and were forced off their land when pastoralist militia created 
mutually beneficial alliances with their neighbours. Moreover, natural adversity has also taken its toll on 
these communities, reinforced by the continuing disintegration of irrigation infrastructure that should 
safeguard against disasters (Montani and Majid, 2002: 6, Le Sage and Majid, 2002: 19-20). 
 Finally, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation’s (FAO) Food Security and Nutrition Analysis 
Unit for Somalia (FSNAU), which has been closely monitoring food security in Somalia for the last fifteen 
years, stresses the importance of markets for food procurement in Somalia. “Markets in Somalia play a 
critical role in the economy affecting both the food and livelihood security of the population” (FSNAU, 
2009b). These markets perform an important role regarding both domestic and import/export trade. Due to 
Somalia’s strong pastoralist tradition, the export market for live animals is the single largest in the world. 
All three livelihood groups described above rely on markets to varying degrees to supplement both their 
income and their food supply (FSNAU, 2009b).19 
 
4.3.3 The effect of conflict on the food-supply to non-combatants  
 
Somalia has been in conflict for a generation, yet the country is also prone to natural adversity. As a result, 
it is difficult to assess exactly what the impact of conflict has been on the food-supply to non-combatants, 
controlling for other factors. Jaspars and Maxwell (2008: 13) outline how conflict has increased 
vulnerability to drought and floods in a number of ways. First, due to loss of assets, limited infrastructure 
and in the absence of even the most basic services, livelihood opportunities are severely restricted. 
Moreover, intermittent conflict has led to large-scale displacement or prevented people in other ways from 
cultivating their land. With regard to the riverine communities, they are more vulnerable to flooding as 
essential irrigation systems have broken down in the absence of an effective government. Due to the 
aforementioned appropriation of their land by powerful pastoralist militia, farmers were pushed closer to 
the sea. 
 However, the conflict has also affected food security in ways that are more direct. With regard to 
the first famine that struck after the demise of the state, in 1991-92, Menkhaus noted that “famine had its 
origins in the collapse of the state and the general disintegration of law and order that contributed to an 
economy of sustained plunder” (1994: 148).  
Political marginalisation is a fundamental indicator in explaining vulnerability. De Waal notes that 
the 1991-92 famine was highly selective, striking primarily two groups, the inhabitants of the riverine areas 
                                                 
19
 Pastoralists rely for 40 to 80 percent of their cash income on the sale of livestock and livestock products and cover 
between 30 to 70 percent of their food needs through cereal purchases. Agro-pastoralists and riverine agriculturalists 
alike depend on markets for the sale of their produce, as well as for employment opportunities (FSNAU, 2009b). 
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and IDPs. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) found near-normal levels of nutrition 
among pastoralists and urban residents, but alarming rates of malnutrition amongst agriculturalists in the 
Juba and Shebelle river valleys, with those displaced showing the highest rates of under-nutrition. “The 
famine was the legacy of long-standing power relations, not poverty as such” (De Waal, 2002: 162). In the 
1980s, agriculture boomed in these regions, yet this natural wealth did little to ensure prosperity of the 
farmers. 
 Jaspars and Maxwell (2008: 10) also note how especially minority groups20 living in the Juba, 
Shebelle, Bay and Bakool regions have suffered the consequences of the conflict on their food security. 
Before 1991, they were the most politically marginalised; however, they also inhabited some of the most 
fertile agricultural land. Yet, these minority groups had lower social and political status than the main 
Somali pastoral clans. As a result, they have been systematically dispossessed from their land. “Land has 
been at the centre of these minorities’ problems” (De Waal, 2002: 163).  
First, the Italian colonisers confiscated large tracts of riverine farmland for banana plantations. 
After independence, a new class of urban Somali entrepreneurs used their government connections to claim 
irrigable nationalised land, if necessary by force. In the Lower Shebelle region, for example, this new set of 
landlords claimed much of the arable land. The largest surge in this systematic dispossession of farmland 
took place in the 1980s. Thousands of civil servants, politicians, merchants and army officers seized large 
tracts of riverine farmland, using provisions from the 1975 Land Reform Act. The small local landholders, 
unable to navigate the bureaucracy, lost control of the land their families have been cultivating for 
generations. In the wake of this wave of dispossession, a new Somali elite of capitalist landowners was 
established, matched by an indigenous class of subsistence farmers and day labourers (Worldbank, 2005: 
29; De Waal, 2002: 162-163; Jaspars and Maxwell, 2008: 10). 
The main livestock losses in general occurred during the 1990s. These livestock losses, combined 
with displacement have resulted in major livelihood changes. Former pastoralists now derive their main 
source of income from agro-pastoralism, farming or wage labour. However, this increased reliance on 
agriculture has not necessarily stabilised livelihoods. Migration and sustainable destocking traditionally 
served as a buffer against crop failure. However, by 2004, one-third of livestock owners had already sold 
more animals than required to maintain the herd size. More than 50 percent of the yields since the early 
1990s have been below pre-war averages (FSNAU, 2009b).  
 Conditions of food insecurity abate significantly depending on for example rainfall. However, 
positive developments in environmental and security conditions in the last eighteen years do not enable the 
most destitute populations to improve their plight, due to the aforementioned almost total lack of 
ownership of assets, in terms of land, livestock, cash and even labour. Gains made in times of relative 
                                                 
20
 Minority groups in Somalia are estimated to present roughly 20 percent of the population and include Sab Somali 
(Digil and Rahanwein clans), indigenous Cushitic people (like the Shebelle and Gabwing), as well as Bantu peoples 
(who are not part of the clan system). Furthermore, Somali society knows a variety of marginalised groups, which are 
characterised by the stigma of their occupation relating to ritual “uncleanliness”. The Eyle people, for example have 
traditionally been hunters and the Tumal blacksmiths. None of these groups have been well represented politically 
(Jaspars and Maxwell, 2008: 10). De Waal notes that if the Sab clans are considered second-class citizens, the Bantu 
are third-class (De Waal, 2002: 162). 
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affluence often go towards the repayment of debt or evaporate in inevitable times of drought or flood (Le 
Sage and Majid, 2002: 11). 
 An internal Action Contre le Faim (ACF) analysis, quoted by Mattinen and Ogden (2006: 299-
300) found that food insecurity and famine for the aforementioned marginalised groups in Somalia are 
indeed more a matter of access than of limited availability. “[C]ommercial networks were functional, there 
was no supply dilemma, and people always had an operational market within their reach” (Mattinen and 
Ogden, 2006: 300). Lack of purchasing power is a key problem in this context. Since the start of the 
conflict, the quality of the diet of marginalised groups had deteriorated and a majority of households had 
resorted to “environmentally or socio-economically erosive coping mechanisms, such as over-reliance on 
credit, labour migration and charcoal burning” (Mattinen and Ogden, 2006: 300). 
 Living conditions have worsened, with every conflict year almost without exception being worse 
than the last, and millions now seem to be on the brink of mass starvation (International Crisis Group, 
2008c: 1). FSNAU’s latest Food Security and Nutrition Special Brief of early September 2009 confirmed 
this observation in detail. It argues in bold terms that “Somalia faces its worse Humanitarian Crisis in 
eighteen years, with half of the population or an estimated 3.64 million people in need of emergency 
livelihood and life saving assistance at least until December 2009” (FSNAU, 2009c: 1). Three-quarters of 
those in need are concentrated in the south and central parts of Somalia. This is also the area where the 
heaviest fighting is taking place, severely restricting access in terms of relief (FSNAU, 2009c: 1).21  
Even when harvests are normal or above normal, as was the case with this year’s Gu harvest, the 
benefits of this in terms of both increased supplies as well as lower prices, cannot be passed on to drought 
affected regions.22 Furthermore, the conflict has created new and increased IDP populations in the South, 
which consume much of the surplus that would normally flow north. The conflict also impacts on the 
accessibility of the main road linking the south and central regions, which affects trade from the south to 
the rest of the country (FSNAU, 2009c: 1; UN, 2009: 2). 
This humanitarian crisis is reflected in increased rates of malnutrition.23 Before 1991, malnutrition 
rates in Somalia showed seasonal variations. These variations have disappeared since the start of the 
conflict, presumably due to limited logistical opportunities to transport seasonal surpluses across the 
country. Throughout the conflict, the agro-pastoralist populations of the Bay and Bakool region and the 
                                                 
21
 Somalia faces some of the highest rates of “mortality, morbidity and malnutrition” (Le Sage and Majid, 2002: 10), 
mirrored in the country’s UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.284. This index was derived in 2001, the 
latest UNDP report on the country. Compared to the latest world ranking this HDI would make Somalia the least 
developed country in the world (UNDP, 2001: 44). 
22
 Due to the severe drought, this year the epicenter of the humanitarian crisis is the regions of Bakool, Hiraan, 
Galgaduud, Mudug, Nugaal, Sool, Snaag and Togdheer (UN, 2009: 2). In these regions, the depth of the crisis in is 
severe. Up to 65 percent of the total population is affected by the crisis, of which 73 percent are classified to be in 
Humanitarian Emergency. In these regions, the nutrition situation is alarming. Most pastoralists and agro-pastoralists 
are classified as “Critical”. In the Bakool region, where the situation is even worse, most pastoralists are classified as 
“Very Critical”. “The contributing factors are the acute food insecurity situation, ongoing displacement, and high 
morbidity burden coupled with a complete lack of access to basic services for the affected populations” (FSNAU, 
2009c: 1). 
23
 For an overview of the current nutrition situation, see Map 6 at the end of this subsection. 
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riverine population along the Juba and Shebelle rivers, as well as IDPs, have had the highest prevalence of 
acute malnutrition (Jaspars and Maxwell, 2008: 13-14).24 
Food insecurity as a result of conflict is further compounded by hyperinflation. “Hyperinflation has 
seen the cost of some food staples triple in just six months during 2008” (Human Rights Watch, 2008: 20). 
International Crisis Group reports how prices for essential food commodities have increased between 110 
and 375 percent since the beginning of 2008. Although to some extent this is a worldwide phenomenon, in 
Somalia it seems to hit even harder due to limited coping mechanisms. Somali traders face increasing 
difficulties in buying rice from traditional suppliers like India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Vietnam. Billions of 
counterfeit Somali banknotes, printed in the autonomous Puntland region, as well as uncontrolled printing 
of authentic shillings, have created hyperinflation and most traders are now unwilling to accept the Somali 
shilling. Since January 2007, the shilling depreciated over 165 percent. Hyperinflation has also impacted 
severely on fuel prices and this, combined with sprawling checkpoints, has pushed prices for staple foods, 
especially on more remote markets, beyond the reach of the poor, resulting in a dramatic increase in 
malnutrition (International Crisis Group, 2008c: 18; FSNAU, 2009b). 
Remarkable in this respect are the resilience of both markets and the role of Somali business elites 
in providing some stability. Even under the present circumstances, both markets and trade have proven 
dynamic (FSNAU, 2009b). Although in the case of Darfur, the conflict had eroded trust levels between 
traders, in the clan system of Somalia, which is a high trust society, these networks continue to function 
(Dowden, 2009: 261). “Nothing is written down, everything is on trust. Somalia –within the clans- is a 
very high trust society. Cheat and you die. It works well” (Dowden, 2009: 115). 
 Keith Ursel argues that although conflict has affected agriculture as fewer crops are grown, Somali 
traders still manage to purchase large amounts of food on the international market (Ursel, 2009). Somali 
business elites have played a leading role in developing the country’s economy, by investing in 
telecommunications, food processing and remittance transfer systems (Mattinen and Ogden, 2006: 299; 
Dowden, 2009: 115). Especially this remittance transfer system proved crucial in alleviating the plight of 
Somalis with relatives abroad. The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate in Somalia. The 
abovementioned figure of more than 3.6 million people in need of assistance consists of an estimated 1.55 
million IDPs, displaced by the continuous fighting, 1.4 million rural people affected by severe drought, as 
well as 655,000 urban poor. Approximately 75 percent of the population in need is concentrated in the 
South and South-Central parts of the country (UN, 2009: 1).  
                                                 
24
 Since January 2009, malnutrition levels in several parts of Somalia have increased. According to the most recent 
statistics, one in five children in Somalia can be considered malnourished, while one in 20 are severely malnourished 
and are at an increased risk of death if they do not receive specialist care (UN, 2009: 2; FSNAU, 2009b; FSNAU, 
2009c: 1). 
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Map 6: Estimated nutrition situation Somalia July 2009 (FSNAU, 2009a). 
 
4.3.4 The role and influence of Food Aid  
 
 The WFP has been operating in Somalia since the start of the conflict and from 1999 to 2009 it 
operated with a Protracted Relief and Rehabilitation Operation (PRRO) that provided about 90,000 metric 
tons of Food Aid per annum. The majority of this Food Aid found its way to the South-Central part of the 
country, where the heaviest fighting was taking place. Within this regional distribution, the greater part of 
the deliveries goes to IDPs and the food-insecure rural population. However, with continuous fighting 
taking place in the cities, most notably Mogadishu, the urban populations now also receive food rations 
(Jaspars and Maxwell, 2008: 6). 
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The dramatic increase in the number of people in need of assistance is attributed to a growing 
urban food security crisis, affecting more than 705,000 urban poor, and a deepening rural crisis reflected 
by a 64 percent increase in the rural population in crisis, from 850,000 earlier this year to more than 
1,395,000 currently. In addition, the number of people displaced by conflict is continuing to increase and is 
now estimated at 870,000 (FSNAU, 2009b). 
Currently, in Somalia, the WFP works under the Emergency Operation (EMOP) Food Aid for 
Emergency Relief and Protection of Livelihoods. This Operation replaced the previous PRRO. The current 
EMOP aims to provide Food Aid to 3.5 million Somalis, yet is faced a shortfall of nearly 60 percent of its 
budget. In Mogadishu, the WFP prefers so-called wet feedings, which means the distribution of prepared 
food instead of dry rations, since the latter is more prone to raiding and looting (World Food Programme, 
2009d: 27; De Waal, 2002: 169). 
 
4.3.5 Theoretical implications  
 
In line with the previous case study, Sen’s observation that food security is an issue of limited access in 
conjunction with limited availability of food also holds true in the case of Somalia, especially regarding the 
early years of the conflict. In Somalia, agro-pastoralist, agriculturalist clans and especially Bantu peoples 
have been marginalised economically and politically. As outlined above, the inter-riverine and riverine 
areas of Somalia, the most fertile parts of the country, have known drought, but never like in the North. 
Since 1991, it is precisely these fertile regions, which have suffered most from malnutrition, a reflection of 
their political marginalisation. Furthermore, alternative coping strategies have allowed these farming 
communities to survive times of natural adversity. However, since the 1980s, business elites in Mogadishu 
have exploited these clans and deprived them of their land. Thereafter, they turned their farms into 
commercial plantations mainly for export purposes. The inter-riverine and riverine communities became 
wage labourers and lost the coping mechanisms, which sustained them in the past. 
 The issue of inflation and skyrocketing food prices further confirms Sen’s observation. Somali 
businessmen still manage to buy significant quantities of food on the world market. Yet, this food is 
beyond the reach of many in need due to the monumental depreciation of the Somali shilling, reflected in 
appalling numbers of malnourished children.  
 Green’s argument that without war, drought in Africa seldom resulted in massive loss of life is not 
entirely true in Somalia. Harvests in Somalia are prone to failure. The country is subject to natural disasters 
and has known devastating famines in the past. However, traditional coping mechanisms are undermined 
by the current conflict. Furthermore, malnutrition levels, which used to vary according to season in 
Somalia, are now not only higher than before the conflict but also seem to remain stable throughout the 
year. This implies that surplus producing areas have lost their connection to deficit areas. Transportation 
has become so insecure and costly that food is being moved to a lesser extent throughout the country and 
surpluses are now often consumed by IDPs residing in these areas. 
 The dynamics described by Keen (1994: 112) of how conflict alters livelihoods have been 
observed in Somalia but by no means to the extent witnessed in Darfur. Scorched-earth tactics like 
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employed on a large scale in Darfur, were only sporadic in Somalia and although large IDP movements 
were created, many of these people were able to return to their original livelihoods in times of relative 
calm. Furthermore, conflict has become such a part of Somali reality that a new modus operandi has 
developed that allows the local population to retain some level of normalcy in the presence of conflict.  
Nevertheless, conflict changed the livelihoods of all three groups mentioned above. Most 
pastoralists have seen a gradual shift in herd composition (from camels to cattle) in response to a 
combination of asset losses, insecurity and market incentives. However, this has left them more vulnerable 
to natural adversity, as camels are better able to survive drought than cattle. Grazing mobility has also been 
restricted due to conflict and insecurity. Agro-pastoralists have also experienced asset losses as well as 
displacement. Their political and economic marginalisation has denied them unhindered access to markets. 
They have to supplement their income by working on other fields, leaving little time to manage their own 
and so invest in future food security. Riverine farmers have suffered both from a continuing disintegration 
of the state of infrastructure as well as from the effects of their political and economic marginalisation. The 
latter has left them vulnerable to attacks by well-equipped pastoralist militia and has pushed them to areas 
even more prone to flooding. 
 
4.4 The use of food as a weapon 
 
4.4.1 Introduction  
 
In the previous section, I outlined how conflict directly and indirectly undermined traditional livelihood 
systems. In this section, I will provide an overview of the tactics deliberately used to create food insecurity 
in terms of food production and food procurement. I will use the distinction between acts of omission, acts 
of commission and acts of provision, made by Macrae and Zwi. This overview will be followed by an 
analysis of how Food Aid has affected the conflict dynamics in Somalia. I will conclude this section with 
an overview of the theoretical implications of this case study in the light of Chapter Two. It has to be noted 
at this stage that the information needed to answer these questions is not as complete as that used in the 
previous case study, mainly due to security constraints. Both the WFP and many news agencies have their 
head office in the Kenyan capital Nairobi and only occasionally travel into the country, creating gaps in the 
availability and accuracy of the data. 
 
4.4.2 Acts of omission 
 
For the purpose of this section, acts of omission are defined as instances where “governments fail to 
monitor adequately and plan for food security in all sections of a country; it identifies the failure of 
governments to manage food reserves and to instigate and facilitate appropriate emergency measures” 
(Macrae and Zwi 1992: 301).  
 Defining acts of omission in Somalia is a difficult matter. One could either define the entire 
eighteen years of the conflict as one major act of omission. When strictly interpreting the definition 
provided by Macrae and Zwi above, the subsequent governments of Somalia have certainly failed to 
manage food reserves and abstained from instigating and facilitating appropriate emergency measures. 
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However, such an interpretation does little for our analysis. I feel that the aforementioned definition should 
be interpreted keeping in mind the capacities and intentions of the government.  
 Since the start of the conflict in 1991, the Somali government has hardly ever exercised more 
effective control than within the city of Mogadishu. The subsequent governments in Somalia only 
nominally held power and have always depended on outside forces to retain it. Under such circumstances, 
it would be unfair to expect that these governments, by any means, would be capable to plan for food 
security. A comparison with the previous case study serves to clarify this point. The GoS deliberately sold 
off large food supplies to other countries, while Darfur was starving, and consciously kept infrastructure 
and basic services in the region underdeveloped. Such an intentional strategy on the part of the Somali 
government would be unthinkable considering the practically non-existent control it has exercised the past 
two decades. 
 When thinking about acts of omission, only one policy comes to mind that could qualify as such an 
act. However, the act itself took place under the regime of Siad Barre. The governments after 1991 have 
not been willing or powerful enough to tackle these problems. This situation concerns the systemic 
marginalisation of the (inter-)riverine communities (De Waal, 2002: 163). The expropriation of their land 
undermined food security not only in these regions, but also in the country as a whole. Mogadishu-based 
elites turned the most fertile land into commercial export-driven plantations, and this land lost its surplus 
producing potential for the domestic market. 
 
4.4.3 Acts of commission  
 
Acts of commission refer to attacks on food production and procurement (Macrae and Zwi, 1992: 303; 
Macrae and Zwi, 1994: 13-19). These acts relate to actions, which effectively undermine agricultural 
production and obstruct coping strategies, including attacks on Food Aid deliveries, markets, as well as 
forced population relocation. Contrary to the above-mentioned acts of omission, acts of commission do not 
require a government in effective control, or any kind of broader strategy, although we saw in the previous 
case study that acts of commission can definitely serve to implement such a broader strategy. Acts of 
commission have been much more common in Somalia and it would be impossible and go beyond the 
scope of this research to provide a complete overview of such acts here.  
 Attacks on food production were especially violent in the early days of the conflict. Siad Barre 
undertook a scorched-earth campaign to prevent pursuit as he fled from the capital. This led to the 
immediate displacement of farmers from their land and drastically undercut food production in the fertile 
areas of the Juba and Shebelle valleys. Eyewitness reports of the warfare in southern Somalia following 
Barre’s flight describe “the massive and brutal victimization of the Jubba (sic) valley farmers. They were 
among the earliest victims of warfare, looting and famine” (Besteman, 1999: 18). For several years after 
1991, the farmers of these regions were “repeatedly victimized by the scorched-earth tactics of the ... 
militia as their forces looted, livestock, seeds, tools, and grain, destroyed water sources, raped the women 
and killed the men” (Besteman, 1999: 18). Shields (1993: 39) confirms that “[w]ith each advance or 
retreat, marauding armies and their thousands of armed camp followers looted and pillaged without 
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restraint... Destruction was systematic, with wells, ponds grain stores, seeds and livestock consumed, 
carried off, killed, or destroyed”. 
 As expected, the politically and economically marginalised communities described above suffered 
most from these acts of commission. ““Bantu” refugees... again became targets, as warlords and their 
militia looted their food relief, just as they had earlier looted their homes, their underground silos, their 
maturing crops, and their villages” (Besteman, 1999: 19). Jaspars and Maxwell confirm the fact that 
minority groups in Somalia suffered disproportionally from the violence, and consequently formed the 
majority of the displaced and the famine victims (2008: 11).  
“The principal victims of this violence were weak agricultural communities and coastal 
minority groups caught in the middle of the fighting. Looted of all their belongings, they faced 
a massive famine in late 1991 and early 1992, prompting large international relief operations” 
(World Bank, 2005: 11). 
 Pillaging, looting and scorched-earth tactics were most common during the first decade of the 
conflict. A 2005 Worldbank report argues that the main reason why these activities have become less 
frequent is simply that there is little left to loot that is not already owned by those with political or 
economic power. “Pillaging and looting are less common as well, mainly because most assets are in the 
hands of businessmen with paid security forces protecting them” (Worldbank, 2005: 12-13). The main 
livestock losses also occurred during the 1990s, when clan disputes involved livestock raiding and looting, 
as well as major population displacement (Mattinen and Ogden, 2006: 314)  
 Unfortunately, looting during Food Aid deliveries is still very common. Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) describes how Food Aid agencies need to rely on gatekeepers, who can help carry out distribution 
and guarantee some degree of safety. Yet, the NGOs are forced to draw these gatekeepers from local 
militia. HRW’s 2008 report on Somalia describes the case of a Food Aid distribution in an IDP camp along 
the Afgooye road, where a militiaman guarding food distribution killed a pregnant woman after an intense 
argument. He refused her access because she was carrying two ration cards. In fact, the other card belonged 
to her friend, who was guarding both their qat stalls (Human Rights Watch, 2008: 80-81). Jaspars and 
Maxwell (2008: 25, 33-34) describe similar malpractice during relief distributions. In some IDP camps, 
food rations are not sufficient to last a whole month and IDPs need to leave the camps to either find work 
in Mogadishu, to join food kitchens, or to collect grass or firewood for sale. “People were beaten, or 
robbed when collecting grass, but had to continue to do this because they had no alternative way of getting 
food or income” (Jaspars and Maxwell, 2008: 39). 
De Waal notes, however, how large-scale looting of Food Aid had some positive side effects, as it 
led to a sharp drop in food prices for many commodities on the local market. In January 1992, “when 8,000 
tonnes of wheatflour was looted from a CARE warehouse in Mogadishu port, the price of food dropped 
sharply and tension in the city was appreciably if briefly eased” (De Waal, 2002: 170). 
 Besides direct acts like looting, raiding and scorched-earth tactics, more indirect acts of 
commission are also encountered. Siege warfare features prominently here. For example in May of 2009, 
al-Shabaab and its allies all but seized Mogadishu and sealed the escape routes out of the city (Gettleman, 
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2009c). Furthermore, massive population displacement during the entire conflict has severely affected food 
security, production and procurement. 
 A prominent act of commission concerns attacks on Bakaaraha market.25 This is an open market in 
the heart of Mogadishu and the largest in the country. During the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993, the market 
was the site of the Black Hawk Down incident. This lively market forms the hub of the Hawiye clan’s 
economic power (International Crisis Group, 2008c: 4). Al-Shabaab currently imposes taxation on the 
market to fund its cause. In September 2009, al-Shabaab stormed the market and demanded the traders to 
join their fight or quit their stalls (Nyakairu, 2009b).  
Furthermore, on numerous occasions the market came under fire from TFG rocket propelled 
grenades (RPG). This violence was often said to be ordered by the security forces to coincide with 
negotiations with Hawiye clan elders, in order to frustrate the outcome (International Crisis Group, 2008c: 
6) “Hawiye clan elders saw recurrent attacks on the Bakaaraha market, the city’s biggest shopping district, 
as meant to punish them economically” (International Crisis Group, 2008c: 16). Massive looting always 
followed TFG attacks on the market. The market is sometimes cordoned off for weeks, causing major 
difficulties for consumers and traders alike (International Crisis Group, 2008c: 17; HRW, 2007: 70). 
 
4.4.4 Acts of provision: attacks on Food Aid  
 
This final category of attacks on food security consists of acts of provision, which concern a differential 
supply of food. This often involves control over and diversion of Food Aid. “Food may be selectively 
provided to government supporters, to those from whom support is sought, or to lure sections of the 
populations to areas controlled by the military” (Macrae and Zwi, 1994: 19).  
 Attacks on Food Aid seem to have replaced attacks on domestic food production as a method of 
choice in the last decade of the conflict. This is a logical trend since attacks on food production, combined 
with deteriorating infrastructure, insecurity, population displacement and drought have limited local food 
production and increased the demand for and volume of relief distributions. 
Consequently, humanitarian access, mainly to South-Central Somalia, has been steadily worsening 
during the last ten years.26 These access problems have resulted mainly from chronic insecurity. Menkhaus 
(2007b: 39) lists a number of these security problems, which include wholesale looting of aid warehouses 
or convoys, security problems at airstrips and threats against aid agencies. The latter are an expression of 
grievances over contracts going to members of opposing clans or dissatisfaction with distribution 
decisions.  
“These types of often dangerous disputes have multiplied since 1995, in part because aid 
agency resources are one of the few sources of jobs and revenues (and hence stakes are high 
for local interests to corner them), and in part because the longer aid agencies operate in an 
area, the more grievances they accumulate” (Menkhaus, 2007b: 39). 
 
                                                 
25
 This market knows many different spellings and is sometimes also referred to as Bakara market. The market 
derives its name from the Somali word baqaar, which means grain silo or storage. 
26
 For the latest update on humanitarian access, see Map 7 at the end of this subsection. 
 80 
Kidnapping of national and international staff for ransom has also become lucrative in the current 
conflict situation, leading to the rise of professional kidnapping rings (Ibrahim, 2009; Mushtaq, 2008). At 
the moment of writing, 13 humanitarian aid workers remain kidnapped in Somalia. Since January 2008, 43 
aid workers have been killed in the country (UN, 2009: 1). This chronic insecurity has forced most aid 
organisations to move their headquarters to Nairobi. Only local staff resides in Somalia on a permanent 
basis, with distant expatriate managers giving orders from thousands of kilometres away. Consequently, 
the WFP has difficulty recruiting qualified staff for its operations (Jaspars and Maxwell, 2008: 25). 
WFP compounds are targets of attack. On 16 August 2009, armed militia attacked the WFP 
compound in Waajid in the Bakool region. This was the fourth UN compound attacked in Somalia in three 
months (UN, 2009: 3). Due to this insecurity, UNICEF was forced to postpone the dispatch of hundreds of 
tons of Food Aid to 85,000 acutely malnourished children in south-central Somalia (UN, 2009: 3). 
Between 2006 and 2008, pirates hijacked three WFP transport ships. The WFP needs four ships each 
month to transport about 40,000 tonnes of food. Currently, the organisation depends on the navies of a 
number of countries for protection (Righton, 2008). 
Islamists insurgents, like al-Shabaab, seem to have launched a jihad-like campaign against 
humanitarians. “Recent postings on websites known to reflect hardline Somali Islamist views conflate all 
UN agencies with the West and the US, and consider them legitimate targets” (Menkhaus, 2007b: 39). 
Such attacks are in line with the Salafist ideolody driving these groups. Salafis favour a rigid interpretation 
of Islamic texts. To them, any engagement with the West is tantamount to renunciation of the faith (Abdi, 
2006). However, the Somali government also seems to block relief intentionally. TFG officials have started 
imposing a series of regulatory restrictions on the inflow of Food Aid into Mogadishu, for example 
ordering inspections of shipments so that no expired food would find its way to the capital (Human Rights 
Watch, 2007: 73). However, it lacked the inspectors to carry out this task (Human Rights Watch, 2007: 74, 
Menkhaus, 2007a: 387). In the absence of such inspectors, this had the effect of blocking Food Aid into the 
greater Mogadishu area. “For many, this looked suspiciously like an attempt to starve out the TFG’s 
opposition” (Menkhaus, 2007a: 387). Furthermore, the TFG has made it its policy to restrict relief inflows 
into areas of the capital under insurgent rule (Menkhaus, 2007a: 358).  
“Restrictions included limiting humanitarian agency access to and use of airstrips outside 
Mogadishu (which were essential given the ongoing attacks on Mogadishu International 
Airport); blocking aid convoys; the imposition of new regulations on aid workers and relief 
material, including taxes; and threats to aid workers” (Human Rights Watch, 2007: 73). 
Selective provisioning of Food Aid also takes place within IDP camps, although this seems mostly 
confined to newcomers in already overcrowded camps. Human Rights Watch (2008: 84) recounts how 
“[n]ew arrivals must sometimes wait weeks to be registered and be eligible to receive food assistance. 
Many cannot access the registration system at all”. Due to security considerations and limited staff 
numbers, Food Aid distribution is often left to local leaders at the village or IDP camp level and what 
happens with the food is in the hands of these leaders. Under such conditions, there have been  
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“allegations of widespread diversion of food aid by militia and other powerful actors before it 
reaches the community level, and widespread practices of the redistribution of food aid beyond 
the WFP-targeted recipients at the community level” (Jaspars and Maxwell, 2008: 6). 
Particularly worrying here is the issue of gatekeepers.  
Jaspars and Maxwell (2008: 24) define gatekeepers as “leaders”, who imposed themselves on 
vulnerable, often minority, communities and who control “access, information and resources” in those 
communities. Yet, they do not belong to that group and have their own agenda, “which usually does not 
prioritize the welfare of the community”. In particular, the “leaders” exploited Bantu minorities in this 
way. “In Mogadishu and other southern towns, IDPs have been reported to pay up to 50-75% of their 
earnings or food aid to aid gatekeepers, or are forced to work for the gatekeepers, in part for protection 
reasons” (Jaspars and Maxwell, 2008: 12). Furthermore, IDPs are forced to move to areas where their clan 
dominates in order not to be excluded from relief once it is handed over to the local leaders. 
 
4.4.5 The (un)intentional effects of Food Aid on the conflict  
 
When discussing the (un)intentional effects of Food Aid in Somalia, it is important to take the extreme 
circumstances into account under which this Aid is being distributed. However, Somalia seems to have a 
history of the misappropriation of Food Aid. Somali society is currently anarchic and impoverished to such 
an extent that it would be futile to provide here a detailed analysis of the effects of Food Aid on conflict 
dynamics. It suffices to bear in mind that in a country with little other resources, Food Aid might well be 
one of the most lucrative things to fight over or divert. In a society where the proliferation of guns has 
turned the majority of the population into potential militia and thus where the line between civilians and 
militia has blurred, Food Aid proves one of the few resources that sustain the war efforts. 
De Waal argues that international aid was complicit in Siad Barre’s dismantling of Somali civil 
society. This aid sustained Barre long after he would have otherwise fallen. His government used it 
selectively to reward followers and to ease out the brutish effects of the aforementioned land grabbing. “By 
the time of Siad Barre’s (overdue) overthrow in January 1991, Somalis were deeply cynical about the 
motives of any humanitarian or development assistance. The nature of aid as an incalculable resource 
continued to fuel war after Siad’s fall” (De Waal, 2002: 162). The subsequent struggles to control 
government, which continue today, should be interpreted as attempts to control these valuable resources. 
“Factional leaders mobilized their troops by promising future rewards (through looting and aid), not by 
tangible political reform or economic welfare” (De Waal, 2002: 162). 
 Aid in all its forms has become part of the war economy. Maintaining an ongoing crisis therefore 
benefits an intricate network of business elites, militia leaders and politicians, and these roles often 
overlap. Jaspars and Maxwell recount how  
“there was reported not only to be a link but an overlap between these roles [of businessmen, 
local authorities, transporters and militiamen], i.e. the implementing partners are also 
businessmen, perhaps have  members or relatives on the local authorities (committees) and 
almost always have their own militia. Clan leaders, or members of the committee, in some 
cases may also be militia commanders” (Jaspars and Maxwell, 2008: 24). 
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As I mentioned earlier, in any conflict combatants always seem to be the last to die of hunger. “While aid 
organisations aim to target less advantaged sections of the population and attempt to alleviate the negative 
economic impacts that exist within a stratified system, access to such groups is not without contact with 
and consent from those who hold positions of power” (Montani and Majid, 2002: 2). In Somali society, 
which is highly stratified along clan lines and within clans, combined with the constraints placed on Food 
Aid distributors, it is virtually impossible to prevent Food Aid falling into the wrong hands. The WFP’s 
choice for the distribution of cooked meals in Mogadishu, rather than dry rations, which are more prone to 
looting, reflects this desperate attempt to get food to the civilian population (De Waal, 2002: 169; Jaspars 
and Maxwell, 2008: 16). 
 
Map 7: Humanitarian Access Map Somalia July 2009 (OCHA Somalia, 2009: 7).  
 
4.4.6 Conclusion and theoretical implications  
 
Contrary to my findings in the previous case study, the distinction provided by Macrae and Zwi into acts of 
omission, commission and provision, seems not to be as useful in the case of Somalia. The country has not 
had a functioning government since 1991 and the term act of omission seems ill suited to describe the 
current state of non-policy with regard to food security. Can we speak of an act of omission when there is 
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in fact no act at all? Acts of commission and provision do occur frequently in Somalia, with attacks on 
Food Aid featuring centrally. Attacks on Food Aid can be defined as acts of commission, namely directed 
against the procurement of food. This is the case with violence during relief distribution, as well as the 
looting of rations. However, when such looting practices are of an increased scale, they can serve as 
deliberate diversion of Food Aid. Such acts, technically speaking, could also be classified as acts of 
provision. For clarity’s sake, in this analysis I have placed all instances of looting under acts of 
commission.  
In Somalia, a war economy has developed over the last eighteen years, where attacks on food 
security reinforce a state of chaos and food insecurity, which in turn attracts greater quantities of 
humanitarian aid. This creates a vicious cycle, where militia feed off humanitarian assistance and need to 
maintain a state of violence to continue their war effort. The next section will provide more insight into the 
logic behind attacks on food security. 
Figure 6 provides a visual clarification of the use of food as a weapon in Somalia. Figure 6 seems 
to come closest to Figure 4 described in Chapter Two, yet differs in the level of control the combatants 
manage to exercise over the food supply lines to civilians. This is also the fundamental difference between 
Figure 6 and Figure 5 of the previous Chapter. In Darfur, the combatants manage to position themselves in 
the centre of all food supply lines to civilians acting as a barrier between civilians and their livelihoods. In 
Figure 6 combatants do not function as such a permanent barrier but attack all different supply lines 
(depicted by the red crosses) on such a regular basis that these supply lines are greatly undermined. 
However, no party in the current conflict exercises such a level of control over these supply lines that 
would qualify as a barrier like in the case of Darfur. If there would be any barrier in Somalia, it would be 
the general state of insecurity or lawlessness that all the warring parties together help to create. 
In this model, although farming and herding activities are greatly reduced (depicted in grey), 
markets manage to operate remarkably well. Business elites deserve a specific mention, as they are crucial 
to maintaining some level of food security (at least to those who can afford it). Market activity in Darfur 
was much more strictly managed or controlled by the GoS and the Janjaweed. Contrary to Darfur, 
however, there seems to be no large-scale sale of relief grain on local markets in Somalia. This could be 
explained by the fact that rations might be smaller in Somalia, leaving little excess food to be traded on the 
markets. However, data to test this hypothesis are lacking. Furthermore, the power of business elites and 
their continuous ability to import foodstuff might also prevent the large-scale resale of Food Aid rations, as 
this would undermine their market position. However, this hypothesis would also need further 
investigation. 
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Figure 6: The use of food as a weapon in Somalia 
4.5 The effectiveness of the “hunger weapon” 
 
4.5.1 Introduction 
 
The previous section dealt with the question “how” attacks on food security take place in Somalia. Here I 
observed some interesting differences with the previous case study, relating to the duration of the conflict 
as well as the levels of authority of the governments in Khartoum and Mogadishu respectively. In this 
section, I will deal with the “Why?” question, where I will investigate whether the rationale behind attacks 
on food security is also different in the case of Somalia, and whether these differences have the same origin 
as those observed in the previous section. Again, I have divided this section into a political, economic and 
military component. 
 
4.5.2 The political logic  
 
With the exception of the marginalised groups in the south-central part of Somalia, food production and 
procurement seem to be attacked without the intent to destroy the livelihoods of specific ethnic groups, as 
was the case in Darfur. In Darfur, food security was attacked in such a way that it became impossible for 
non-Arab tribes to return to their previous modes of existence. In Somalia, this is not the case. Food 
production and procurement are temporarily diverted rather than being permanently destroyed, in order to 
benefit a specific group, clan or militia politically or economically. In Somalia, attacks on food security 
serve power relationships rather than genocidal intent. Attacks on food security contain a superficial 
political logic, but politics merely serve to mask a deeper economic struggle for a share in the meagre 
resources of the country. 
The homogeneous nature of Somali society might partially explain this. Although fighting along 
clan lines has continued for nearly two decades now, this fighting is essentially about power relations and 
important government positions. However, there seems to be no deeper ideology at the basis of these 
quarrels. The ability of Somali society to form ever-changing alliances and to unite when faced with an 
external enemy testifies to this. Gettleman argues that “Somali society often divides and subdivides when 
faced with internal disputes, but it quickly bands together when confronted by an external enemy” 
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(Gettleman, 2009a). Keith Ursel confirms that attacks on food security in Somalia are carried out for power 
and profit, but not to realise some broader political goal, as in Darfur.  
“In Somalia attacks and destruction of society both contribute to food insecurity, but here we 
do not see a methodical destruction of farms, livestock, warehouses etc, like I saw in the early 
days of Kosovo. Food and associated commodities, tools etc are stolen for profit and power” 
(Ursel, 2009). 
Ursel does stress that controlling Food Aid flows into specific regions gives militia a valuable power 
resource.  
“To steal it or change the location of the distribution has many benefits to a warring party. It is 
a way to fund a conflict and a way to gain political support from a district of villagers. It is 
much more manipulation of food movement's, then a theft, that is how they see it” (Ursel, 
2009).  
Besteman (1999: 18-19) records how warlords used their large weapon arsenals to acquire food in 
order to maintain their patronage networks. This enabled them to maintain their power grip. The Bantu 
peoples, seen as third-class citizen anyway, were the main victims of such practices (Worldbank, 2005: 
41). 
“After using their arms to cut off the food supply and to undermine the ability of the people to 
produce their own food in areas they wished to bring under their sphere of influence, the 
warlords turned to looting food relief as a strategy to finance the large patronage systems on 
which they relied” (Besteman, 1999: 18-19). 
Thus, attacks on food security do serve a political purpose. However, this political rationale is rather 
shallow and limited to obtaining support and hence power. Yet, this power is only a means to an end, and 
this end is a share in the economic resources. 
Attacks on food security are sometimes a tool in a wider campaign of political discrediting. An 
example in this case would be the arrest in 2007 of the WFP director in Somalia at the time. Prior to the 
arrest, the WFP had started distributing food in mosques in Mogadishu. The local governor, who consented 
to this, was a supporter of Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi. The politician, who controls food 
distribution in the eyes of the population, has a powerful position, and President Ahmed did not want 
Ghedi to appear to be in this position. The members of the National Security Service (NSS), who 
kidnapped the WFP director, were under command of the President (Ursel, 2009; NRC Next, 2007). 
 
4.5.3 The economic logic  
 
Behind clan rivalry and fundamentalism an entirely different motive is helping to fuel the conflict in 
Somalia, namely profit. The anarchy has created a completely new class of opportunists who feed off the 
chaos. They do not pay taxes and do not possess any skills that would be of use in a peaceful society and 
are increasingly and openly teaming up with the insurgents. Gettleman quoted a Mogadishu businessman, 
who started renting out rooms in the former Ministry of Minerals and Water, as saying he will do whatever 
it takes to thwart the government’s plans to reclaim pieces of public property. “If this government survives, 
how will I?” (Gettleman, 2007).  
The Worldbank confirmed this mentality in 2005. The report claims that a whole generation, 
deprived of schooling, saw conflict, plunder and extortion as their only means of livelihood.  
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“Some businessmen were enriched by war-related criminal activities such as weapons sales, 
diversion of food aid, drug production, and exportation of scrap metal. And whole clans found 
themselves in possession of valuable urban and riverine real estate won by conquest, which 
they stood to lose in a peace settlement” (Worldbank, 2005: 11). 
The Somali economy is now largely driven by those whose best interests are served by no government at 
all; the businessmen bringing in expired medicine and baby formula, armsdealers and those harbouring 
terrorists. After the central government imploded in 1991, Somali businessmen took over previously public 
services, and those able to seize abandoned government property, like ports and airfields hit the jackpot. 
Such property can make up to $40,000 a day and is especially valuable, as all humanitarian aid needs to 
come into the country via these privatised ports and airstrips. Food Aid quickly became part of the war 
economy, fought over by militia and diverted by warlords (Worldbank, 2005: 11). 
Thus, these businessmen have a stake in perpetuating food insecurity, as it ensures a steady cash 
flow in taxes from NGOs. Beneath this class of warlords, there exists a whole clan-based network of 
thousands of people, such as truck drivers, clerks, and militiamen, who are all tied into the “chaos 
economy”. Gettleman even recounts how in some areas, IDPs are forced to pay a “shade tax” to local 
residents for resting in the shade of their trees (Gettleman, 2007). Furthermore, on the lowest level, the 
state of lawlessness allows for looting. De Waal recounts how looting served commercial purposes, 
particularly in the case of the large-scale theft of cattle for export to Kenya (De Waal, 2002: 165). The 
chaos also opened up opportunities for extortion. “Some villages came to agreements with the Marehan 
forces; they would pay a certain amount of animals or grain as a tribute, or collect tribute from other 
villages, in return for being left in peace”(De Waal, 2002: 165). 
Consequently, instances of pillaging and looting only declined when nearly all public or valuable 
property was owned by powerful elites, whose interests would be hurt by a continuous state of conflict. 
Furthermore, the Worldbank report (2005:12) notes that pillaging and looting only really subsided when 
Somali business interests shifted away from profits that could be made out of the war economy towards 
other quasi-legal business ventures, which actually needed security to flourish. 
 
4.5.4 The military logic  
 
Finally, the military logic of attacks on food security is most obvious. For many young and illiterate 
Somalis, becoming a militiaman is a regular job decision. Being a militiaman and having a weapon 
provides a way to obtain food in a country where food is scarce and hyperinflation has put even simple 
staple foods beyond the reach of many. De Waal (2002: 164) recounts how “militia looted to sustain 
themselves, storming villages at night and carrying away what they could, and exacting taxes at 
checkpoints on roads and villages” (De Waal, 2002: 164). According to De Waal, looting was sometimes 
systematically organised. “[The troops] would see the smoke from cooking, and come to that place and 
loot the food for themselves” (De Waal, 2002: 165). 
 
4.5.5 Conclusion and theoretical implications  
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Contrary to the previous case study, attacks on food security in Somalia are much more economically than 
politically motivated. This broader political agenda existed in the early years after 1991, yet as the country 
plunged into chaos, attacking food security became a way to perpetuate a state of chaos and keep lucrative 
Food Aid shipments flowing into the country. Somalia, an arid and fundamentally food insecure country 
without any significant natural resources, has developed a war economy that immensely benefits a few 
powerful elites, sustains numerous others, and has impoverished the masses. To keep lucrative 
humanitarian aid organisations involved in the country there has to be a perpetual humanitarian crisis. 
Attacks on food security are just one way to ensure this. 
 Essentially, the rationale behind attacks on food security in Darfur and Somalia follows the same 
pattern over the years. I stressed in the previous Chapter that such attacks in Darfur now start to follow the 
lines of a war economy, where the economic gains of looting and extortion now sustain and even enrich the 
militia. The conflict in Somalia is 12 years older than that in Darfur and here the war economy has shifted 
into full gear. 
 Moreover, in Somalia, there is no effective government to supervise a broader political strategy 
using attacks on food security. Such attacks out of economic or military gain require much less 
coordination and are thus more prevalent in an anarchic country like Somalia. Furthermore, in ethnically 
homogeneous Somalia, there is no tradition of systematic and politically motivated attacks on one specific 
ethnic group and large-scale acts of omission with the aim of punishing such a group have been absent.  
 
4.6 Conclusion and implications  
 
Drawing on the theory of Chapter Two, I aimed in this second case study to analyse the use of food as a 
weapon in Somalia, in order to evaluate whether attacks on food security in this country are in line with my 
hypotheses as outlined in Chapter One. Furthermore, I have drawn on findings from the previous case 
study to highlight some interesting differences and similarities. The concluding Chapter, which follows 
hereafter, will provide a more elaborate comparison. 
 The first section provided an overview of conflict dynamics in Somalia since 1991. Although 
Somalia is one of the most ethnically homogeneous countries on the continent, here clan dynamics 
undermine national unity. Some argue that traditional explanations of the conflict favour clan dynamics 
and challenging environmental conditions over the economic stratification of Somali society and the role 
of self-interested elites. In the light of the flourishing war economy, this observation seems to hold true. 
Throughout the conflict, warlords have used their militia to expropriate land from (agro-)pastoralist 
communities, subduing them to a class of subservient day labourers. Competition for resources amongst 
these elites has fuelled conflict for nearly two decades and has undermined attempts at stability. 
 The second section analysed the impact of conflict on livelihoods in Somalia. Livelihoods can be 
divided into pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and riverine agriculturalists. Pastoralist clans have been 
dominant in terms of economic and political power and have marginalised the other two groups 
considerably, both throughout and prior to the conflict. Previously rather food secure regions are now at 
the heart of the humanitarian crisis, as coping strategies have been undermined. Moreover, food insecurity 
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for many groups is indeed a matter of access over availability. Markets in Somalia have remained 
operational and dynamic and business elites still manage to import large quantities of food. However, 
rising food prices worldwide, as well as hyperinflation domestically have put even staple foods beyond the 
reach of the needy. Conflict has become such an integral part of Somali reality that the local population 
have adapted in order to retain some level of normalcy. Nevertheless, conflict has changed the livelihoods 
of all three groups mentioned above to a significant extent.  
 In the third section, I found that the theoretical framework provided by Macrae and Zwi, which 
divides attacks of food security into acts of omission, commission and provision, is not as useful as in the 
previous case study. The absence of an effective government in Somalia during the past two decades raises 
questions about the definition of acts of omission, especially with regard to required capacity and 
intentions of a government to carry out such acts. Acts of commission and provision are much more 
frequent, with an emphasis on attacks on Food Aid over food production and procurement. In Somalia, 
such attacks reinforce a state of chaos and food insecurity, which attracts lucrative Food Aid, creating a 
vicious cycle. In the visual summary presented at the end of section three, I outline the lower levels of 
control the different actors are able to exercise over the food supply lines to non-combatants. Furthermore, 
specific mention is made of the important role of business elites in maintaining a resilient and dynamic 
market system. 
 The final section outlined the political, economic and military logics behind attacks on food 
security in Somalia. Although all three logics are present here, there seems to be a strong emphasis on the 
economic rationale behind such attacks. Similar to the case of Darfur, the prominence of the different 
logics has changed over the years, as economic factors replaced political considerations. Currently, such a 
political rationale merely seems to serve an underlying struggle for access to resources. Somalia has 
developed a war economy that benefits a few powerful elites, but has impoverished the masses. Food Aid 
is a lucrative resource, which, in the absence of any significant natural resources, has acquired strategic 
importance. However, this resource will only be available as long as there is a humanitarian crisis, and 
attacks on food security sustain such a crisis. 
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Conclusion 
 
This conclusion first aims to present the main findings from the research, comparing and contrasting the 
previous case studies of Darfur and Somalia, in the light of the central question and hypotheses provided in 
Chapter One. This will be followed by an overview of the policy implications stemming from this research 
with regard to the distribution of Food Aid in African civil conflict. Here I will provide some modest 
recommendations on how humanitarian aid could have less “side effects” and be made more accountable. 
These two sections are concluded by suggestions for further research. 
 
5.1 Main findings from the research 
 
The central research question throughout this research has been the following: What similarities exist in 
combatants’ control over food supply lines to non-combatants in civil conflicts in Darfur and Somalia? Are 
the similarities sufficient to permit generalisations about this issue? It is important to bear in mind here 
that two case studies are insufficient to permit any infallible conclusions, and rather, I aimed to gain more 
insight in the way food is used as a weapon in these two conflict situation. Throughout my research I have 
been guided by the question whether hunger in conflict situations is “man-made” or whether it is an 
unfortunate and unwanted outcome by all sides in these conflicts. Thus, are attacks on food security 
deliberate and rational?   
 I commenced this research with two hypotheses. First, I expected to find a general pattern in which 
combatants use the control over food supply lines to non-combatants during civil conflict as a means of 
power. Second, I assumed that the control over food supply lines differs essentially from the control over 
other resources in the purpose it serves. I expected this purpose to be first and foremost the control over the 
non-combatant population and only thereafter the quest for revenue. 
 
5.1.1 Generalisations about the use of food as a weapon 
 
With regard to the first hypothesis regarding the ability to generalise, I divided my research up into three 
sections. First, I dealt with the effect conflict had on food security and livelihoods in Darfur and Somalia. 
Thereafter, I analysed the different ways this food security is attacked by combatants, drawing on Macrae 
and Zwi’s framework of acts of omission, commission and provision. Finally, I outlined the different 
rationales behind attacks on food production, procurement and Food Aid, distinguishing between a 
political, economic and military logic. I will now provide the major findings from my research with regard 
to these three sections. Thereafter, I will evaluate my second hypothesis. 
 
5.1.1.1 Effect of conflict on livelihoods and food security in Darfur and Somalia 
 
I found many similarities between the two cases concerning the impact of conflict on livelihoods and food 
security. Regarding the origins of food insecurity and famine, throughout this study, the work of in 
particular Sen (1981), De Waal (2002), Green (1994), Keen (1991, 1994) and Rangasami (1985) has 
influenced my analysis. Sen made the important contribution to the debate that food security is much more 
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an issue of both limited availability of food in conjunction with imperfect access to food. Famine is hardly 
ever the result of a lack of food, but more often caused by people being denied access to food. Different 
households are affected by famines in different ways and a famine has never occurred in a functioning 
liberal democracy. Green (1994) furthermore argued that without war, drought in Africa has seldom 
resulted in massive loss of life. Rangasami (1985) and Keen (1994) finally observed that famines are 
highly functional and create winners and losers. 
These observations hold true in both cases. In Darfur, despite unfavourable climatic and 
geographical conditions, the region was normally able to achieve food self-sufficiency in the absence of 
conflict and the more prosperous parts of the region even produced a surplus (Buchanan-Smith and 
Jaspars, 2006: 7). As a result of the conflict, these surpluses disappeared and the breakdown of 
transportation networks cut deficit areas off from potential surpluses. In Somalia, the main victims of the 
succeeding famines were the politically and economically marginalised agro-pastoralist and agriculturalist 
clans and especially Bantu peoples. These communities populate the most fertile parts of the country. Since 
the 1980s, powerful elites in Mogadishu have exploited these clans and deprived them of their land, 
turning these marginalised farmers into wage labourers. Hyperinflation in Somalia reinforced Sen’s 
observation. Somali merchants still manage to bring substantial quantities of food into the country, yet this 
food is beyond the reach of many in need due to skyrocketing food prices combined with a monumental 
depreciation of the Somali shilling. 
 Green’s argument that, without war, drought in Africa has seldom resulted in massive loss of life is 
also confirmed in both cases, yet with some reservations. Both regions are rather food insecure. In Darfur, 
droughts caused massive loss of life during the 1984 famine and in Somalia one in five harvests is a partial 
failure and one in ten a complete failure. However, the effect of conflict is felt in the limiting of coping 
mechanisms. During the 1984 famine, Darfuris chose not to eat their seed or sell off livestock and 
withstood remarkable periods of hunger in order to be able to rebuild their livelihood after the famine. 
Such coping strategies have been undermined in both Darfur and Somalia as people have lost their 
livestock and means of livelihood to raiding and looting. Especially in Somalia, communities have been 
systematically impoverished by continuous conflict. Malnutrition levels used to vary in Somalia according 
to season but are now remarkably stable throughout the year, indicating that surplus-producing areas have 
been cut off from deficit areas as transportation has become dangerous and costly. 
 The dynamics described by Keen (1994: 112) regarding how conflict changes livelihoods, were 
very visible in Darfur, but much less so in Somalia. In both countries, raiding and looting disrupted 
economic life and stripped communities of their assets. Victims tried to sell the remaining assets, including 
labour in order to buy grain. Subsequently, the price of grain shot up, while the remuneration for labour 
plummeted. Yet, in Somalia, scorched-earth tactics like those employed in Darfur, were only sporadic and 
IDPs were usually able at some point to return to their original livelihoods when the security situation 
permitted. A major difference between both cases concerns the price of grain. In Darfur, the sale of relief 
rations allowed the price of grain to remain fairly stable, enabling the majority of the population to afford 
this staple food. Yet, in Somalia, hyperinflation has put such staples beyond the reach of the most needy. 
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5.1.1.2 The use of food as a weapon: acts of omission, commission and provision 
  
In order to analyse the use of food as a weapon in Darfur and Somalia, I made use of the framework 
provided by Macrae and Zwi (1992; 1994), who distinguish between acts of omission, commission and 
provision. Acts of omission are defined as “failures to act” (Macrae and Zwi, 1994: 11) and occur when 
governments fail “to manage food reserves and to instigate and facilitate appropriate emergency measures” 
(Macrae and Zwi 1992: 301). Thus, acts of omission include failures to facilitate relief operations as well 
as the mismanagement of existing food resources. Acts of commission concern the production and 
procurement of food (Macrae and Zwi, 1992: 303; Macrae and Zwi, 1994: 13-19) and relate to those 
actions that effectively obstruct coping strategies and undermine agricultural production. Such acts concern 
attacks on production and procurement, including attacks of Food Aid convoys, safe corridors and markets, 
and forced population relocation. Acts of provision, finally, occur when food is “selectively provided to 
government supporters, to those from whom support is sought, or to lure sections of the populations to 
areas controlled by the military” (Macrae and Zwi, 1994: 19). These acts generally involve control over 
Food Aid in order to obstruct or divert it. 
 In the case of Darfur, the framework provided by Macrae and Zwi proved very useful to describe 
the use of food as a weapon. All three types of acts were present in this case, although the lines between 
the different categories might be blurry at times. It was interesting to note how all three types of acts 
occurred in unison and should be seen as part of a complete strategy for civil conflict, used by most sides, 
in which the use of food as a weapon plays a crucial role. In Darfur, different ethnic groups could be 
distinguished from each other by their means of livelihoods and targeting these livelihoods proved part of 
the genocidal plan drawn up by the GoS to erase the presence of black African communities from the 
region. In Sudan, the GoS largely engineered the humanitarian crisis and the delivery of Food Aid is 
undermined on a daily basis.  
 In Somalia, the distinction provided by Macrae and Zwi is not to be as useful. The definition of 
acts of omission proves difficult to apply to a country, which has not had a functioning government since 
1991. The term act of omission seems ill suited to describe the current state of non-policy with regard to 
food security. Furthermore, attacks on Food Aid can be defined as acts of commission, namely directed 
against the procurement of food, but also as acts of provision. Acts of commission might refer to violence 
and looting during relief distribution. Yet, when such looting practices are of an increased scale, and might 
serve to divert Food Aid, these acts could also be classified as acts of provision.  
 In Darfur, the combatants exercised a greater level of control over food supply lines to non-
combatants, effectively acting as a barrier between civilians and their livelihoods. In Somalia combatants 
do not act as such a permanent barrier but attack all different supply lines on such a regular basis that these 
supply lines are greatly undermined. Yet, no party is powerful enough to exercise the levels of control as 
witnessed in Darfur. In Somalia, the greatest barrier is the general state of insecurity or lawlessness that all 
the warring parties together create. Another difference between the two cases concerns the position of 
business elites and traders. In Darfur, market activity was greatly reduced, as traders encountered 
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significant obstruction from the GoS. Yet, in Somalia, these business elites are in a way the state. They 
profit tremendously from the general condition of lawlessness and are closely interlinked with the militia. 
These militia in turn provide the necessary level of security for these traders to run their business. In 
contrast to Darfur, there does not seem to be a large-scale grassroots resale of relief rations. A potential 
explanation might be that rations in Somalia are smaller. However, it could also be the case that Somalia’s 
“moneylords” obstruct such a resale as it might undermine their own market position. To investigate this 
difference, further research would be needed. 
  
5.1.1.3 The logic behind the use of food as a weapon in Darfur and Somalia 
 
In Chapter Two, in line with Duffield (1994), Keen (1991), De Waal (1989; 2002), Polman (2009), Stewart 
(1998) and Macrae and Zwi (1992), I argue that famine in African civil conflict is highly functional and 
has a distinct political-economic character. A group of winners will act to prolong the state of food 
insecurity at the expense of masses of losers. In short, the creation of famine is often deliberate, with a 
hidden political agenda. Starvation as a tactic of war is effective and cheap in ecologically and 
economically vulnerable societies such as Sudan and Somalia. In order to sustain one’s own group and 
ensure loyalty, it is essential to be able to secure food. On the contrary, to prevent opposing groups to 
secure food will cause their defeat (Stewart, 1998: 563). Furthermore, a famine will almost certainly attract 
Food Aid, which is an economically and politically valuable resource.  
 Macrae and Zwi (1992: 301) identify three primary purposes for attacks on food security; political, 
economic and military. By undermining the ability of communities to produce and procure food, they are 
placed at the mercy of combatants. Moreover, by keeping food supplies limited, merchants can make 
significant profits out of this situation of scarcity. During conflict, some groups become economic 
"winners". Food Aid proves an extremely valuable resource in this regard, not only in the direct economic 
value of the distributed goods, but also in the quantity of jobs and contracts that come in its wake. Finally, 
combatants need food in order to survive and often depend on the civilian population to provide them with 
this.  
 The political logic of attacks on Food Aid was most important in Darfur, although here we saw the 
signs of a sustainable war economy similar to the one that is in full gear in Somalia. Part of Khartoum’s 
strategy of attacks on livelihoods has been to contain ethnic groups affiliated with the different rebel 
groups. By creating a human catastrophe that forced these communities from their land, this land could be 
resettled by communities loyal to the GoS. Such a mass resettlement also served an important electoral 
purpose as Arab groups resettled areas where demographic change was needed to secure electoral victories. 
For the Janjaweed it is also important to create a sustainable crisis, as this will make Khartoum dependent 
on its alliance with this Arab militia to control Darfur. Furthermore, the Arab communities that have 
resettled abandoned areas will continue to depend on the Janjaweed for their protection. Finally, the IDP 
population in the camps, although hostile to the GoS, also knows it is dependent on it in order to get access 
to Food Aid deliveries. This was confirmed by the UNAMID humanitarian liaison in Darfur. Attacks on 
humanitarian aid are a way for Khartoum to pressurise Western governments, as many of the aid workers 
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are westerners and the West heavily funds the humanitarian operation in Darfur. The two major waves of 
increased violence against relief agencies coincided with Western interference in what Khartoum saw as 
essentially domestic affairs.  
 In contrast, in Somalia, food production and procurement seem to be attacked without the intent to 
destroy the livelihoods of specific societal groups, with the exception of the politically and economically 
marginalised groups in the south-central part of the country. Attacks on food security serve power 
relationships rather than genocidal intent. The political logic is very superficial in Somalia and is hardly 
more than a cover for an economically driven struggle for limited resources. This might be explained by 
the ethnically homogeneous nature of Somali society, where clans form and break alliances out of 
pragmatism rather than ideology. Keith Ursel, Senior Programme Advisor for the WFP in Somalia, who 
was previously assigned to Kosovo confirms that in Somalia, there is no methodical destruction of farms, 
livestock and warehouses as seen in more ideologically and ethnically motivated conflicts like Kosovo.  
 This contrast between the ideologically driven conflict in Darfur and the state of chaos in Somalia, 
combined with the presence (Sudan) or absence (Somalia) of an effective government is a very interesting 
observation that ensues from this research. The level of deliberateness and organisation of attacks on food 
security, and hence the importance of the political logic, seem to tie in with the level of organisation of the 
central government, as well as with the presence or absence of a powerful ideology that clearly divides 
certain sections of the population from others. An interesting observation here is how the political logic in 
Darfur became less important as the conflict progressed and the region became more anarchic. It seems 
that the onset of a war economy renders the political rationale behind attacks on food security less 
important. As the parties to the conflict splintered, the use of food as a weapon became less deliberate and 
more economically driven. A large-scale politically motivated campaign against the food security and 
livelihoods of specific societal groups requires a certain degree of coordination. When conflict undermines, 
rather than reinforces, political control, this coordination of a long-term political strategy gives way to 
short-term and direct economic gains by the combatants carrying out the attacks.  
 I strongly encourage further research to investigate whether this observation holds when 
comparing other conflict situations. Cases of anarchy that come to mind would be the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo or Sierra Leone a few years ago, these cases could be compared to, for example, Kosovo or 
Bosnia in the 1990s.   
 With regard to the economic logic, I found in my research that attacks on food security are part of 
a war economy in both countries. The evidence for this was strongest in the case of Somalia. The quest for 
profit seems to be one of the main drivers of the current conflict and a new class of opportunists have 
emerged, which benefits from the current chaos. This chaos has resulted in an appalling humanitarian 
crisis, which in turn led to a major influx of humanitarian relief. The profit that can be made of this aid, by 
means of control or diversion, but also through jobs, contracts and tenders is enormous. Some, in Darfur, 
but especially in Somalia, have become economic winners, at the expense of a great multitude of losers. 
Furthermore, the longer a conflict lasts, the more economic activity will be geared towards those 
enterprises that are profitable in a conflict zone. In Somalia, a whole generation has grown up with few 
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skills that could be of use in a peaceful society. Societal roles start to overlap, where businessmen can be 
militia commanders and politicians at the same time.  
 The military logic behind attacks on food security is most obvious and present in both case studies 
in more or less the same way. Militiamen need to eat. In the absence of a government or a strong central 
command, which takes care of the logistical aspects of their military campaigns, these combatants are 
forced to live off the land and its people. This is a dangerous process, as it blurs the lines between 
combatants and the civilian population, turning the latter into a potential target for attack by opposing 
forces. Furthermore, the promise of a means of livelihood when being a militiaman attracts unemployed 
youths in both case studies, especially when their previous livelihoods have been destroyed (Darfur), or 
when they have grown up in a war zone (Somalia). 
 
5.1.2 The different purpose of control over food supply  
 
My second hypothesis concerned the difference between the control over food supply and the control over 
“traditional” resources. I assumed that the control over food supply lines differs essentially from the 
control over other resources in the purpose it serves. I expected this purpose to be primarily the control 
over the non-combatants population and only thereafter the quest for revenue. Research on resources and 
conflict is substantially larger than that dedicated to hunger and conflict (see for example Herbst, 2000; 
Ron, 2005; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002 and 2004; Duyvestein, 2000; Lujala, Petter and Gilmore, 2005; 
Fearon, 2005; Le Billon, 2004).   
 Literature on resource wars focuses strongly on exportable and lootable resources, which can 
include food, yet only to the extent that it is suited for export in a profitable manner. However, the profit 
margins of locally produced food for the domestic market are too low to make export profitable. Thus, I 
assumed that combatants want to control food supply lines within and into a conflict zone with the aim to 
subdue the local population. This can be done through the omission of measures to ensure food security in 
certain regions, attacks on production and procurement of food, as well as selective provision to punish or 
reward (Macrae and Zwi, 1994: 11-19). I assumed that attacks on food security do not constitute the 
economic foundation under the war efforts.  
 From the analysis provided above on the economic rationale behind attacks on food production, 
procurement and Food Aid, it seems that this second hypothesis should be discarded. I expected that the 
economic purpose of attacks on food security would not preside over the political purpose. Yet, especially 
in the case of Somalia, this hypothesis does not hold. Also in Darfur, where we now note the early stages 
of a war economy, this economic rationale is rapidly gaining in importance. Especially Food Aid seems to 
function to some degree as a “traditional” resource, with regard to its economic importance. As the 
conflicts under study progressed, it seemed that the rationale behind the control over food production and 
procurement and especially Food Aid approaches that of ordinary resources. In some conflict situations, 
such as Somalia, humanitarian aid is one of the last resources left to fight about. To ensure the availability 
of this resource, the humanitarian crisis needs to be sustained. This can be done by directly and indirectly 
undermining food security, by means of acts of omission, commission and provision. 
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 However, the political and military logic of attacks on food security should not be underestimated. 
I would therefore not go as far as to argue that the theory on resource wars is suited to describe attacks on 
food security. I only observe here that some aspects of the use of the “hunger weapon” seem to fall in line 
with resource war theory. To what extent such theory proves useful to explain the economic logic behind 
attacks on Food Aid would be a relevant topic for further research. Furthermore, a more integrated 
political-economy approach can prove useful to explain attacks on food security.  
 
5.2 Policy implications: Mitigating the negative effects of Food Aid.  
 
It would go beyond the scope of my research to identify all the policy implications that arise from it. For 
the sake of conciseness, I have chosen one issue that I feel is most prominent. This issue relates to the 
principal question I was asked when explaining my research to others and concerns the role of Food Aid in 
African civil conflict. In layman’s terms, this question would sound something like: “Oh, so you suggest 
we should stop all Food Aid and just let people starve?” The following section will deal with this question 
and the policy implications that flow from it.  
 In both case studies, Food Aid proved an incredibly valuable resource that can fund or even sustain 
a genocidal regime, as in the case of Sudan, or can be one of the prime spoils of war sustaining a state of 
anarchy, as in Somalia. Many instances come to mind where Food Aid was actually complicit in creating 
and prolonging human suffering, as illustrated by the cases of Biafra, the resettlement policies of the 
Dergue in Ethiopia in the 1980s and the Hutu refugee warriors in Goma in 1994. Should we then 
completely stop delivering humanitarian aid?  
 This is not what I am suggesting. What I do advocate is an open discussion about the perils and 
merits of such aid. This discussion is currently laced with emotion. I suggest that we do not exempt the 
humanitarian system of careful analysis and scrutiny. Humanitarian aid workers feel they have a duty to 
alleviate human suffering, even if that involves helping the bad guys. Their argument goes as follows: If a 
drunk driver kills another driver and ends up wounded in the street, you cannot leave him or her to bleed to 
death, even this drunk driver is entitled to help like any other human being (Polman, 2009: 168). However, 
in my opinion, this argument does not hold. In a democratic society with respect for the law, you get the 
drunk driver to the hospital and afterwards surrender him to the police. The police then, ideally, put the 
driver behind bars and ensure that he does not kill anybody in the future. However, humanitarian aid 
organisations operate in countries where such a legal system does not exist, or only serves one party. They, 
therefore, do carry responsibility for the effects of their aid. 
 The question, thus, is not whether we should refrain from giving any humanitarian aid. The 
question is rather at what point humanitarian principles stop being ethical. When governments and militia 
use Food Aid for political ends, then humanitarian agencies cannot afford to be apolitical. However, 
binding agreements on ethical boundaries within the humanitarian community do not exist. Furthermore, 
the humanitarian community can easily avoid the blame. Many NGOs only specialise in one small aspect 
of aid, in a specific region and can point to other or bigger organisations when things go wrong. 
Furthermore, they point to a failing “international community” or a “lack of political will” to solve conflict 
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and hunger in the world. However, in my opinion, these aid agencies have to acknowledge that they work 
in a world where the political will to solve conflict and hunger simply does not exist.27  
 After the debacle in Goma, the humanitarian community seemed to be dedicated to an extensive 
inquiry into its own operations (Buchanan-Smith, 2003: 9-11). Key players from all over the humanitarian 
field came together. The objective of this meeting, as formulated in the Sphere project’s initial proposal 
(SCHR, 1997: 5) was  
“[t]o elaborate technical standards, which agencies should seek to implement, without 
reference in any way to the rights or aspirations of the assisted beneficiaries and claimants 
risks becoming a self-serving exercise concerned more with agencies’ accountability to 
donors, than the rights of people affected by disaster. We therefore believe that any set of 
‘industry’ standards must first be prefaced by a set of ‘consumer rights’; a beneficiaries or 
claimants charter, which highlights what, under existing international law and declarations, a 
person should have a ‘right’ to in a humanitarian crisis.” 
 
Subsequently, these technical standards were turned into a handbook, the Humanitarian charter and 
minimum standards in disaster response (Sphere Project, 2004).28 However, this handbook provides 
recommendation instead of enforceable rules.  
 A similar industry-based review mechanism, the Active Learning Network for Accountability and 
Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), publishes the Review of Humanitarian Action, of which 
the most recent eighth edition was issued in July 2009. In the seventh edition, John Mitchell noted, “as 
every year goes by it is increasingly clear that the system is unable to assess its own performance. There 
are still no baselines, no agreed definitions of performance and an absence of any kind of mechanism able 
to track performance” (Mitchell, 2008: 17). This is essentially the same conclusion the humanitarian 
community made in 1994. 
 Yet, it is not just the humanitarian community that should take responsibility. It is also up to donor 
governments, the general population, who gives money to fundraisers, as well as the media to demand 
more accountability and better performance on the part of the Food Aid community. With regard to 
ordinary people, Polman (2009: 172) urges to “dare to spoil the mood at national fundraisers: ask the 
humanitarians questions! If they claim that their aid helps, ask who is being helped with that food or those 
drugs. Innocent victims, warlords, or both?” It is important to confront the humanitarian community 
whether doing something is always better than doing nothing. 
 
5.3 Suggestions for further research 
 
From the concluding remarks outlined above, three fields for further research stand out. First, it would be 
valuable to investigate to what extent the degree of effective government control and/or the presence of a 
                                                 
27
 Corruption, especially in the African context, is also often blamed for obstructing the effective distribution of Food 
Aid. Yet, according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, Italy (55) is more corrupt than 
Botswana (36), Poland (58) is worse than South Africa (54) and Bulgaria (72) is more corrupt than Ghana (67) 
(Transparency International, 2008). 
28
 For an overview of the origins of the Sphere Project please see Peter Walker and Susan Purdin. 2004. “Birthing 
Sphere”, Disasters. 28 (2): 100-111 and Buchanan-Smith, M. 2003. How the Sphere Project Came into Being: A Case 
Study of Policy-Making in the Humanitarian Aid Sector and the Relative Influence of Research. ODI Working Paper 
215, July 2003.  
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binding ideology impacts on the importance of the political logic behind the use of food as a weapon. In 
my research, I find evidence for a relation between these factors. However, two case studies are not enough 
to prove such a theory. Thus, this research should be extended to include more case studies, with a specific 
focus on the factors of governmental control, ideology and political logic. 
 Second, it was beyond the scope of this research to evaluate to what extent traditional theory 
regarding the relation between resources and conflict can be useful in explaining attacks on food security. 
However, especially in the case of Somalia, it seemed that humanitarian aid could be identified as a 
resource in a country with little other resources. The question whether humanitarian aid could really be 
defined as such a resource needs to be addressed in further research. 
 Finally, as the previous section on policy implications highlighted, more work needs to be done on 
how to mitigate the side effects of Food Aid. Humanitarian aid workers, despite their promise to remain 
independent, cannot afford to be apolitical when their aid is used for political ends. It is important that the 
levels of accountability need to be improved across the humanitarian spectrum. Currently, market 
dynamics in the relief community ensure that when one organisation pulls out of a country as a protest 
against the misuse and diversion of their aid, others are waiting to fill the gap. This way, it is extremely 
difficult to effect any change and thus to mitigate the negative side effects of Food Aid in African civil 
conflict. Further research is essential to identify mechanisms that can increase such accountability. 
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